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SOCIAL LEARNING FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A LOCAL GOVERNMENT
APPROACH
ABSTRACT
The manner in which man views environmental problems is undergoing a radical 
transformation. Awareness is increasing that past efforts at environmental protection are 
insufficient and that changes, often drastic, are necessary. Clearly, greater understanding 
of natural systems is needed. However, scientific knowledge alone is insufficient. 
Scientific information must be translated into viable policy options. “Sustainability” will 
require increased knowledge of both the natural and social environments. Particularly 
useful will be knowledge pertaining to how scientific information is utilized in the 
process of what has been termed “social learning”. Social learning occurs when society 
undergoes a transformation in the way it views an environmental problem or its solution. 
It often results from perceived changes in the social environment or from crisis 
situations. The focus of social learning is on how a problem is defined, what its scope is, 
or the goals its solution are intended to meet. It is often evidenced by innovative policy 
measures, though not all policy innovations are a result of or result in social learning.
This research integrates theoretical constructs from the literature on social 
learning and policy innovation, together with site-specific information, in the creation of 
a decision-making schematic for environmental policy innovation by the city of Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. A qualitative inquiry was undertaken to interpret human actions taken during 
the development of three innovative policy measures. Case studies were developed and
xiii
examined to determine the degree to which attributes of social learning and innovation 
identified in the literature were evidenced. A decision-making schematic for the 
innovation/social learning process in the city of Tulsa was developed. A survey of policy 
entrepreneurs who were engaged in the innovation process was subsequently conducted 
to determine the cumulative nature of social learning by the city. The overall goal of this 
study was to obtain a better understanding of the process of municipal-level 
environmental policy innovation as a first step toward a sustainable society.
None of the representations of innovation foimd in the literature review portion of 
this research did an adequate job of explaining the innovation/social learning process 
which took place in the case studies examined. As a result of the case study analysis, an 
original decision-making schematic of innovation was developed. The new schematic 
more adequately describes the processes of innovation and social learning. It makes 
clear the points of intervention for both policy entrepreneurs and scientific/technical 
information in the policy-making system, something lacking in the alternative 
representations.
The inadequacy and inaccessibility of STI is a serious barrier which must be 
overcome for environmental policy innovation/social learning to occur. The entrepreneur 
plays a key role in overcoming this barrier. One important method used to overcome this 
barrier is to consult with experts from outside the policy-making circle. Entrepreneurs 
also often serve multiple roles, facilitating the flow of information and ideas between the 
various agencies involved in environmental decision-making.
XIV
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1 Introduction
In recent years, the focus of environmental policy has begun a transformation 
from regulating for environmental protection toward that of “sustainable development” 
(Mazmanian and Kraft 1999). Environmental policy makers currently are wrestling with 
the question of how to adapt the strategies and approaches for dealing with 
environmental problems toward more sustainable ends. Doing so requires the 
development of innovative policy measures which enable society’s institutions to better 
cope with competing demands for its natural and human resources. For purposes of this 
research, innovative policy is defined as "programs or practices which are new to the 
institutions implementing them and which are evidenced by a change in standard 
operating practices”.
Over the course of the last several decades, the City of Tulsa, OK, has earned a 
reputation as an innovative government with respect to municipal environmental policies 
and programs. Three examples of innovative environmental policy are its flood hazard 
mitigation efforts, its municipal solid waste recycling program, and its ozone 
management activities.
During the Upper Mississippi River Basin floods of 1993, for example, Tulsa 
received national recognition for its effective flood control strategies along Mingo Creek 
after enduring decades of destructive flood events. These strategies represent the 
culmination of many years of effort on the part of policy entrepreneurs to alter citizens’
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core beliefs about private property rights and the role of government in reshaping the 
city’s growth toward sustainability.
Confronted with the pending possibility of a shortage in municipal solid waste 
disposal capacity, a successful metropolitan recycling effort was initiated. The resulting 
program, The Metropolitan Environmental Trust (The M.e.t.) has received regional 
praise for its innovativeness. The “Ozone Alert!” program was developed as an effort to 
remain in compliance with federal air quality regulations. In addition to this program, 
the city signed an innovative agreement with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
which allowed the city to design and undertake its own strategies for improving local air 
quality in lieu of applying federally-mandated options.
All three environmental policies (hereafter referred to as Mingo Creek, The 
M.e.t., and Ozone Alert!) were adopted outside the boundaries of the traditional policy 
making model. Understanding the process of environmental policy innovation, and its 
complementary process o f social learning, remains incomplete however (Healy and 
Ascher 1995; Pielke 1995). For instance, several different authors have identified 
different variables as necessary for the innovation process and social learning to occur 
(Milbrath 1989; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Behn 1997; Borins 1998). Others 
have argued that the roles played by policy entrepreneurs and scientific and technical 
information (STI) in »he innovation process have not received adequate attention (Meo 
and Deyle 1993; Meo et al. 1994; Mintrom 1997). Policy entrepreneurs are persons who 
“... seek the adoption of innovative policy into the public domain by formulating new 
ideas and mobilizing support for them” (Roberts and King 1989).
This research has three purposes: (I) to describe the process of innovation which
2
took place in Tulsa; (2) to determine which of the factors identified in the literature as 
key to policy innovation and social learning contributed to Tulsa’s experience, and; (3) 
clarify the roles played by policy entrepreneurs and STI. These goals will be 
accomplished through a qualitative inquiry of the three iimovative policy measures 
mentioned above, as well as an examination of an on-going environmental policy 
dilemma (Lake Eucha).
A review was conducted of the literature on sustainability, policy making, social 
learning and innovation. The review was used to formulate working definitions of social 
learning and policy irmovation. In addition, several conceptualizations of the innovation 
process were identified and described. The elements of these descriptions which best fit 
the dynamic interaction of policy entrepreneurs, scientific and technical information and 
social learning which occurred in Tulsa were identified and utilized in the development 
of a decision-making schematic.
2 Scope of Work
In order to achieve the research goals discussed above, the following major tasks 
were undertaken and are discussed in greater detail in the following subsections:
2.1 Retrospective Assessment
A retrospective assessment of the process of environmental policy irmovation as 
undertaken by the city was conducted to assess the degree to which different attributes 
identified in the literatiure review were present. A case study approach was undertaken 
for each of three policy iimovations: (I) Mingo Creek flash-flood mitigation; (2) 
municipal solid waste recycling and The Metropolitan Environmental Trust; and (3) 
ozone/air quality management. The changes in environmental policy which occurred in
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the city of Tulsa were documented by reviewing literature including (but not limited to) 
technical reports, internal memos, and newspaper articles. For each case, key events, 
issues, and persons that comprised the policy debate were documented. Descriptive case 
timelines were developed to identify policy entrepreneurs, and appear in Appendices A 
through C of this document. The case studies developed, therefore, are empirical 
retrospectives, and the contextural variables are not known with enough certainty to 
develop alternative scenarios of what might have happened.
The case study results follow the same format, beginning with a brief introduction 
to the case. This is followed by a description of the events which precipitated innovation. 
The key innovations are then highlighted and discussed, with particular attention focused 
on the aspects of social learning which were identified. The retrospectives developed are 
key to understanding the nature of the innovation/social learning processes which took 
place. The chapters end with a summary section which places the case study in the 
context of the relevant literature. The following subtasks were completed during the 
development of the case studies:
2.1.1 Newspaper Articles
Newspaper articles served a dual purpose in developing the case studies. First, 
they served as a written record which was used to construct the timeline of events which 
took place for each case. Secondly, review of the articles gives a portrait of the overall 
political context in which decision-making took place. Newspaper articles were obtained 
from two primary sources: (I) Personal collection of one of the policy entrepreneurs; and 
(2) a computer search of Tulsa World database files.
Ann Patton, a former newspaper reporter and current employee of the City of
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Tulsa Public Works Department, has kept several scrapbooks of news clippings relating 
to many issues over the past 30 years. These scrapbooks were catalogued into a 
searchable Microsoft Access database containing over 16,000 entries. In the course of 
cataloguing the scrapbooks, they were searched for articles pertinent to each o f the three 
cases. All articles found in such a manner were copied, and sorted according to case and 
date for further analysis.
The second source for newspaper articles is the CD-ROM database available for 
the Tulsa World. This searchable database dates back to 1989. A keyword search was 
done for each of the three cases, as well as the Lake Eucha case (to be discussed in a 
subsequent section). This allowed the researcher to obtain pertinent articles which may 
not have been available from Ms. Patton. The result of both efforts is a collection of 
2905 articles distributed across the cases as follows: Mingo Creek (1264), The M.e.t. 
(810), Ozone Alert! (653), and Lake Eucha (178).
2.1.2 Technical Reports, Internal Memos, Meeting Minutes, etc.
A variety of other pertinent written documentation also was analyzed in the 
development of the case studies. This includes documents such as U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers technical reports, feasibility reports, consultant reports, reports generated by 
the City of Tulsa, Indian Nations Council of Governments (INCOG) planning 
documents, minutes from meetings discussing the various policy decisions, and internal 
memos. In much the same way as the newspaper articles, these documents served as a 
written record of what actually occurred during the time periods o f interest. 
Approximately 100 such documents were obtained for the Mingo Creek case, 75 for the 
solid waste case, and over 1000 for the ozone case.
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2.1.3 Policy Entrepreneur Interviews
Data obtained from available written resources were supplemented with 
information obtained from personal interviews with policy entrepreneurs active in the 
policy debate. Policy entrepreneurs were chosen for the interviews because of: 1) the 
availability of adequate background material, and; 2) the focus of the research on 
clarification of the roles played by policy entrepreneurs in the innovation/social learning 
process. Interviews were conducted in an informal, open-ended manner and centered 
around two or three general questions. “The purpose of open-ended interviewing is ... to 
access the perspective of the person being interviewed” (Patton 1980). This method of 
interviewing allowed information revealed at the time of the interview to guide the rest of 
the questioning. Interviews were conducted in person when possible, however, time and 
location constraints required some interviews to be conducted over the telephone. In all, 
twenty-eight interviews were conducted, each lasting for approximately one hour. All 
interviews were recorded on audio cassettes and transcribed for later examination. 
Personal notes also were taken during the interview process to record the interviewer’s 
thoughts and reactions to the respondent’s comments.
2.2 Development o f Decision-Making Schematic
Based on the review of the literature, the pertinent case histories, and analysis of 
the response to interviews, a decision-making schematic representative of social learning 
for environmental policy innovation was developed. The process which was undertaken 
can be regarded as a “qualitative inquiry emergent design” approach as the data are not 
designed to fit into predetermined categories. “Qualitative data consist o f detailed 
descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions, and observed behaviors; direct
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quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts; and 
excerpts or entire passages from documents, correspondence, records, and case histories” 
(Patton 1980).
The first action taken in the development of the schematic was to build its 
framework based upon the theoretical underpinnings found in the literature review. This 
was accomplished by first representing the literatme in idealized fashion. These 
idealized versions were then compared with Tulsa’s experience to identify both their 
strengths and limitations in describing the case studies. Examination of the 
representations found in the literature showed that none did an adequate job of describing 
the process as seen in Tulsa. In particular, they did not adequately delineate the roles 
played by policy entrepreneurs and STI. The individual elements of each idealized 
version which applied to the case studies were then reformulated into a decision-making 
schematic for policy innovation as experienced in Tulsa. For this step, all possible 
pathways between “boxes” of the schematic were considered. The framework was then 
“fleshed out” using case-specific information acquired in steps 2 and 3 discussed above. 
This fleshing out step used the case-specific information to eliminate pathways which 
were not observed in any of the case studies. The resulting schematic clarifies the points 
at which the entrepreneurs and scientific and technical information enter the decision­
making process.
2.3 Policy Entrepreneur Survey
A complimentary activity to the development of the decision-making schematic 
was the survey questionnaire to determine the relative importance in the 
innovation/social learning process of several variables identified in the literature as
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important. Such a survey was developed and sent to entrepreneurs active in the three 
case studies discussed above. The survey questionnaire was designed to detail the type 
of information entrepreneurs utilized, their perceived difficulties in the process, the 
factors they judged to be important in overcoming barriers to innovation, and whether or 
not they believed social learning had occurred. The survey instrument consisted of 
closed-ended questions, with answers placed on a scale of 1 to 6, rating the importance of 
the variable in the particular question (Dillman 1978; Sudman and Bradbum 1982). Of 
the 28 surveys sent out, 24 responses were received.
2.4 Decision-Making Schematic Applicability
To determine the nature of policy-oriented social learning by the city, the problem 
of water quality at Lake Eucha, an environmental dilemma currently being faced by the 
city, was examined. Lake Eucha is one of the primary sources of drinking water for the 
city of Tulsa. In recent years, elevated levels of nutrients have been found in the lake, 
causing eutrophication which results in taste and odor problems, as well as additional 
operating expenses for Tulsa’s water treatment facilities. The issue of how to protect the 
city’s drinking water supply, as well as the interests of farmers and others involved is 
currently being addressed by the city of Tulsa. It, therefore, provided a good context 
within which the schematic developed as part of this research could be examined.
A somewhat shorter case study was developed documenting the emergence of the 
issue on the policy agenda using the same methods discussed above. A survey was then 
administered to the political and technical experts active in this debate. The aim of the 
case study was to determine the degree to which the decision-making schematic agrees 
with the current decision-making paradigm operating in the city of Tulsa. The survey
8
results were compared to those of the policy entrepreneurs.
3 Contents of Dissertation
Chapter 1 provides a general introduction to the research hypothesis and major 
objectives of this research. The literature review is summarized in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 
through 5 present the case studies of policy innovation discussed above. Chapter 6 
reviews the idealized representations found in the literature and introduces the decision­
making schematic for environmental policy innovation and social learning in the city of 
Tulsa. The results of the policy entrepreneur survey for each of these cases are reported 
in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 presents the Lake Eucha case study and survey results. Chapter 
9 contains a brief summary of the research findings, general conclusions, and suggestions 
for future research. Cited references are listed at the end of each chapter.
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review
1 Introduction
This study is based on diverse literature. As such, it requires a discussion of 
terminology at the beginning. For purposes of this research, innovative policy is defined 
as programs or practices which are new to the institutions implementing them and which 
are evidenced by a change in standard operating practices. Policy entrepreneurs are 
persons who "... seek the adoption of innovative policy into the public domain by 
formulating new ideas and mobilizing support for them” (Roberts and King 1989).
Social learning is defined to be a paradigm shift which results in enduring policy 
changes.
The concept of “sustainable development” is currently being advocated at 
national and global scales as the formula for facing the current state of human actions 
toward the environment. However, the meaning of this phrase is unclear. Accordingly, 
the first body of literature reviewed is that of sustainable development. This is followed 
by an overview of policy making in the United States, paying particular attention to the 
policy process model and the role of experts in the policy process. This brief review is 
followed by a discussion of the definitions and theoretical models of policy learning. 
This discussion first presents the various definitions of policy learning which are used as 
a basis for formulating a working definition of social learning. This is followed by a 
discussion of several models o f social learning which can be tested against empirical 
evidence. One overarching principle of the social learning literature is that many 
instances in which social learning occurs result in innovative policy. Accordingly, the
12
discussion of learning is followed by a review of the pertinent literature pertaining to 
policy innovation. Policy innovations are defined, followed by a discussion of models of 
innovation. The final section reviews the literature on social learning/innovation 
specifically related to environmental policy.
2 Sustainable Development
In recent years, the focus of environmental policy has begun a transformation 
from regulating for environmental protection toward that of sustainable development 
(Mazmanian and Kraft 1999). Environmental policy makers currently are wrestling with 
the question of how to adapt the strategies and approaches for dealing with 
environmental problems which were developed over the last several decades toward 
more sustainable ends. Doing so requires the development of innovative policy measures 
which enable society’s institutions to better cope with competing demands for its natural 
and human resources. In order to appreciate the role played innovative policy measures 
in sustainable development, an elucidation of sustainable development and its 
relationship to environmental policy is required.
2.1 Definitions
The term sustainable development includes not only scientific theory (i.e., what 
are the environmental impacts of a proposed action?, how might impacts be mitigated?), 
but also processes of social transformation (i.e., how will society regulate polluters?, at 
what level should regulations be enacted?), concepts of morality (i.e., what level of risk 
is considered “acceptable”?, who should bear the “costs” of pollution?), and concepts of 
economics (i.e., how should the costs of pollution be borne?).
There is currently no universally accepted definition of sustainable development.
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The most oft-quoted definition is that of the Brundtland Commission: “Development that 
would meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987). This definition explicitly includes 
the idea of accountability to future generations. President Clinton also included the 
accountability issue when he created the President’s Council on Sustainable 
Development (Clinton 1993).
Tonn and MacGregor (1998), in their review of the various definitions of 
sustainable development, group definitions into the following categories: global views, 
systems views, future generations, decision theoretic views, public participation, and 
practitioner views. Global views are those which consider sustainable development a 
concept focused on problems affecting the global biosphere. Systems views look at the 
linkages between three main components of sustainable development: “... environment, 
economy, and social/cultural/community health” (Tonn and MacGregor 1998). 
Definitions which focus on intergenerational equity, such as that proffered by the 
Brundtland Commission, are grouped together imder the heading “future generations”.
Decision theoretic views examine sustainable development from the viewpoint of 
what are and are not acceptable tradeoffs. This paradigm introduces the important 
concepts of irreversibility and the precautionary principle. Irreversibility refers to “the 
need to make explicit the closing of potential options by human-initiated permanent 
restructuring of the environment” (Tonn and MacGregor 1998). The precautionary 
principle is intended to make certain that uncertainty regarding the consequences of 
action does not prevent action from taking place when there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage. The public participation definitions make explicit their focus on the
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political process as a mean of working toward a sustainable future. These practitioners 
call for measures ranging from increased public participation in the democratic process to 
a complete overhaul of the policy making procedures. The final group of definitions 
discussed by Tonn and MacGregor are the practitioner views. These researchers 
observed that many of the concepts used by the other groups were included in 
practitioners definitions of sustainable development, with the notable exception of the 
global viewpoints.
Sustainable development is a concept which has many different meanings 
depending upon the context in which the term is used. Whatever the definition, it 
appears to be a concept which is here to stay in its many different forms.
2.2 Sustainable Development and Environmental Policy
Modem environmental challenges share the following characteristics: they 
are interdisciplinary in nature; they are (mostly) anthropogenic in origin; they are rife 
with conflicting interests; and they are socially constructed (i.e., they result from the fact 
that man values certain properties of the natural environment). Their interdisciplinary 
nature will require cooperation both among and between the social and natural sciences. 
One thing upon which most participants in current debates will agree is that man’s 
activities have caused and/or accelerated today’s most pressing problems. Conflicts of 
interests occur in many policy matters. In environmental policy, conflict often arises 
between different parties which have an interest in the problem solution (i.e., 
governments, corporations, environmental interest groups, non-govemmental 
organizations [NGOs]). Often, the conflict centers around policy prescriptions for a 
particular problem, rather than the scientific information. The fact that environmental
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challenges are socially constructed, that is, society must agree that an issue is a problem 
and seek a solution, also can be a source of conflict over which issues are to be 
addressed.
The focus on sustainable development has resulted in two opposing viewpoints 
(representing ends of a spectrum) as to how public policy should address the 
environmental challenges of the next century. The first viewpoint, often termed 
“environmental modernization”, holds that environmental constraints can be accounted 
for via changes in production process and corresponding institutional adaptations. In the 
words of Lee (1993)
“Moving towards sustainability is a two-part process: first, revising the uses of 
the ecosystem so that environmental values take an economically relevant place 
in policy and practice; and second, incorporating the well-being of the ecosystem 
into the way management is conceived and implemented” .
At the policy level, proponents of ecological modernization view environmental 
challenges as opportunities for innovation. They assume that innovations (in both 
technology and policy) which will ensure conservation can be encouraged through the 
market economy (Blowers 1997). The process of dealing with complex environmental 
issues is one of gradual change and adaptation of the current status quo.
The opposing viewpoint is that of the “risk society”. Proponents of this theory 
hold that the environmental challenges faced today are so dire that nothing short of 
radical social and economic changes are needed in order for survival. In contrast to the 
transitional nature of economic modernization theory, this outlook is transformational by 
nature. The proponents offer, however, no policy prescriptions as to how these radical
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changes are to come about. More often they simply offer criticisms of the economic 
modernization theories (Blowers 1997).
These theories represent the extremes along a continuum of ideologies. Each has 
its individual strengths and weaknesses (Blowers 1997). Noticeably lacking from each 
theory is a discussion about the types of political institutions necessary for sustainable 
development. Due to the nature of the environmental challenges to be faced in the near 
future, the proper institutional framework is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
sustainable development to become a reality. The long time-frames and great deal of 
coordination required for the solution of modem environmental problems will require a 
method of decision-making which transcends current short-term, sectoral outlooks.
The concept of social learning is one which may prove useful for the resolution of 
the opposing pressures applied by the search for sustainability and scientific uncertainty 
regarding the nature and degree of environmental problems. Milbrath (1989) argues that 
learning must occur if we are to become a sustainable society. Learning about the way 
in which social and natural systems interact is of particular importance. “In studies of 
sustainable development, some of the most important things learned seem likely to 
include scientific facts and models, [and] ‘policy theories’...” (Parson and Clark 1995). 
This research is an attempt to discover how such interactions promote learning through 
examination of local government case studies.
3 Policy Making Process
Development of a decision-making schematic for social learning regarding 
environmental policy requires understanding how policy is made. The model of the 
American policy making process which is most useful for the purposes of this review is
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that known as the policy process (or policy cycle) model. It originates from a policy 
perspective which White (1994) terms the “policy discourse” perspective. This is a 
perspective which "... links analysis to the broader policy process and describes how it 
shapes that process and in turn is shaped by it. While it links analysis to what is 
politically feasible, it pushes analysis to play a role in defining what is feasible.” (White 
1994) This perspective provides opportunities for policy change to occur and emphasizes 
that institutions and persons both influence what is promoted on the political agenda. 
Proponents of this perspective feel that change (i.e., organizational/social learning) is not 
determined by interests, ideas, or institutions alone, but by the interaction of all three 
(White 1994).
The literature on the policy process identifies at least six stages: (1) issue 
identification/ problem recognition; (2) agenda setting; (3) policy formation; (4) policy 
adoption; (5) policy implementation; and, (6) policy analysis and evaluation (Kingdon 
1984). The first stage involves the perception by the public that a problem does exist, 
and the process of bringing this problem to the attention of decision-makers. This stage 
can involve considerable conflict (Lee 1993).
The agenda-setting stage involves a listing of those problems to which 
government officials (and those persons outside of government yet closely associated 
with government officials) are paying serious attention at any given time. The dominant 
paradigm in the literature is one of many different groups vying for the attention of, and 
actions by, policy makers. According to Kingdon’s (1984) framework, this process is 
dynamic and it is the convergence of “policy streams” during a “policy window” that 
allows “policy entrepreneurs” to persuade decision makers of their ideas.
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Policy streams represent the different problems, politics, participants, and choice 
opportunities available to decision makers. According to May (1986), “The term [policy 
window] embodies the notions that opportunities for particular proposals only occur 
given the “right” circumstances, and that combinations of circumstances are of limited 
duration.” Policy entrepreneurs have been defined as persons who “... seek the adoption 
of innovative policy into the public domain by formulating new ideas and mobilizing 
support for them.” (Roberts and King 1989)
In this dissertation, the next two stages (policy formation and adoption) are 
combined into a generic stage termed “decision-making”. This stage involves the 
enumeration and selection of viable policy alternatives. The literature discusses several 
models of decision-making that may occur within the policy process. They are the 
rational choice model, the satisficing model, incrementalism, and mixed scanning. The 
role of experts in guiding decision making will also be presented. These models will be 
reviewed in subsequent sections of this review.
The final two stages of the policy process are implementation and 
analysis/evaluation. The implementation stage is the actual carrying out of the policy 
decisions. The implementation stage is when the policy administrators actually 
operationalize the policy. Implementation proceeds via either a forward mapping (or top- 
down) or backward mapping (bottom up) trajectory. Policy evaluation is used as a 
process feedback loop to determine the efficacy of the policy instrument in meeting both 
stated and implied goals.
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3.1 Decision-Making Models
3.1.1 Rational Choice Model
The conventional wisdom regarding political decision-making is that it is based 
on rational choice. This model assumes that all decision-makers act as rational 
individuals in a rational world where they have access to all information (Simon 1955). 
When presented with a problem, the decision-makers prioritize their specific objectives 
and values. They then investigate all possible alternative courses of action which may 
help them obtain their stated goals. This investigation includes a review of all potential 
consequences associated with each course of action. The final step is the selection of the 
one course of action or policy which comes the closest to fulfilling the highest ranked 
objective while preserving the highest ranked values. In economic terms, the rational 
decision-makers are “optimizing”, that is they are acting to maximize their own utility.
The model of the rational decision-maker is an idealized model which fails to 
account for the real world in which policy decisions are actually made. In practice, the 
costs (in terms of time and money) of obtaining information on all possible choices, 
much less all possible outcomes, are too great to bear. Even if only a few courses of 
action are available, unintended consequences are inevitable, given the interrelations 
present in any real-world system. The rational model is further complicated by the fact 
that, in many instances, it is imclear which goal or value is to be optimized.
In such cases, the rational decision-maker may be forced to suboptimize. 
Suboptimization refers to the situation in which decisions are optimal with respect to one 
variable, but less than optimal with respect to another variable (Miller and Starr 1967). 
The concept of suboptimization more accurately depicts the method by which most
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decisions are truly made. Suboptimization of decisions regarding public policy does not 
necessarily lead to “bad” policy; in many situations the public may be better off than it 
would have been if the problem had never been addressed.
3.1.2 Satisficing Model
Simon (1955), in an effort to overcome the limitations of the rational decision­
making model, posited the administrative satisficing model. This model is based on the 
decision maker operating within the concept of “bounded rationality”. Simon observed 
that human capacity for processing information is limited. As a result, decisions tend to 
be made based upon a (limited) set of options with which the decision-maker is most 
familiar. While many options may be considered, a detailed listing of the pros and cons 
of each is not necessarily worked out within this model. This process allows decisions to 
be made within the constraints created by the limited availability of resources. Instead of 
maximization, the decision-makers seek a solution which is “good enough” and which 
allows the decision maker to resume normal functioning.
There are both limitations and implications of this model when it is applied to 
policy decisions. According to Janis and Mann (1977), uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of the best choice may cause decision-makers to select an obvious second 
best. This second best choice may have the additional advantage of being more familiar 
and therefore less likely to cause disturbances in the status quo. The resulting policy 
may or may not serve the purpose which was intended.
According to Lee (1993), the model of bounded rationality has three important 
policy implications. The first implication is that decision-making will routinely result in 
inconsistencies within the decision-making body, as each individual makes decisions
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based upon his/her own boundaries. The second implication, which provides hope for 
solutions to difficult policy decisions, is that large groups are able to accomplish what 
single persons cannot as each person will limit his/her options differently. This is true 
for both the types of accomplishments as well as for the scale of what might be 
accomplished. The final implication is that learning within the confines of bounded 
rationality is both a difficult and costly maneuver. The learning process consists of a 
step-by-step search for solutions which may be viewed as beneficial to one portion of a 
system, but may not be so for the system as a whole. In the arena of environmental 
policy, decisions must not prove detrimental to the whole system, as its preservation is 
the ultimate focus.
3.1.3 Incrementalism
In his essay on “muddling through” Charles Lindblom (1959) offered an 
incremental model of decision-making. In this model, as with satisficing, limited 
comparisons are drawn. Lindblom then places these choices within the larger framework 
of policy making by considering the effect of many such incremental decisions. The 
policy outcomes which result from this model are not based on long-term goals, but are 
focused on alleviating short-term shortcomings. As new ideas emerge regarding what 
goals/values are important, new policies are adopted which address these new problems. 
This process has an advantage over previous models through its ability to account for 
different actors who may enter and leave the decision-making process over the course of 
time. However, its failure to take accoimt of the broader policy environment in which 
decisions are made is a serious shortcoming. This type of approach has often been taken 
in the past regarding environmental policy. Sustainability, however, requires that the
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broader policy questions must also be addressed.
3.1.4 Mixed Scanning
The theory of mixed scanning (Etzioni 1967) attempts to synthesize the rigidity of 
rational decision-making with the approach of Lindblom. The key feature of this model 
is that decision makers utilize different methods for different decisions (Janis and Mann 
1977). This model further assumes that any given decision may be reached in more than 
one manner. It is only when a combination of models are used that the observer gains a 
complete picture of how decisions are actually made. Theoretically, this model would 
allow for all interested parties to have a voice in the decision-making process, while still 
allowing for a systems approach to be taken. Deliberate undertaking of a mixed scanning 
approach to environmental policy decisions appears to hold promise for sustainable 
decisions. It allows for the most varied of opinions/values to be considered while 
efficiently exploring many different options.
3.2 The Role of Experts
McClendon and Quary (1988) point out in their discussion of the current nature of 
the political environment that, as resources become more limited, political actors will 
need to rely more and more upon persons outside of formal policy institutions. One 
“outside” group which has particular importance for environmental policy are experts. In 
this context, “experts” refers not only to persons possessing ample technical knowledge, 
but also those with “political” knowledge. Benveniste (1977) discusses the role of 
experts in the political process at great length. He sees one of their prime functions as 
reducing uncertainty in the face of complex decisions.
The scientific aspects of environmental problems require highly developed
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technical information to be delivered to policy makers in a timely and understandable 
fashion. Rarely is such information available in a form that is useful to the policy maker. 
Further, decision-making in a climate of imcertainty involves substantial risk-taking. 
Increased information about the technical aspects of a problem often reduces the 
probability of erroneous decisions. Clearly, there is a need for technical expertise in 
environmental policy making in order to increase (for the policy maker) the analytical 
tractability of the problems being addressed and reduce their inherent risks.
Technical expertise is a necessary but not sufficient condition for addressing 
environmental problems. Another form of expertise, here termed “political” expertise, is 
also required. The nature of the policy process in the United States is such that decisions 
are heavily influenced by powerful persons outside of the decision-making body. 
Informed decision-makers are better prepared to react to political crises and the pressures 
exerted by the powerful elite (Benveniste 1977). “Political” experts are able to avail 
themselves of what Benveniste (1977) has termed “the multiplier effect”. This describes 
the phenomenon whereby independent decision-makers who share similar beliefs about 
future events are able to reorient their actions towards those suggested by the experts. 
Political expertise involves the formation of coalitions of persons with similar beliefs, 
who are ready to accept the information made available by the technical experts. The 
role played by these policy entrepreneurs is indispensable.
4 Social Learning
This section will review the various definitions of social learning found in the 
literature, from which the working definition of social learning was constructed. It then 
reviews the general models of social learning which were the basis for the idealized
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versions of social learning upon which the decision-making schematic was built. The 
focus of this research is on policy learning which occurred in the city of Tulsa, OK, as a 
result of several policy innovations.
4.1 Definitions
Learning can be defined as the process of incorporating new knowledge. Heclo 
was one of the first researchers to explore the relationship between learning and policy 
(1974). He used the term “social learning” to describe “a relatively enduring alteration in 
behavior that results from experience” (Heclo 1974). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) 
utilize a similar definition for what they call “policy-oriented learning” in their advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF) which will be discussed below. Lee (1993) defines social 
learning as “the combination o f adaptive management and social change”. Adaptive 
management is an approach to policy making which views policies as experiments from 
which society must learn (Lee 1993). Hall (1993) also utilizes an instrumental definition 
of social learning, viewing it as a deliberate attempt to change policy in view of the 
ultimate goals of government.
May (1992) distinguishes two types of “policy learning” from what he terms 
“political learning”. Political learning occurs when one learns about the policy processes 
and prospects. Policy learning results when persons within a given domain draw lessons 
from experience with a given policy instrument. “Instrumental” policy learning involves 
lessons about the viability of certain policy instruments or implementation procedures. 
“Social” policy learning involves reformulating social constructions of the policy itself. 
The focus is on the policy problem, its scope, or its goals.
Much of what is known about group learning comes from studies that focus on
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private sector organizations. One of the basic assumptions o f this body of literature is 
that dissatisfaction with performance serves as a stimulus for the search for new modes 
of operation. One common approach toward a definition o f “organizational learning” 
that follows this line of reasoning is that which views learning as the adaptation of an 
organization to changes in its environment (which produce dissatisfaction with 
performance) through adjustment of its goals and/or search rules (i.e., Cyert and March 
1963; March and Olsen 1975). Etheredge’s construct of “government learning” (1981) 
suggests that these concepts, developed for private firms, apply equally to public sector 
organizations.
Sabatier’s (1988) conception of social learning stems from his familiarity with the 
knowledge utilization literature. BCnowledge utilization theory suggests that much of the 
information to which policy makers are exposed can serve an “enlightenment function”, 
that is it serves to open the policy-maker’s mind to new ways of thinking about problems 
and solutions (Weiss 1977). (This is in opposition to an “instrumental” use whereby 
information is used directly to impact the decision-making). The advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF) proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), and discussed in the 
following section, describes conditions under which policy learning would and would not 
be expected to occur.
Bennett and Hewlett (1992) examined the policy literature to see if “learning” 
theories are viable alternatives to conflict-oriented theories of political change. They 
classified the different definitions of learning using a three-tiered approach. They 
answered the questions of who leams, what is learned, and what effects learning has on 
policy for each of five competing theories of learning. The resulting paradigm breaks
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“policy learning” into three concepts: (I) government learning; (2) lesson-drawing; and,
(3) social learning. Government learning is process-related learning by government 
officials which results in organizational change (i.e., the structure of the organization is 
changed). Lesson-drawing is learning by policy networks regarding specific policy 
instruments, resulting in program changes. Social learning involves the 
conceptualization of ideas by the policy community and results in paradigm shifts.
This research will not focus on the political learning described by May (1992), 
but will instead focus on social learning, which is defined, following Bennett and 
Howlett (1992), to be a paradigm shift which results in enduring changes in policy. The 
concept of social learning includes learning by actors both within and outside formal 
governmental organizations. The term “organizational learning” will be used to refer to 
policy learning which occurs within the confines of the governmental organizations 
themselves.
4.2 Models of Learning
One model of policy learning which has received increasing attention over the last 
several years is the advocacy coalition approach framework (ACF) by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1993). This approach represents an attempt by the authors to overcome 
some of the failures they see with the traditional public policy stages framework. They 
assert that the stages heuristic (i.e., the traditional model of policy formation) has 
difficulty accounting for the role of state/local agencies as policy innovators and the 
continuing role technical information plays in each stage of the policy process.
The framework has four assumptions: (1) understanding policy learning requires a 
time perspective of a decade or more; (2) the most useful method of viewing policy
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change is through a focus on “policy subsystems” (sets of coalitions - actors who share 
the same belief systems); (3) these coalitions involve all levels of government; and, (4) 
that public policies/programs can be conceptualized as sets of values and assumptions 
about how to realize goals.
An overview of the ACF is shown in Figure 1 (after Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993). External system parameters (both stable and dynamic) result in a series of 
constraints under which policy must be formed. Within the policy subsystem, opposing 
coalitions advance their individual policy innovations. Compromise is reached, and the 
resulting policy decisions produce outputs and impacts which can act to alter exogenous 
constraints and coalition belief systems. Policy learning involves the feedback loops in 
Figure 1. Central to their framework, the authors assume that a coalition’s beliefs can be 
characterized as core (deep-seated, personal philosophies central to the coalition) and 
secondary beliefs (less-entrenched beliefs, yet still important to the coalition). In policy 
terms, policy core beliefs are the fundamental policy positions, while secondary beliefs 
are often the means to realize the policy positions.
The result of the ACF is a set of twelve hypotheses delineating the interactions 
between advocacy coalitions, social learning, and policy change. Policy learning is such 
a central construct to this framework that five of the twelve hypotheses deal directly with 
this topic. Relating learning by advocacy coalitions to the terminology used by May 
(1992), policy learning (social or instrumental) occurs across coalitions, while political 
learning occurs within coalitions. In essence, this approach lists conditions under which 
social learning would and would not be expected to occur. The variables which, 
according to the ACF, determine the probability that learning will occur are the
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Figure 1. Overview of Advocacy Coalition Framework (after Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
1993)
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following:
(1) level o f conflict’, learning is most probable when an intermediate level o f 
conflict exists. When conflict levels are high (i.e., policy cores of all coalitions 
are threatened), information is most likely to be used to sustain one’s own, or 
attack an opposing, position. As a result, little opportunity for learning exists. 
Conversely, when the level of conflict is too low (i.e., only secondary beliefs are 
threatened), little is at stake and concessions are easily given. Again, little 
opportunity for learning exists, as little effort is spent on trying to enlighten other 
coalitions.
(2) analvtical tractabilitv: increased analytical tractability o f  an issue increases 
the opportunity for learning to occur. Evaluations of competing assertions are 
much more likely when parties can agree upon basic theories and methods.
Where little overlap between coalition premises exists, there is no basis upon 
which to compare competing claims, and hence learning is not likely to occur.
(3) nature of the analvtical forum: learning is most likely to occur when the policy 
debates take place within a professionalized forum. This variable is postulated as 
important based upon several reasons. The first is that, often, professional fora 
are formed for increasing the analytical tractability of a problem. Secondly, the 
authors feel that information is often utilized in completely open fora (as opposed 
to a professional forum) primarily for the purpose of buttressing pre-existing 
policy options, which would hinder learning.
(4) existence of quantitative performance indicators: learning is most likely to 
occur when accepted quantitative performance indicators exist. Reliable
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quantitative performance indicators may increase the tractability of an issue, 
hence facilitating social learning. The ACF postulates that learning in this case is 
more likely when the performance indicators are for natural rather than for social 
systems.
While the ACF does a good job of explaining the process of policy learning, it is 
less than adequate to explain how beliefs and learning actually translate into policy. A 
model of policy learning which wishes to fully explain policy change must account for 
the translation of beliefs into actions, and place those actions in the context of the 
political environment in which they occur. Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair (1993) found 
support for many of the ACF hypotheses. However, policy change was explained not 
through the actions of the coalitions themselves, but by exogenous shocks to the system. 
The ACF recognizes the role which the institutional setting (here a crisis) plays in 
potentially altering core beliefs and the necessity for coalitions to take advantage of such 
situations; however, it does not focus upon the specific actions which may be taken by 
the coalitions in response to a crisis. According to Birkland (1997), crisis serves to focus 
the attention of decision makers in three ways. First, these events gain power through the 
use of symbolic images. Second, the social construction highlighted by a particular event 
will influence the policies used to deal with the crisis. Finally, political actors use these 
events to expand the issue to encompass concerned citizens. Many other researchers 
have similarly recognized the role played by crisis in social learning (May 1992; 
Etheredge 1981; Milbrath 1989)
A model whose theoretical underpinnings complement those of the ACF is that 
of institutional analysis. According to this framework, many of the efforts of individuals
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(or coalitions) to realize their policy preferences are directed at changing the institutional 
arrangements which define allowable actions (Ostrom 1990). The important difference 
between this construct and the ACF is that information regarding the situation in which 
individuals find themselves matters more than the individual’s belief systems. Thus, 
coalitions are more than actors who share the same belief systems; they also exhibit 
coordinated activities aimed at providing a political environment in which their policy 
preferences can best be met (in Kindgon’s terminology, they attempt to bring together 
policy streams). Nice (1994) found evidence to support this model, with his perceived 
importance of the “problem environment” in his study of state innovations.
Attention to the strategies used to translate beliefs into action is important for 
understanding how, why, and when coalitions may exploit “windows of opportunity” 
presented by their institutional environment. Both the ACF and institutional analysis 
frameworks fail to appreciate the importance of strategic actions beyond simply 
advocating one’s own position (as suggested by the ACF). One strategy which is often 
used by differing coalitions is to utilize the same facts to construct different problem 
interpretations. This may be a conscious or unconscious strategy. Robinson’s (1988) 
examination of the energy debate illustrates this point. Schon and Rein (1994) have 
argued that, particularly in cases involving intractable issues and high levels of conflict, 
reflection upon an opposing coalitions’s “frame of reference” can alter the context in 
which feasible alternatives are analyzed, and may lead to social learning. In other words, 
putting oneself in the opposition’s shoes may lead to learning.
Another important aspect of policy change/policy learning for which both the 
ACF and institutional analysis frameworks fail to account is the role of policy
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entrepreneurs (Meo and Deyle 1993). There is no discussion in these models on the 
policy learning effects resulting from the strategic actions of policy entrepreneurs. 
Strategies undertaken by individuals are often aimed at overcoming the many obstacles 
to innovation which are discussed below in the section on innovation. Given the 
important role these players appear to play in the policy process, their role in promoting 
social learning must be accoimted for by any model which attempts to explain social 
learning. Further, these models fail to accoimt for the nature of how scientific 
knowledge, a key component o f environmental policy, is brought to bear in decision 
making (Meo et al. 1994). Westley (1995), however, cautions that scientific knowledge 
must be provided to decision makers in a form which they feel is useful. “Planning 
processes are able to incorporate stimuli from the environment, in the form of scientific 
information, as long as that information does not challenge the paradigms upon which the 
planning processes are based” (Westley 1995). She concludes that highly focused, 
centralized organizations seem less able to respond to new scientific/technical 
information.
Another model of social learning, here termed the “complex systems” model, is 
that which emerges from the literatures of complex adaptive systems (CASs), and 
innovation. Wildavsky (1988), in his study of risk, laid out the process of dealing with 
risk as one of balancing anticipation (of a problem) and resilience. Anticipation in this 
instance refers to obtaining enough technical knowledge to recognize that a problem may 
exist. Resilience, on the other hand, refers to having the institutional ability to cope with 
the potential problem. While useful for gaining insight into the nature of how society 
should approach uncertain events, his study offered no detail regarding the organizational
33
structures which would maintain the learning process through time. The complex 
systems literature proves useful in providing insight into how organizations cope with 
uncertainty in a dynamic environment.
In the complex systems model, the government organizations responsible for 
policy decisions are viewed as analogous to complex systems. Comfort (1994) identifies 
four characteristics of complex systems which she sees as critical to understanding social 
learning. They are: (1) a capacity for innovation among organizational units which 
interact to achieve a common goal; (2) flexibility in the relationship between the system 
parts and the whole; (3) interactive exchange between the system and its environment; 
and, (4) a crucial role for information as the energy which drives innovation.
The capacity for iimovation has been found to be a key, not only for social 
systems (Wildavsky 1988), but for private businesses (Seely Brown and Duquid 1996) 
and biological systems (Kauffman 1993) as well. As discussed below, policy innovations 
occur most readily when the balancing of anticipation and resilience is complemented by 
incorporation of incoming environmental information. System flexibility is what allows 
systems to be innovative and adapt to their changing environments (as well as change 
those environments). This flexibility is maintained by information exchange between the 
system and its environment; this knowledge transformation is partially responsible for 
“learning” at the systems level. This model views a learning system as one which is “ ... 
capable of adapting its internal performance to new information from the external 
environment, and allowing its different components to adjust appropriately to one 
another in constructive interaction” (Comfort 1994). Information, then, is the “energy” 
which drives a learning system.
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This view in which information is the driving force for a learning system is 
finding increased acceptance among ecosystem scientists. First articulated in 1988 by H. 
T. Odum (Odum 1988), the theory articulates concepts of self-development for open 
systems (including systems learning) in terms of the energy transformations which take 
place. In practice, energy transformation diagrams, much like ecological food chain 
webs, are constructed which reveal the changes in energy forms which take place (Odum
1996). According to this theory, information results from the transformation of vast 
amounts of lower quality forms of energy (Odum 1988).
The information driving a learning system may be technical (scientific) 
knowledge specifically about the problem, it may pertain to the institutional setting in 
which the problem is addressed, or it may be the beliefs held by individuals active in the 
policy process. A better understanding of the relationship between innovation (a result), 
information, and learning (a process undergone to achieve a result) is necessary to fully 
develop a decision-making schematic for social learning. Therefore, the following 
section reviews the literature on policy innovation.
5 Innovation
This section will review the various definitions of policy innovation found in the 
literature, from which the working definition of innovation was constructed. It then 
reviews several models of innovation which were the basis for the idealized versions 
upon which the decision-making schematic was built Finally, it identifies several 
potential barriers to innovation.
5.1 Definitions
What constitutes an innovation in terms of public policy? Within the innovation
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literature there are many definitions of innovation. Basing their definition on their work 
with the Ford Foundation-Kennedy School of Government Innovations in State and 
Local Government Program, Altshuler and Zegans (1990) assume an innovation must be 
a new idea which has its expression in a practical course o f action. The idea need not 
necessarily originate with the innovator; he is free to borrow and adapt it from another 
source. For purposes of their work, the innovator serves to link the idea to a particular 
problem. These authors note that iimovations often consist o f a mix of both familiar and 
novel elements.
Zegans (1997) ftirther refined his definition of innovation with respect to the 
public sector in a study of nine senior public managers. He found that four common 
themes ran through their discussions of innovation:
(1) Innovation is the process of implementing an idea, or enacting a technology, 
novel to a given situation; (2) Successful innovation depends more on 
implementation skills and political savvy than creative thinking; (3) Irmovation is 
a tool for improving agency performance, not an end in itself; and, (4) Innovation 
is an intrinsic part o f the public manager’s job” (Zegans 1997).
Mintrom’s (1997) definition of an innovation as “a policy that is new to the state 
adopting it” again stresses the novelty aspect. However, it is somewhat broader than that 
of Altshuler and Zegans in that it allows for policies to be “borrowed” from other 
locations and still be considered innovations. Following this same general definition, 
Nice (1994) emphasizes that to qualify as an innovation, a policy must break from 
existing practices. Speaking to the subtle differences between an innovation and an 
incremental adjustment, he states “Innovation involves the introduction of new decision
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rules, new technology, new approaches to organizing, or new goals.” (Nice 1994). 
Another broad definition, which is somewhat operational, is that used by Roberts and 
Bradley (1991): "... the generation, translation, and implementation of new ideas into 
practice.”
Osborne (1998) builds upon the concept of newness, using it as the first o f his 
four core characteristics of an innovation. The second characteristic he identifies is the 
distinction between innovation (the application of new ideas or approaches) and 
invention (the discovery of new ideas or approaches). Innovation is also characterized as 
both a process and an outcome. The final characteristic this author finds important is the 
fact that innovations involve discontinuous changes. Combining these characteristics, 
Osborne (1998) defines policy innovation as:
"... the introduction of new knowledge into a service system and its 
application, though not its discovery. This introduction produces a 
process of organizational transformation which itself produces 
discontinuity in the service production system.”
This definition begins to set the stage for the relationship between innovation and social 
learning (referred to above as organizational transformation).
Perhaps the most general definition of innovation is that used by Polsby (1984) 
who defines policy innovation as policy initiation, rationalizing that all policies are 
innovative when first initiated. He utilized seven descriptive dimensions to classify eight 
case studies of innovation:
Timing: The time between proposal and enactment of an innovation.
Specialization: Whether "experts” or politicians serve as a source for alternatives.
Subculture: Whether or not agreement exists among decision makers as to the
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nature of the “problem”.
Public Saliency: Degree to which innovations receive public support and 
attention.
Political Conflict: The degree to which innovations generate conflict.
Research: The degree to which solutions are improvised.
Staging: The degree to which problem identification and solution proposition are 
temporally juxtaposed.
Polsby (1984)was able to classify innovations as either Type A (acute) or Type B
(incubated). Type A innovations are those characterized by a short time lapse between
idea and enactment, high levels o f improvisation, idea invention occurring during the
search for alternatives, and little conflict. Type B innovations cluster along the opposite
end of the spectrum for these four dimensions. Here again, the important connection
between innovation and social learning is hinted at.
The differing definitions presented by various researchers represent more than
just differences in semantics; they reflect the differences in individual researcher’s
backgrounds as well as their differing values. For the purposes of this work, policy
innovations will be defined as “programs or practices which are new to the institutions
implementing them and which are evidenced by a change in standard operating
practices”.
5.2 Models of Innovation
Once a definition of irmovation has been agreed upon, the next questions asked 
are “how?” and “at what point in the policy process?” do iimovations occur. The 
literature describes three models of iimovation as they relate to policy implementation:
(1) policy planning; (2) groping along; and, (3) one which will be referred to as “strategic 
innovation” (Berman 1980; Behn 1988; Deyle 1994; Meo and Deyle 1993).
The standard model of innovation, (often been called “policy planning”) has its
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roots in the rational model of decision-making. Its focus is on a careful examination of 
all possible outcomes associated with the implementation of a given policy. The policy 
decisions emerge through a careful balancing of perceived outcomes and desired goals. 
What results are detailed prescriptions for policy implementation which are to be 
followed at every level of government. Such “programmed implementation” “assumes 
that implementation problems can be made tolerable, if not eliminated, by careful and 
explicit preprogramming of implementation procedures” (Berman 1980).
Rational decision-making is not the only type which fits into the policy planning 
model. Simon’s (1955) bounded rationality/satisficing model and Lindblom’s (1959) 
model of muddling through still emphasize the role of analysis prior to policy 
implementation. Hence, both would fall within the policy planning paradigm.
Behn (1988) first coined the phrase “management by groping along”. This model 
views an agency’s design of implementation strategies as akin to “adaptive 
implementation” (Berman 1980). In contrast to the policy planning model, little thought 
is given at the outset to the relationships between outcomes of specific policy decisions 
and explicit policy goals. In this model, policies undergo continual refinement once they 
are placed within the confines of their operating environment. Hence, decision-makers 
are given much latitude in their day-to-day decision criteria.
The recent literature offers support for the groping along model. For example, 
Golden (1990) examined seventeen human services iimovations and suggested that the 
groping along model best fits the manner in which those innovations occurred. She does 
concede, however, that the groping along approach may not work in programs (such as 
many environmental policies) which must be accountable to the requirements of higher
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levels of government due to the conditions such accountability often imposes.
Evidence for the groping along model is also offered by Sanger and Levin (1992). 
These authors build upon the arguments of Behn and Golden by recognizing the 
importance of utilization of an existing knowledge base, perhaps through a reassemblage 
of such knowledge into a new conceptual framework. These authors also begin to 
recognize the important role crisis plays in spurring innovative activities. The 
observations of Sanger and Levin most closely correspond to the premises of the third 
model of innovation, that of strategic innovation.
In his study of innovations in American government, Borins (1998) found that 
planning and groping along appeared to be equally important. “Strategic” policy 
innovations represent a middle ground between the policy planning and groping along 
models. In his examination of environmental policy innovations, Deyle (1994) examines 
the role played by analysis in the solution of problems characterized by high levels of 
conflict. He concludes that the groping along model may be less than adequate in such 
cases. One factor which may contribute to a more planned approach in the case of 
environmental policy is the concern with potential legal challenges policies may face. 
This concern would dictate a more careful initial examination of alternatives than that 
suggested by the groping along model. However, the nature of scientific uncertainty with 
regard to environmental problems would also necessitate a more flexible approach than 
that of the policy planning model. It is clear that as the need for scientific knowledge 
increases, environmental policies must be able to adapt to changing knowledge.
Both the policy planning and groping along models focus primarily on the 
implementation stage of the policy process. Ingraham (1987) recognizes the inherent
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difficulties associated with this focus on the implementation phase of the policy cycle. 
“Analyses which focus on the end of the process -o r at a mid-point in the cycle ... cannot 
account for characteristics created by the earlier activities of problem definition and 
policy design.” (Ingraham 1987) She suggests that highly complex, uncertain problems 
(characteristics typical of many environmental problems) will result in many policy 
reformulations during the implementation and evaluation phases, even if much planning 
occurs during initial phases. Hence, the strategic innovation model may be most 
appropriate in such cases.
Deyle’s (1994) view of the innovation process affirms an alternative model 
articulated by Roberts and King (1989) which emphasizes the role played by individuals 
(Roberts and King 1996) in the entire policy process. These authors postulate that policy 
entrepreneurs are involved in promoting innovation throughout all phases of the policy 
process. Aspects of both the policy planning and groping along models were found to 
have explanatory power in this study.
“At the macro level of analysis Kingdon’s model had much to offer. The streams 
of problems, solutions, choice opportimities, and the coupling function o f policy 
entrepreneurs comprise a process that is fluid, chaotic, and governed by chance, 
more in line with how Kingdon’s modified “garbage can model of decision 
making” characterizes policy making. However, at the micro level, in an analysis 
of their activities over time, we found the policy entrepreneurs to operate more 
strategically, more deliberately, with greater conscious planning and orchestration 
than Kingdon’s model would anticipate” (Roberts and King 1989).
Deyle (1994) concludes that, for environmental policy challenges, the strategic
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irmovation model may be most appropriate due to the scientific uncertainty regarding the 
nature of the problem and probable impacts of solutions. Several authors who have 
recently focused on the role of policy entrepreneurs at both the state and local level have 
found that they do indeed play an important role in the policy process (Schneider and 
Teske 1992; Mintrom 1997; Meo and Deyle 1993). Further, the groping along model, 
since it includes no initial technical or formal analysis, would not allow for incorporation 
of the role played by scientific and technical information which has been found to be so 
important (Meo et al. 1994). Investigation regarding the roles played by strategic 
entrepreneurs and scientific/technical information in policy innovation continues (Meo
1997).
5.3 Barriers to Innovation
Models of how innovation occurs will only allow for a partial glimpse into social 
learning regarding policy decisions. The question remains why do some innovations 
occur/succeed while others fail. Several authors have proposed barriers which must be 
overcome in order for policy innovations to occur. This section will review these barriers 
to innovation, with special consideration being given to their implications regarding 
social learning.
Behn (1997) presents fifteen “dilemmas of innovation” which he asserts can 
never be “solved” but which represent barriers to innovation which must be faced by 
policy makers. He groups these dilemmas into six general categories: (1) accountability 
dilemmas; (2) paradigm dilemmas; (3) analytical dilemmas; (4) structural dilemmas; (5) 
replication dilemmas; and, (6) motivation dilemmas. Accountability dilemmas address 
issues such as who is responsible for iimovating and how should these individuals be held
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accountable for their innovations. Paradigm dilemmas exist due to the fact that all 
persons (and organizations) exist within “mental paradigms” constructed from past 
experiences. Innovation often requires thinking outside the boundaries of existing 
paradigms, a task which is very difficult indeed.
Analytical dilemmas ask the question how much analysis should occur prior to 
taking action to address any given problem. It is clear from the discussions above that 
there are differing opinions on this matter. Structural dilemmas are those faced due to 
the nature of the organization within which the innovation occurs. Replication dilemmas 
present themselves when policy makers attempt to “borrow” innovations which have 
already proven successful. Finally, motivation dilemmas seek to determine why some 
policy makers choose to innovate while others do not.
Behn identifies three accountability dilemmas: (I) authorization dilemmas; (2) 
failure dilemma; and , (3) customer dilemma. Theoretically, the American system of 
government operates so that politicians make policy and bureaucrats administer it. In 
reality, many civil servants are called upon to make policy decisions in the course of their 
everyday work. This constitutes the authorization dilemma. The failure dilemma arises 
as a result of the inherently risky nature o f innovation. To many public managers, failure 
in the eyes of the public can be very costly, thus innovative policies may be approached 
with trepidation. Customer dilemmas address the issue of to whom are innovators 
accountable.
Two paradigm dilemmas which may arise are the routinization and scale 
dilemmas. Government operation requires rules and regulations to protect the citizens 
values of honesty, fairness and efficiency. However, the additional values o f flexibility,
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ingenuity, and adaptivity may place personnel in situations which the rules cannot 
address. These situations may totally undermine efforts at innovation, hence the 
routinization dilemma. The scale dilemma acknowledges differences in the definition of 
innovation, while acknowledging the fact that small improvements may preclude larger 
innovations. It considers how significant a change must be in order to “count” as an 
innovation.
Based upon the varying models of innovation discussed above, it is unlikely the 
analytical dilemma will be resolved in the near future. The diversity dilemma is the first 
structural dilemma Behn identifies. Decentralized organizations provide opportunity for 
the generation of many innovations; however, this organizational structure acts as an 
impediment to the successful implementation of much of them. The diversity dilemma 
seeks to discover the “correct” amount of diversity needed within an organization for 
successful generation and implementation of innovations. The other structural dilemma, 
federalism, similarly seeks to balance innovations within the various levels and agencies 
of government.
On the surface, it is far easier to adapt someone else’s “good” idea, than to 
generate it oneself. This path to innovation is, unfortunately, fraught with difficulties as 
well. The uniqueness of every situation requires adaptation. The adaptation dilemma 
occurs not only during initial replication of innovations, but throughout implementation 
as well. While details of innovations must be adapted to the needs of organizations, so 
do the organizations need adapting to the features of the innovation. This is the 
organizational-adaptation dilemma. The timing of replication results in the 
dissemination dilemma. Replication which occurs both too quickly or too slowly can
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harm both the original innovation and any receiving organizations. The final replication 
dilemma is the definitional dilemma. What exactly is the innovation? Is it a particular 
policy? Is it a change in operating procedure? These types of questions must be 
answered in order for others to successfully adapt innovations to their needs.
The final category of dilemmas are the motivation dilemmas: (1) media 
dilemmas; (2) reward dilemmas; and, (3) elected-ofacial dilemmas. The tendency of the 
media to focus on failures while rarely lauding successes creates the media dilemma. 
Research suggests that what counts most to most innovators are intrinsic rewards such as 
recognition from peers. If this is true, the reward dilemma may be easy to overcome.
The risks faced by elected officials seeking to innovate are much greater than those faced 
by civil servants. Efforts must be made by both groups to encourage innovation and 
share the credit for successful innovation equally. A final barrier to innovation, 
particularly in environmental policy, are the regulations themselves (lies 1996). This 
study recognizes that in many instances, legal frameworks impose rigid enforcement 
mechanisms based upon static systems portrayals which can act as significant barriers for 
innovative policy prescriptions.
The processes of overcoming the barriers to innovation outlined by Behn can be 
related to the definitions of social learning discussed above. Using May’s (1992) 
classification scheme, overcoming the accountability and structural dilemmas may lead 
to political learning; the replication may lead to instrumental learning; the paradigm may 
lead to policy learning; and, the analytical and motivation to either instrumental or policy 
learning. Similarly, using Bennett and Hewlett’s (1992) classification scheme: 
government learning would be evidenced by overcoming the accountability and structural
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dilemmas; lesson drawing would be evidenced by overcoming the replication (and to a 
lesser extent the analytical and motivation) dilemma; and, social learning would be 
evidenced by overcoming the paradigm dilemma (possibly the analytical and motivation 
as well). Evidence that innovators have overcome these dilemmas may serve only as 
prima facie evidence of social learning according to May (1992). In discussing the 
difference between learning and copying, May (1992) states the learning “implies 
improved understanding, as reflected by an ability to draw lessons about policy 
problems, objectives, or interventions.” Thus, to demonstrate learning, one needs 
evidence of increased understanding leading to changing beliefs.
6 Social Learning and Environmental Policy
This section reviews the literature in which social learning specifically related to 
environmental policy was studied. One of the most thorough examinations of public 
policy innovation is that undertaken by Sandford Borins (1998). This broad analysis of 
217 Ford-Kennedy School of Government Innovation Awards semifinalists characterizes 
both the iimovations themselves and the people who originated them. The innovations 
are also grouped by policy areas, including environmental policy, for ftirther analysis. 
With regard to environmental innovations, several generalities were found; (I) 
environmental programs are holistic and will require integration across several 
government departments; (2) volunteers can serve as a valuable resource and support for 
entrepreneurs; (3) market mechanisms and user fees may prove useful for support and 
enforcement of innovations; (4) substantial permeability seems to be evident across the 
boundary between bureaucratic and political environments; and, (5) planning and policy 
analysis are key aspects of successful environmental innovations.
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In another study which focused on environmental policy, Weyant (1988) 
examined the evolution o f natural gas pricing for evidence of social learning. To 
facilitate his analysis, Weyant used a case study approach which placed the history of 
natural gas pricing within the advocacy coalition framework. He concluded that modest 
social learning did occur across advocacy coalitions during the natural gas pricing debate. 
This learning was accomplished via extensive technical analysis conducted by the 
advocacy coalitions. This work served to further the suggestion that technical expertise 
is vital for social learning about environmental policy to occur. While the author found 
that all of the ACF’s conditions for learning to occur existed, many of the debates did not 
necessarily occur in a professional fora, but were conducted in a professional manner.
Another study which uses the advocacy coalition framework as a method for 
organizing the historical events is Heintz’s (1988) study of the Department of the 
Interior’s Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas leasing program. The author describes the 
controversy as “a classic case of conflict between those seeking to bring about the 
benefits of large scale economic development (i.e. make money) and those seeking to 
reduce environmental degradation and local disruption.” (Heintz 1988) This study found 
that while the debate was long and generated much technical information, little social 
learning occurred. In support of the ACF’s hypothesis, the author contends that strong 
conflict and the lack of a professional forum were the reasons that little social learning 
took place. The policy change decisions which took place during this debate are assumed 
to reflect self-interest and quasi-religious values to a greater extent than the ACF can 
account. It serves as evidence of the strong role played by the “political” experts, in this 
case to such an extent that the role of technical information was undermined.
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In her study of the response to the Northridge, CA, earthquake of 1994, Comfort 
(1994) draws three conclusions which are of importance for social learning: (1) 
information drives the processes of order and entropy within a complex, adaptive system, 
altering both the internal relationships between the parts and the whole and its external 
environment; (2) flexible organizational structure is essential for maintaining focus for 
multiple organizations working towards a common goal under conditions of uncertainty; 
and, (3) organizational structure needs to allow adaptation both at the system level in 
response to changes in the environment, and at the sub-system level to allow functioning 
under time and resource constraints.
Ingram (1994) studied knowledge utilization as it applied to Lake Tahoe, NV-CA, 
environmental policy, with particular emphasis on enlightenment via technical 
information as a special type of social learning. The author identifies four characteristics 
of the Lake Tahoe debate which are shared by many other policy subsystems and 
therefore may make his findings generalizable: (1) intense controversy; (2) well-matched 
coalitions; (3) openness; and, (4) abundant scientific information (Ingram 1994). Most 
environmental policy debates would certainly share many of these characteristics. His 
examination revealed that the conditions necessary for social learning to occur (as 
predicted by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith) were not present. Therefore, while much 
scientific information was utilized, little social learning actually occurred.
Barke (1985) presented a historical analysis of Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) laws, looking at stable and dynamic environmental parameters as 
identified by the ACF framework. He found that changes in RCRA policy could not be 
attributed to changes in coalition core beliefs as postulated by the ACF. Instead, he
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points to the power of scientific and technical information in bringing about social 
learning regarding hazardous waste.
In his discourse on sustainability and social learning, Lester Milbrath (1989) 
identifies fourteen characteristics of a “learning society”:
1 Utilizes a wealth of information.
2. Finds better ways to disseminate and utilize information.
3. Emphasizes integrative and probabilistic thinking.
4. Emphasizes values as much as facts.
5. Is critical of science and technology.
6. Combines theory with practice.
7. Is consciously anticipatory.
8. Believes that change is possible.
9. Examines outcomes to learn from them.
10. Develops intuitions to foster systemic and futures thinking.
11. Institutionalizes a practice of analyzing future impacts.
12. Reorients education toward social learning.
13. Supports research.
14. Maintains openness and encourages citizen participation.
While many of Milbrath’s characteristics appear reasonable at first glance, they 
offer little in the way of specific prescriptive advice for how society might obtain 
sustainability. They do, however, pinpoint two of the key aspects which other 
researchers have found to be critical. The first is the absolute essential nature of looking 
at a problem from a systems point of view. The second is the role of 
knowledge/information, especially scientific knowledge.
Mann (1991) argues that social learning regarding environmental problems needs 
a decentralized political regime in order to provide opportunities for innovations to occur. 
Once this occurs, he identifies four keys to learning: (I) experimentation; (2) substantial 
feedback; (3) redimdancy; and, (4) awareness of unforeseeable consequences. Like many 
of the environmental issues examined thus far, his argument is focused on achieving
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paradigm shifts at the level of the nation-state. However, the precursor to change by 
nation-states is often change at the local level. This research focuses on social learning 
regarding environmental policy at the municipal level.
7 Conclusions
Sustainable policy will require the development of innovative policy measures. 
However, as shown in the literature review above, understanding of how innovative 
policy is made remains uncertain. Also, the nature of the relationship between social 
learning and innovation remains unclear. Some researchers believe that one must 
proceed the other. Tulsa’s experience shows that social learning is continually occurring 
during the irmovation process.
Understanding policy innovation as a process is difficult because it involves not 
only an understanding of the events which take place, but also of how certain people 
shaped those events. Policy entrepreneurs are generally acknowledged as important in 
the process, but uncertainty still remains as to what methods they utilize in shaping 
events. Additional uncertainty remains regarding the importance of STI in the innovation 
process, particularly regarding how entrepreneurs make use of such information. The 
decision-making paradigm developed as part of this research shows the maimer in which 
Tulsa’s entrepreneurs both shaped events and made use of STI in the innovation/social 
learning process.
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Chapter 3 
Mingo Creek
1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the retrospective assessment for the Mingo 
Creek case. The timeline developed for this case is presented in Appendix A: Mingo 
Creek Timeline.
Several dramatic flood events as well as the proven inability of the city to react 
forced the city to develop the capacity to respond to flood issues. The city initially 
attempted to respond through floodplain management policies, and experienced only 
limited success. Tulsa’s prevailing institutional stmcture did not allow these policies to 
work toward easing the flooding situation. The motivation of successful long-term 
solutions would require a dramatic event as well as an effective political coalition.
The dramatic event came in the form of the 1984 flood. The entrepreneurs 
involved in the actions taken in the mid-1980's constituted an effective political coalition. 
They successfully tapped outside expertise to find the scientific and technical information 
necessary to develop solutions. They also were quite adept at building partnerships with 
several federal agencies to overcome financial and political barriers. Finally, they 
worked hard to include the public in their decision-making process, gaining acceptance 
for their innovations, and successfully changing Tulsa’s institutional environment.
2 Case Description
Initial efforts at federal flood control in the United States included the Flood 
Control Acts of 1928 and 1936. These early acts focused on the building of structures
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such as levees to prevent flooding along the nation’s waterways. The 1936 act 
designated the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) as the primary agency for flood 
control works (Petak and Atkisson 1982). With the passage of the Federal Disaster Act 
of 1950, the federal government began offering assistance to flood victims. The Flood 
Control Act of 1960 (PL 86-645) authorized the COE to aid communities with floodplain 
maps as well as offer technical and planning assistance. This act marks the beginning of 
the federal government’s end to exclusive reliance on structural flood controls.
The National Flood Insurance Administration (FIA) was created with the passage 
of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (PL 90-448). This act allowed cities to 
obtain federally subsidized flood insurance provided they implement certain non- 
structural flood control measures. It also marked the beginning of the federal 
government’s involvement with land use planning on non-public lands. Prior to the 
passage of this act, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had 
suggested to Congress that the best use of the nation’s floodplains would be to encourage 
a shift in land use in flood plains from residential to industrial and recreational (Petak and 
Atkisson 1982). The Flood Disaster Prevention Act of 1973 (PL 93-234) made 
participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) requisite for receiving 
federal financial assistance in flood-prone properties (Petak and Atkisson 1982). It also 
tied floodplain management requirements to flood insurance (Greer 1999).
Historical records show that Tulsa has a long history of flooding problems 
(Flanagan 1994). Beginning with a series of floods in the early I970's, Tulsa began the 
process of reexamining its floodplain management decisions (A. Patton 1993).
Following the Mother’s Day floods of May 10-11, 1970, Tulsa entered the NFIP.
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Serious flooding (one with over $18 million in damage) occurred throughout the city on 
four separate occasions in 1974, prompting the moniker “the year of the floods” (A. 
Patton 1994). The 1974 floods also spurred debates in Tulsa regarding how the city 
should best manage its floodplains (Anonymous 6/1/1975). A citizens committee made 
interim recommendations regarding floodplain management in May of 1975 (A. Patton 
2/15/1976). Much of the debate was prompted by the efforts of a group of concerned 
citizens who formed Tulsans for a Better Community (TEC) to seek flood solutions (A. 
Patton 12/7/1975). One member, Carol Williams, was particularly outspoken, openly 
challenging propositions put forth by the city engineer’s office (Anonymous 2/26/1976).
The majority of TEC members lived within the Mingo Creek floodplain. Prior to 
1950, this area was primarily agricultural, however, residential development in the area 
increased steadily through 1970 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1970). Accepted 
practice in the early 1970's was to convey stormwater through a series of underground 
pipes and concrete channels. However, by the 1970's serious nationwide consideration 
was being given to alternative methods of control (Poertner 1974). Tulsa’s debate over 
alternative means of stormwater conveyance coincided with a realization that the city’s 
storm sewers were in a state of ill-repair (A. Patton 12/9/1975).
Mayor Robert LaFortune became interested in the plight of Mingo Creek 
residents following the 1974 floods, and requested a plan (LaFortune 1999). City 
engineers responded with the Mingo Creek Improvement Project, which included 
widening part of Mingo Creek. In order for the widening project to proceed, the city 
purchased and removed 33 homes along the right-of-way (A. Patton 1993). These homes 
were removed just prior to the Memorial Day flood of 1976.
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Meanwhile, the debate over the appropriate means of dealing with stormwater 
continued (A. Patton 2/15/1976; Logue 2/17/1976). No interim management practices 
had yet been implemented, as the city commission engaged in a protracted debate of the 
issues (Logue 2/18/1976; A. Patton 2/18/1976). New development criteria requiring the 
detainment of stormwaters on-site, followed by slow downstream release, were adopted 
by the city commission in March of 1976 (A. Patton 3/20/1976).
2.1 Memorial Day Floods of 1976
On May 30, 1976 as much as ten inches of rain fell in parts of the city over a three 
hour period, the resultant flooding killed three people. The majority of the more than $34 
million in damages occurred along Mingo Creek (A. Patton 1993). It was after this flood 
episode that members of TBC began to lobby for widespread acquisition of flood-prone 
properties. They lobbied for the federal government to fund a clause. Section 1362, of 
the flood insurance law which would provide funds to relocate frequently flooded 
properties. Congressman Jim Jones was particularly helpful in this regard, seeking an 
appropriation from Congress (A. Patton 1993; S. Williams 1999).
This flood also served as an impetus for the city to enact some policy decisions 
which had been part of the debate following the 1974 floods. These policy decisions 
included: I) a moratorium on floodplain building; 2) hiring of the city’s first full-time 
hydrologist; 3) the development of city-wide floodplain management policies, including 
stormwater detention, and; 4) the beginning of a partnership with the COE. The 
moratorium on floodplain building was a city-wide extension of a policy which had 
previously been enacted in portions o f the city (A. Patton 6/12/1976). Especially hard hit 
would be the owners of mobile home parks which could be forced out of business. When
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questioned about that possibility, the street commissioner, Robert Franden, replied 
“That’s exactly right. It’s a big price to pay but that’s the step necessary to prevent the 
terrible danger and hazard” (Earley 6/11/1976). The city had finally begun to realize that 
it was going to have to take actions, many of which would be unpopular, in order to 
protect its citizens (Anonymous 6/14/1976). The temporary moratorium, which applied 
to public as well as private projects, would last for 6 months. The intent was to prohibit 
any building until structural flood-control improvements could be made or until “land use 
controls that effectively deal with the problem have been adopted” (Anonymous 
6/29/1976). The city commission did, however, retain the right to approve, on a case-by- 
case basis, some repair actions provided it could be shown they would not aggravate 
flood problems.
Commissioner Franden’s proposal included more than the building moratorium.
In addition, he also proposed a potential drainage fee, a study to determine how to 
include flood hazard information on property abstracts, and creation of a flood warning 
system (Anonymous 6/14/1976). As part of their efforts to establish new floodplain 
management policies, the city hired Stan Williams to act as floodplain management 
advisor to the city commission (Anonymous 7/11/1976). He was the person responsible 
for drafting floodplain management policies for the city (Anonymous 5/4/1977). In 
addition, the city hired its first full-time hydrologist, Charles Hardt, to focus on flooding 
concerns and staff the newly created hydrology department within the city engineer’s 
office.
Shortly after the flood, members of the Urban Studies Program at The University 
of Tulsa who had been working with Congressman Jones convened a series of meetings
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to discuss the best course of action to alleviate flood problems. These meetings, and a 
lack of information, led to a call for a symposium to discuss the available alternatives 
(The University of Tulsa 1976). The symposium was timed in order to provide input into 
the floodplain management policy-making process. Speakers included academics, civil 
servants, and selected flood victims. Many of the panelists discussed floodplain 
management options which had been undertaken in other parts of the country, 
particularly Chicago, Rapid City, and Denver (The University of Tulsa 1976).
Congressman Jones served as a panelist, discussing current federal flood control 
efforts in Tulsa (Jones 1976). In regard to Mingo Creek, the congressman discussed two 
different programs on which he was working. The first program was an amendment to 
the benefit/cost ratio principle under which the COE determined project eligibility. The 
amendment to the Water Resources Act, which applied only to Mingo Creek, allowed for 
the improvements which the city had made to Mingo Creek since January 1975 to be 
included as part of the city’s cost share should the COE undertake any structural flood 
control project along Mingo Creek (Jones 1976). As of the time of the meeting, the bill 
was awaiting the President’s signature, which did occur. This amendment would allow 
for a favorable benefit/cost ratio under which the COE could seek funding the following 
year.
The second portion of the federal contribution to a solution for Mingo Creek 
which the congressman discussed was Section 1362 of the Federal Flood Insurance Act. 
This section allows the FLA to negotiate with homeowners on properties suffering from 
repeated flooding for the purchase of their homes and relocation of the homeowners 
(Logue 776/1976). The property is then turned over to the local government for its use.
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This particular section had never received funding, primarily because of a conception that 
it would be construed as federal land use planning (Jones 1976). Congressman Jones had 
been working to convince the FIA director to use Mingo Creek as a demonstration 
project for Section 1362. While the program was not funded as of the fall of 1976, 
Congressman Jones stated “1 feel cautiously optimistic that we can get the $6 million for 
a demonstration project on Mingo Creek in the supplemental appropriations early next 
year” (Jones 1976). His office was also working with the U.S. Department of the Interior 
to get funding for a park, should the relocation effort succeed.
The resulting floodplain management policy proposals, more stringent than 
required by the FI A, went before the city commission in May, 1977. An assistant city 
attorney filed a complaint against the regulations, saying the city did not have a right to 
impose conditions more stringent than those of the FIA (Anonymous 5/4/1977). Even at 
this point, after much debate, the city staff could not develop recommendations upon 
which all could agree and for which the city maintained the necessary data (Anonymous 
5/5/1977). Despite the heated nature of the debate, a floodplain management policy was 
eventually adopted by the city commission in December 1977 (Anonymous 1/7/1978). 
The four-part policy included: the establishment of a floodway zoning district; a 
floodplain development permit ordinance; an earth change and stormwater drainage 
control ordinance; and the adoption of a criteria manual for the earth change ordinance 
(Strizek 1/19/78).
The establishment o f floodway zoning districts was an effort to limit the types of 
land uses in floodways (the channel of a watercourse and adjoining portions of land 
required to carry a regulatory flood) to passive uses. It prohibited the location o f mobile
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home parks within floodways. In addition, the city retained the right to prohibit 
reconstruction of a stmcture previously located in a floodway if  it was more than 50 
percent damaged in a flood. The floodplain development permit ordinance required that 
no structures be built, existing structures altered, or land modified within a floodplain 
without first obtaining a permit from the city engineer’s office. In order to obtain a 
permit, certain criteria must be met including not increasing run-off to adjacent properties 
and elevation of the bottom floor of a structure at least 1 foot above the 100-year flood 
elevation.
Under the stormwater drainage control ordinance, all new development needed to 
be capable of accepting run-off from a 100-year flood. Control options included a 
combination of on-site detention and storm sewers. This was later amended to allow 
developers to pay a fee-in-lieu of providing on site detention. The earth change 
ordinance required that permits be obtained prior to initiating any excavating, grading, 
regrading, landfilling, berming or diking activities.
Even when these ordinances had been enacted, the debate over the city’s authority 
regarding floodplain management continued. One citizen’s lawsuit, claiming the city had 
no right to establish such regulations, went to the state supreme court (Rehg 5/26/1978). 
Controversy again raged when the stormwater detention regulations were altered in 1979 
(Pearson 6/10/1984).
Following the 1976 floods, and due in large part to Congressman Jones’ efforts, 
the city began to improve its working relationship with the COE. The Corps was 
working on what it called the Tulsa Urban Study. The study was a comprehensive study 
which looked at all aspects of water problems in Tulsa, including flood damage, quantity
63
reduction, and water quality issues. Its objective was to develop plans which the local 
communities could use to “solve their water-related problems and make the best use of 
their water resources” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1976).
As the Corps continued its study, working with city officials to determine 
solutions, the city continued its piecemeal flood control efforts, coordinating with the 
Corps along the way. The joint CO E/city efforts represent all of the new flood control 
projects the city announced between 1978 and 1984 (see for example Rehg 10/13/1978; 
Anonymous 10/19/1978). The city even diverted monies which had been dedicated to 
charmel improvements along a portion of Mingo Creek to detention facilities (Rehg 
6/28/1978).
The basic effort by the city was in part due to the city commission seated during 
this time frame. James Inhofe, the mayor from 1978 to 1984 has been characterized by 
some of the entrepreneurs as anti-flood control. It was during this time period that the 
stormwater detention regulations were eased, allowing developers to pay a fee-in-lieu of 
on-site detention. The fees which were to support the construction of larger, regional 
detention facilities did not accumulate quickly enough to prevent serious flooding. By 
1983, adequate funds had not been raised for even one of these facilities to actually be 
created (Neal 7/13/1983).
In the fall o f 1978, the COE presented its final Mingo Creek plan to the citizens 
of Tulsa for approval. Their preferred plan included 23 regional detention ponds (only 1 
of which would have a permanent lake) and 7.5 miles of channelization along Mingo 
Creek (COE 1982). The plan received the backing of both the city government 
(Anonymous 11/17/1978) and the homeowners coalition (Rehg 11/2/1978). As of May,
64
1984 the plan was still awaiting funding authorization from Congress in order for
construction to begin.
2.2 Memorial Day Floods o f 1984
On May 26-27, 1984, up to 14 inches of rain fell overnight (Anonymous undated
newspaper article). The resulting floods killed 14 people and injured 288, resulting in
over $ 125 million in damages along Mingo Creek. Following this devastating event, the
newly elected (only 19 days in office) mayor, Terry Young, and street commissioner, J.
D. Metcalfe, took action. They brought together a group of persons familiar with Tulsa’s
flooding problems. Among them were former city hydrologist Charles Hardt, who was
working as a water engineering consultant; Stan Williams, former city planner and
former FEMA employee who was working as a lawyer for the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission; Ron Flanagan, Tulsa planning consultant; and Ann Patton, former reporter
with the Tulsa World and former COE employee who was working as administrative
assistant to Commissioner Metcalfe. The team’s mission was to develop recovery and
mitigation plans prior to the arrival of federal disaster assistance agencies on site.
“The leadership team knew that a federal interagency hazard-mitigation team 
would be coming to Tulsa shortly, to issue mitigation recommendations within 15 
days after the May 31 disaster declaration. Tulsa leaders determined to meet 
them coming in with local recommendations, couched so persuasively that the 
feds would agree” (A. Patton 1993).
From past experience, the task force knew that rebuilding efforts would begin 
almost immediately. In order to gain time to examine the possibility of acquisition and 
relocation, they took a series of steps to slow the process down. These included enacting 
moratoria on both mobile home hookups and permits for repairing damaged structures.
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The temporary ban on mobile home hookups was enacted citywide, although exceptions 
were granted on a case-by-case basis. The ban was intended to prevent any further 
location of mobile homes within flood damaged areas. On June 15, the city commission 
approved an ordinance temporarily prohibiting major repairs of 284 homes in the areas 
hardest hit by flooding (Pearson 6/16/1984; Foran 6/16/1984). The ordinance was a 
necessary first step in relocating the families using Section 1362 monies. Both 
ordinances were to expire July 31, 1984, giving the city little time to formulate a 
relocation plan.
2.2.1 Acquisition and Relocation
The debate over relocation proved to be quite heated, with city commissioners as 
well as individual homeowners voicing both approval and disapproval for the proposed 
actions. City consultants, McLaughlin Water Engineers, proposed a solution calling for 
the purchase of 289 houses, many of which had suffered repeated flooding. They 
suggested utilizing surplus monies from a third-penny sales tax (i.e., one penny of a 
three-penny city sales tax) which had been approved in 1980 to fund the city’s portion of 
the relocation costs (Neal 7/15/1984). In addition to acquisition, the consultant’s report 
also called for various storm sewer, channelization and detention projects.
The suggestion that sales tax monies be spent for acquisition sparked a heated 
debate among city commissioners, with two of the five commissioners opposing the idea 
(Pearson 7/12/1984). In response to the opposition. Mayor Young convened a 24- 
member ad hoc panel to study the proposal and provide for public input and debate over 
the Issue (Pearson 7/25/1984).
The bipartisan panel consisted of members o f the local business community,
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developer representatives and individual citizens (Eveld 7/24/1984). After consideration 
of the issues, the committee voted to endorse the plan, calling for mandatory acquisition 
of 289 homes (as opposed to a voluntary program as requested by Mayor Young) 
(Pearson 7/25/1984). They also voted to recommend that the city permanently extend the 
building moratorium for those homes, thereby guaranteeing that the city would remain 
eligible for several federal acquisition ftmding programs (DelCour 7/29/1984). The 
committee’s endorsement, as well as that of the Chamber of Commerce was then put 
before the city commission.
On July 31, 1984 the city commission had to make a decision on whether or not 
to extend the building moratorium. In order to make this decision, however, they also 
had to reach some consensus on how to fund the proposed acquisitions and whether or 
not to accept the rest of the consultant’s recommendations (Pearson 7/29/1984). With 
opposition to using sales tax revenues still strong from two of the commissioners, a 
compromise was finally reached. In the compromise, the commissioners voted not to use 
sales tax surpluses to buy houses unless they were needed as right of way for structural 
improvements such as channelization or detention work (Foran and Eveld 8/1/1984). In 
return, one of the commissioners opposed to the plan voted for an emergency clause 
which extended the building moratorium. Instead of using sales tax monies, the 
commissioners voted for a financing measure in which short-term loans would be 
obtained, the monies reinvested at higher interest rates, and the excess interest would be 
used to fund the city’s portion of the buy-out program (Pearson and DelCour 8/1/1984).
Federal funding was also available to put toward the buy-out program. Tulsa’s 
congressional delegation was successful in having $1 million o f the fiscal year 1985
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flood relief budget targeted toward acquisition in Tulsa (Marier 8/8/1984). In addition,
82 of the homes targeted in the buy-out were initially deemed eligible for Section 1362 
funds (Marier 8/8/1984). In the final agreement between the city and FEMA, insurance 
funds were first applied toward the purchase price. The remaining purchase cost was 
divided evenly between the city and FEMA.
The legality of the city’s plan to finance buy-outs with interest monies was called 
into question (Foran 9/7/1984), and thirteen families filed suit, seeking to block their 
acquisition (Clay 8/11/1984). However, by December 1984 the buy-out was over 90% 
complete (Anonymous 12/22/1984). As of then, only 23 of the 191 parcels the city was 
obligated to buy had not yet received offers due to title problems, the citizen’s lawsuit, or 
refusal to negotiate (Anonymous 12/22/1984). Ultimately, the program would include 
the purchase of 300 homes and a 228-pad mobile home park, $10.5 million in flood- 
control works, and $2.1 million for master drainage plans (A. Patton 1994). The buy-out 
efforts were only a portion of the total flood-control package eventually undertaken in 
Tulsa, with the COE making significant contributions as well.
2.2.2 The Corps of Engineers Mingo Creek Project
The flood of 1984 also spurred renewed interest in getting the COE’s Mingo 
Creek project funded. No new federal water projects had been funded since the 
beginning of the Carter administration, however, so obtaining funding would be difficult 
(Averill 7/7/1985). The lack of funding partially resulted firom a dispute over issues of 
cost-sharing (Martindale 3/27/1986). Following the 1984 flood. Congressman Jones 
renewed his efforts to get a water projects authorization bill which included monies for 
the Mingo Creek project authorized. However, congressional leaders abandoned the bill
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in the fall of 1984 (Howell 10/11/1984). Oklahoma’s congressional delegation was, 
however, successful in getting $400,000 appropriated in 1984 to continue planning and 
engineering work for the project.
The following year found Oklahoma’s congressional delegation once again 
working for Mingo Creek. They were successful in lobbying for $900,000 ($400,000 
over what the administration had requested) to finish the planning and engineering 
studies one year ahead of schedule (Duck 10/31/1985). Authorization bills, including 
funding for the Mingo Creek project, were passed by both the House and Senate in late 
1985 and early 1986. While both bills authorized the Mingo Creek project, they differed 
over the amount of local cost share required (Ward 4/5/1986). A compromise 
authorization bill, passed in October 1986, had the local cost share at approximately 31% 
of the total $135 million price tag (Anonymous 10/18/1986). This authorization bill 
included funding to finish the design and engineering work, however it did not include 
funding for construction. A separate appropriations bill would be needed to provide 
construction monies.
While awaiting appropriation of funds, the cost-sharing issue once again became 
an issue. At the heart of the debate was the COE’s interpretation of the 1986 Water 
Resources Development Act (PL 99-662) which established new cost-sharing 
requirements (East 3/5/1987). Three portions of the bill troubled the city: 1) a 
prohibition which disallowed credits for any money spent on projects prior to Nov. 17, 
1981; 2) an additional 5% local contribution, and; 3) a COE interpretation that no credit 
is allowable if real estate costs exceed 20% of overall project costs. The COE later 
rescinded its interpretation on the first and third points, referring to the earlier law which
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allowed Tulsa full credit for its work on the project. However, the city would still have 
to come up with the additional 5% ($6.7 million), upping its total cost share to 38% 
(Martindale 3/17/1987).
Initial construction costs were appropriated in late 1987. In January 1988, the 
COE and the city of Tulsa signed a joint agreement outlining each entity’s 
responsibilities in the final project (Hoffman 1/23/1988). According to the agreement, 
the city retained responsibility for: 1) buying land for ponds, easements, and right of 
ways; 2) relocating utilities and streets, and 3) disposing of waste. The COE was 
responsible for construction and design (aside from the city’s 5% construction cost 
responsibility). The city raised the funds necessary for the 5% contribution through bond 
issues approved in late 1987 (Hoffman 1/21/1988).
In late 1988, the COE released its initial designs for the first 5 detention sites 
(Flanagan 1994). Area residents voiced opposition to the COE designs (America 
3/24/89), which were primarily single-purpose flood control facilities (Reynolds 1994). 
The city’s earlier efforts at building detention facilities had emphasized a multi-purpose 
nature, with McClure Park (Hoffman 7/22/88) and Turner Park-Rogers High School 
(Reynolds 1994) being the most visible. The city had even reworked a 1924 trails plan 
(Hinkle 1994) using concepts introduced to the city by Ian McHarg in 1968 (Flanagan 
1994) to create the Tulsa Trails plan. This project would ring the city with a continuous 
path, beginning with a section along Mingo Creek (Anonymous 4/27/1988).
In response to citizen’s complaints, the city hired local consultants to design 
multi-purpose plans for the detention areas. The new plans gained pubic acceptance, as 
one citizen put it “we should accept nothing less... (detention facilities) need to be made
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an attraction, rather than a distraction” (America 3/24/1989). After questions of funding 
for various portions of the plan were ironed out, the plan was adopted and pursued by the 
COE. The project has since garnered numerous awards including a 1994 National 
Society of Professional Engineers Outstanding Engineering Achievement Award for 
innovative engineering (Anonymous 1994). The project received its final dedication in 
1999 (Lassek 6/7/1999).
2.2.3 Department of Stormwater Management
Following the 1984 floods, as the city began to examine the causes and 
consequences of flooding, leaders realized that stormwater responsibilities were 
fragmented across several city departments (DelCour 9/23/1984). This fragmentation 
had resulted in stormwater (particularly maintenance of the current system) receiving 
little funds through the years (Anonymous 12/21/1984). The creation of a separate 
department was seen as a way to ensure that policies enacted by the current 
administration were adhered to in the long-run. According to J. D. Metcalfe, former 
street commissioner and one of the entrepreneurs, “Creating a department is the only way 
to maintain and guarantee a continuity in policy and procedures” (Foran 1/11/1985).
The city commission approved the creation of the department within the street 
commissioner’s office. It also created a citizens panel, the Stormwater Drainage 
Advisory Board, which was to provide guidance and open decisions to public scrutiny 
(Pearson 1/15/1985). The mission of the new department was multi-faceted, duties 
ranged from enforcing the city’s floodplain development regulations, to maintenance of 
stormwater infirastructure, to developing master drainage plans for the city’s numerous 
water basins. Stan Williams was hired as the department’s first head, meanwhile Charles
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Hardt was re-hired by the city as city engineer.
The creation of the department was a relatively easy matter, funding its activities, 
however, would prove to be more onerous. The Citizen’s Task Force on Funding for 
Water Drainage Problems, appointed by the city commissioners, was charged with 
finding permanent funding sources to improve the city’s drainage system (DelCour 
10/14/1984). One possibility, used in other municipalities, was to treat drainage as a 
utility in the same sense as sanitary sewers. A drainage fee would then be assessed from 
every property owner. Once again, controversy erupted. Many outraged citizens 
considered the fee to be an illegally imposed tax (Anonymous 4/30/1986). However, city 
attorney Neal McNeill studied the issue and determined that the fee was perfectly legal 
(Pearson 9/26/1985). The fee is used for departmental operations, enforcement of 
floodplain regulations, and to maintain the storm sewer network. A flat fee is charged to 
residential customers, while commercial development pays a fee proportional to the 
amount of roof and paved areas they include.
One particularly innovative aspect of the fee is the manner in which it is billed. 
Residents receive one utility bill from the city which includes the stormwater fee along 
with charges for sanitary sewers, water consumption, and refuse. Credits are applied 
toward the bill in a hierarchical manner, with water consiunption being the last to get 
credit. Thus, if a homeowner disagrees with the fee and refuses to pay it, they are left 
with an outstanding balance on their water bill and the city can discontinue water service 
(McNeill 1999).
2.3 Recent Developments
In the years since the 1984 flood, Tulsa has developed a comprehensive flood
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hazard mitigation program which has been widely copied. In addition to the features 
mentioned above, the program includes a state-of-the art warning system linking rain 
gauges in a computerized database to increase warning times (Finlayson 3/10/1988). The 
city’s efforts have resulted in reduced flood insurance rates and a number one rating 
under FEMA’s Community Rating System (Anonymous 3/2/1992). In late 1993, the city 
reinstated the flood hazard mitigation team as the Tulsa Mitigation Team, an ongoing 
panel responsible for mitigation efforts. The panel works to identify potential mitigation 
projects throughout the city and also identify any funding opportunities which may arise 
(C. Williams 1995; A. Patton 1995). The efforts Tulsa has made toward protecting its 
citizens from flood hazards will continue to pay off for the city in years to come, as 
evidenced by a recent heavy rainstorm in the area (Lassek 5/10/2000).
3 Key Innovations
This section will review the key innovations identified through the examination of 
the Mingo Creek case. The review will focus on the policy conflicts which led to each 
innovation, as well as the strategies employed by the policy entrepreneurs which led to 
the specific innovations. Consideration will also be given to the role played by 
scientific/technical information (STI) in advancing the innovations.
3.1 Floodplain Management Policies
The seeds of change were planted following the floods of 1974 and 1976 when 
the city enacted its first floodplain management policies. “And that’s when citizens and 
others began in earnest trying to get something done, because we didn’t want things to 
just continue on the way they had been in the past. It was time for a change” (Flanagan 
1998). The flooding crisis had forced citizens to become involved with the issues.
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“Where we were coming from was: We’ve got to have some help folks, and we don’t 
know what else to do except to go to our elected officials” (C. Williams 1998). Citizen 
involvement at that level was not readily accepted by the city of Tulsa at that time, 
however.
“And they told us we couldn’t participate in the meetings; we couldn’t be 
participants. We were treated very much like second-class citizens because ‘you 
all don’t know anything.’ Well, after we sat through a few hundred of the 
meetings, we found out they didn’t know anything either. They were all just 
groping around out here trying to answer these questions we were asking” (C. 
Williams 1998).
Thus, the prevailing institutional environment was not receptive to the needs of its 
citizens or their calls for change. The city’s opinion, based upon a ruling by the city 
attorney, was that water was a common enemy over which the city had no control.
This was interpreted by the city in such a manner, that, what one property owner 
did to “protect” himself from floods was acceptable, regardless of the effect his efforts 
would have upon those properties located downstream (C. Williams 1998). Indeed, the 
city had done little to control development or deal with stormwater issues. According to 
Stan Williams, the city employee responsible for writing subdivision regulations at the 
time, there was a “lack of requirements for new development in terms of infrastructure, 
particularly drainage and flood-control type infrastructure” (S. Williams 1999). Charles 
Hardt, then city hydrologist, stated “In fact, their stormwater criteria at the time consisted 
of one sheet, 8 K x 14 inches, and had such vague requirements that it made it almost 
impossible as a practicing engineer to implement” (Hardt 1998).
Following the 1976 floods, the citizens had their flood insurance to turn to in 
order to gamer the attention of elected officials.
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“Our major question from then on was: ‘How is this going to affect our flood 
insurance?’ ... And we had asked that in public meetings all the time, so it thereby 
made the people here that weren’t terribly interested or knowledgeable about it, 
they’d have to go check and see if it was going to violate the flood insurance 
because they were going to be held accountable” (C. Williams 1998).
After the 1976 flood, in order to remain in the federal flood insurance program, and also
in an effort to quiet the vocal citizenry, city leaders were forced to enact floodplain
management regulations. There was little support from the city for the policies, however.
“The job where we rewrote the subdivision regulations, I quickly found out that 
nobody wanted them rewritten. So I’d spent a long time working on revising 
things that people didn’t really want me to revise. And it wouldn’t have 
happened, I don’t think except for 1976 when it flooded again, it really gave a 
great impetus to the efforts that were going on. So we were successful in revising 
the regulations based on this really great deal of involvement by all these 
citizens” (S. Williams 1999).
This crisis set in motion the beginnings of the floodplain and stormwater management
programs which, today, are so successful. “So, that was the start of our floodplain
management program here. And essentially it was to qualify these flood prone areas for
flood insurance. That was our main policy objective. And gradually, as we brought in
the floodplain mapping from the flood insurance program, that led to some development
controls” (LaFortune 1999).
Although the floodplain management policies which were enacted in the late
1970's were not stringently enforced by future administrations, the institutional
environment was changed in that the citizens had been able to voice their opinions and
influence the government. They not only changed the institutional environment of the
local government, but, they had altered the institutional envirorunent of the FIA (S.
Williams 1999). Their efforts also served to raise issues which would become the center
of the controversies following the 1984 floods. “It laid the seeds, I guess, that would
75
come back later on and be very fruitful in future years. In the ‘70's we had talked about 
the fact that Mingo Creek, some of the property that had developed, the houses, they 
shouldn’t have been there” (S. Williams 1999).
3.2 Flood Hazard Mitigation Team
While Mayor Terry Young had used flooding and drainage problems as one of his 
campaign issues, no one could have anticipated that he would be forced to confront the 
Issue in such a dramatic fashion just 19 days after taking office. The team which he 
assembled following the 1984 floods included many of the people who had been active in 
earlier reform efforts. As many of these people had left Tulsa to pursue other interests, it 
was just “a remarkable coincidence of people being in town at that particular time who 
were advocates for our program over a number of years” (T. Young 1999). However, 
had the crisis not occurred, ‘T might not have tapped many of those same people to try to 
put into place the stormwater management system that I had proposed in my campaign. I 
might have used an entirely different set of people to develop those things than I ended 
up using after that devastating event” (T. Young 1999).
Many of the policy entrepreneurs interviewed commented, however, on the fact 
that it was the particular combination of people who were tapped that made iimovation 
possible. “I’m convinced that what has happened in Tulsa since [1984] is because of that 
very reason. Because you had a relatively small group of people there that felt like this 
was the right thing to do and they would not let me or anyone else rest until everything 
got done that could be done” (Greer 1999). Each of these persons brought to the team 
individual traits which collectively helped the team succeed. Former street 
commissioner, J. D. Metcalfe, brought credibility to the group. “He was so well
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respected in the community by the different political factions that I think that made a 
difference” (Hinkle 1999). As a professional hydrologist, Charles Hardt brought 
technical know-how to the group. “I think he was, again, one of the key players because 
he did have so much expertise. He knew what he was doing; he knew the history; he had 
the scientific background” (Hinkle 1999). “He tried to find solutions that would solve 
everybody’s problems, you know that wouldn’t be one side against the other. Charles 
was the guy in the middle who would try to bring both sides together and find that 
common ground” (Flanagan 1998).
Mayor Young brought with him an attitude of being “an advocate of looking out 
for new ways of doing things” (T. Young 1999) which inspired him to form the advisory 
team. Stan Williams, in particular, was able to promote discussion on many different 
ways of doing things. He “was well-read [and] had some far-thinking concepts on the 
environmental impact of floodplain management” (Hardt 1998). Ron Flanagan, planning 
consultant, was perhaps the most radical proponent of change (Flanagan 1998). Carol 
Williams brought to the team the fear of living with flood danger on a day-to-day basis. 
Finally, there was Ann Patton who served as administrative assistant to J. D. Metcalfe.
As a reporter, she kept the issue before the public’s eye, “the public never would have 
known about these issues if it wasn’t through the media” (Flanagan 1998). In her 
capacity as administrative assistant, however, she acted as the glue that held everyone 
together, keeping the team focused on its mission. “She always knew where we were 
going. I didn’t always know where we were going. I just always knew that we needed to 
be in constant compromise” (Hardt 1998).
The individual team members also were adept at obtaining outside information.
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“We had some people who knew where to point for information, too” (T. Young 1999).
By the time the 1984 floods hit, “we bad made our contacts, and we knew people from all
over the country” (Flanagan 1998). Several of these contacts were nationally recognized
academic authorities on flood control. Various team members had met with Gilbert
White (a nationally known expert on flooding from Colorado) and found him very
receptive to helping Tulsa work towards solving its problems (A. Patton 1999). Ian
McHarg (a planning expert) had twice visited Tulsa and provided input into the direction
the city should pursue (Flanagan 1994).
In addition, contacts had been made within the COE and FEMA, particularly
since many of the team members were former employees of these agencies. The
relationship with the COE had been forged in the late 1970's and was strengthened
following the 1984 flood, particularly once the COE Mingo Creek project was flmded.
The COE relationship was also aided by the fact that J. D. Metcalfe and the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Affairs were personal friends (Metcalfe 1999). The team
worked hard to find out what the current state of knowledge was regarding the issues of
flood protection. “We reached out. We talked to the FEMA people. We learned about
experiences in other communities.... We read every document. We looked at every
opportunity. We looked at every option.” (T. Yoimg 1999). FEMA’s willingness to be
so helpful in Tulsa partially resulted from the prevailing attitudes of the time.
“In the early days of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 our normal 
reaction was this is the federal government trying to force regulations on us and 
we’re not really interested in being required to do those things.... The unique 
feature of Tulsa was they were out there saying ’Yes. We know that. We want it 
now. What can you do help?”’ (Greer 1999)
The team acted strategically while pursuing their ultimate goal of flood
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protection. The meetings “were not categorized as strategizing sessions. It was just 
‘what next?”’ (Hardt 1998). The strategy which eventually developed had several key 
components: I) look for opportunities to act right after the crisis; 2) gamer community 
acceptance and participation; 3) allow the city to get financial credit for its early efforts, 
and; 4) ensure continuity of the program and policies through changes in the institutional 
environment. According to one entrepreneur “1 think being poised to act quickly and 
take advantage of changing circumstances has been the key to our success” (Hardt 1998). 
Most of the subsequent innovations can be directly related to furthering one or more 
these strategy components.
3.3 Acquisition and Relocation
One manner in which the entrepreneurs found to act quickly was the acquisition 
and relocation of flood-damaged properties. Quick action was critical, “the need was to 
try to put into practice some of the things that we’d learned from the ‘70's in terms of 
trying to do something right after the flood, look for opportimities for mitigation” (S. 
Williams 1999). The crisis had intensified the entrepreneur’s belief that the time was 
right to take action, “we looked at the political opportunity of striking while the iron was 
hot, and while the community was reeling over this” (T. Young 1999).
The team decided “that Mingo Creek had flooded enough, and there was no sense 
in building all those houses and putting them right back in place, and so the night of the 
flood, we started putting together maps and deciding which houses were going to stay in 
the floodplain” (Flanagan 1998). While other municipalities had experienced limited 
success with buy-out programs, the idea also had support firom the residents whose 
homes had flooded. “The balance of more than 50% of it [the buy-out idea] came firom
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the people whose mental health and physical health was beginning to suffer dramatically
because of the stress and anxiety of being in these repetitive flooding areas and not being
able to do anything about it” (T. Yoimg 1999).
The city then imposed its controversial rebuilding moratorium, which was an
option available within the existing framework of city government (Metcalfe 1998). The
purpose of the moratorium was two-fold, it kept the citizens from spending their
insurance money on rebuilding and it bought the city time to arrange financing for the
buyouts. The buy-out proved to be quite controversial, however, as coalitions formed
over property rights issues. “Interestingly, these folks were kind of trapped in those
houses because they couldn’t sell them on the market. But when we were proposing that
we were going to move them, they suddenly became very attached to those houses” (T.
Young 1999). Overcoming the resistance of the anti-acquisition coalitions took a great
deal of political will (Metcalfe 1998).
“We went to a public meeting where the people that were hosting the meeting 
were absolutely against the policies that were being advocated, of acquisition of 
flood properties and stuff. They wanted to live there, and they just wanted the 
problem to go away. I don’t remember all the details, but in effect the person in 
charge on the platform made a statement, and there was a citizen comment, and to 
answer the question it needed the mayor, who proceeded to take the microphone 
and never gave it back to the person in charge... and he sold some of those 
concepts” (Hardt 1998).
Aside from the political controversy the buy-out created, the entrepreneurs also
had to overcome funding barriers.
“The innovative part of Tulsa was that they found a way to obtain financing and 
actually perform the relocation activities that people across the country were 
talking about doing but were not able to do either for lack of significant interest 
really to get it done, or more importantly, the financing to get it done” (Greer 
1999).
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By declaring the moratorium, they were able to persuade FEMA to work with them to 
find a solution
“we had turned to FEMA for a significant amoimt of assistance in funding this 
entire program ... FEMA deserves a great deal of credit in this particular program 
for being willing to try something a little bit different than they had traditionally 
been called upon to do in the past” (T. Yoimg 1999).
The city had initially requested the entire cost of the buyouts from FEMA Section 1362
funds, but ended up with a compromise solution whereby each would fimd half the cost
remaining after insurance monies were applied (T. Young 1999). The entrepreneurs had
envisioned using part of the surplus sales tax revenues to fund their portion of the buyout.
Once again, they met with political resistance, and were forced to compromise (Pearson
7/12/1984). “And then we put together, again with some very innovative people, some
very creative people, a way of using interest earnings on sales taxes to fund our part of it
without having to take taxes away from designated projects to do it” (T. Young 1999).
Once the funding particulars had been worked out, great efforts were still required
to gain public acceptance of the buy-out solution. “People said, ‘You’re using our tax
money to buy out those house of those people there. They knew better than to build out
there anyway. They shouldn’t have moved in out there if they didn’t want to be flooded’.
We had a tough one to fight” (T. Young 1999). The entrepreneurs used the media as a
means for gaining the much needed public acceptance
“The newspapers, the editorial side of the newspapers and those commentaries 
that emanate from those writers became supportive of the concept. And so rather 
than it being such a radical proposal, it was being discussed in tone of voices that 
had some reason in them. And it [the media] was a great contributor to the ability 
to sell the program” (T. Young 1999).
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3.4 Corps of Engineers Mingo Creek Project
The idea of gaining public acceptance was carried over to the development of the
COE Mingo Creek project. “Part of this process was selling the detention concept to the
citizenry” (Hardt 1998). In the beginning the citizens were uninformed as to the nature
of the detention basins.
“The planning that had gone into it by the COE in the ‘70's had been done with 
not much citizen participation, and the impact of the project was very wide 
spread.... So one of the things that we had to do different in the ‘80's was we had 
to go out and explain to those neighborhoods what was being planned. And that 
became the major challenge, that I recall, is trying to make that project one that 
could be accommodated by the commimity without a real negative reaction” (S. 
Williams 1999).
To build public support, the entrepreneurs used an existing park which was already slated
for channelization. The park was used to show the citizenry how regional detention areas
could benefit the community. They used a combination of charmel work and detention
areas in the park, upgrading the recreational facilities at the same time.
“And we would say, ‘Look. Here’s an example of how it can be done and will be 
done.’ And it was on that good faith commitment that we were able to sell this so 
lightly, and go into neighborhoods and build these things next to housing 
developments where they were not just drastically resistant” (Hardt 1998).
Not only did the city have to gain public acceptance of the project, but they had to 
win over the COE as well. In the late I970's Tulsa began to realize that on-site detention 
was not as effective as it had hoped and began to look at the idea of using regional 
detention facilities. They then garnered citizen support for the idea and approached the 
COE about amending their Mingo Creek plans (Hardt 1998). They initially met with 
much resistance from the Corps, as the Corps’ standard design plan was to build 
concrete-lined channels (Buchert 1998). The city took advantage of some key personnel
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changes within the Corps (Hardt 1998; Buchert 1998), the personal friendship between J. 
D. Metcalfe and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Affairs (Metcalfe 1998), as 
well as Congressman Jones’ political clout (Jones 1999) to win the acceptance of the 
COE.
Part of the resistance on the part of the COE stemmed from a historically
adversarial relationship they had with the city concerning flood control issues. “But out
of necessity perhaps, hopefully because of design, but out of necessity as well, we were
reaching out to create a parmership with the Corps. They were astounded at the change
in attitude” (T. Yoimg 1999). One key tool the entrepreneurs used in developing this
partnership was to include the COE in decisions from the beginning. Another key in
building the successful partnership was a willingness on the part of the entrepreneurs to
allow the COE to take credit for the iimovative nature of the detention basins.
“And so our bond became inseparable. Wejust became a true partnership. And 
partners meaning you don’t try to stab each other in the back and you don’t try to 
take all the credit, but you give the other person credit. So whenever the Corps 
would get up to speak, we were wonderful. Whenever we got up to speak, the 
corp was wonderful” (Hardt 1998).
The efforts the entrepreneurs made to gain favorable attention for the project also served
as part of their strategy for maintaining program continuity as administrative changes
were made. A final key factor in the forging of a successful partnership was the city’s
willingness to cooperate with the Corps on the cost sharing issues.
“Fortunately for Tulsa, that [cost sharing] wasn’t an issue because we’d had that 
provision that allowed us to get credit for all the work that had been done. So we 
didn’t have any problem with the concept of cost sharing because we had already 
put a lot o f money into it” (S. Williams 1999).
This deal, made after the 1976 floods, was essential in allowing the entrepreneurial team
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to forge ahead with its plans for city-wide flood control. Had that deal not been in place, 
the city may not have been able to fund it’s portion of the cost sharing (East 3/5/1987).
The initial design the COE worked up for the detention basins were primarily 
single-purpose flood control facilities (Reynolds 1994). Area residents voiced opposition 
to the COE designs (America 3/24/89). Several of the entrepreneurs had gained 
familiarity with multiple-use facilities and had already applied the concept in some of the 
city’s detention basin efforts. In the case of the COE Mingo Creek project, the multiple- 
use basins represented a more dramatic (due to the scale of the project) application of 
existing technology. The multiple-use design feature had a dual purpose. As discussed 
above, it eased the process o f gaining public acceptance. However, it also served as a 
means for ensuring that program changes made immediately after the 1984 floods would 
not be readily changed after the flood was forgotten. “The dilemma was that as we were 
successful in our floodplain management activities, we were losing our constituency.
And so the very people who were supporting us no longer had a vested interest in 
stormwater management” (Flanagan 1998). The entrepreneurs reasoned that if the 
detention basins served multiple purposes such as parks and open space, the commimity 
would fight any efforts to discontinue the programs supporting them. “It was strictly a 
preservation thing of ourselves, preserving our own objectives. In order to save the 
floodplains, you had to make them usable by the public” (Flanagan 1998).
3.5 Department of Stormwater Management
Along with garnering awards and ensuring the public had a vested interest in the 
detention basins, a third strategy for ensuring program continuity was the establishment 
of the stormwater department and the utility fee. “A couple o f things that were intended
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to try to make sure those changes didn’t get wiped out over time, was of course the utility 
fee concept, getting a dedicated funding source, and trying to figure out some way to get 
the effort there recognized as being successful” (S. Williams 1999).
When the entrepreneurs began studying the underlying causes for the 1984 floods, 
they found that the storm sewer system in Tulsa was a contributing factor. “The fact that 
the existing drainage system was in such poor shape was a very significant contributing 
factor to ‘84 flooding. We found many cases of channels that were so clogged with 
debris and growth that they just couldn’t function properly” (Metcalfe 1998). While 
creation of the new department was relatively easy, funding its activities proved to be 
fairly controversial. “They weren’t hearing about any new taxes, so if we played it [the 
fee] as a utility, people would be willing to pay for services that were being provided to 
them” (Flanagan 1998). The utility fee idea was borrowed from other mimicipalities, “It 
had been implemented in Bellevue, WA, and a couple of other cities” (S. Williams 1999). 
The fee received the endorsement of the mayor’s funding task force, which later became 
the stormwater drainage advisory board. “We were going to look at how it [the 
stormwater department] should be organized and, as importantly, how it would be 
funded.... and so I think that was key to have this group of citizens be the ones to make 
that recommendation [for the fee]” (Hinkle 1999).
Despite its successful application elsewhere, attorneys for the city continued to 
argue whether or not Tulsa could implement such a fee. Neal McNeill, city attorney, 
found a relevant precedent from the state supreme court that said a city could impose a 
(sanitary) sewer fee.
“I was convinced we could take that same language and apply it to stormwater
85
because there is no distinction in the statute, it just says sewers. No distinction 
between one and the other. The rest of the department thought that it needed 
specific legislation to authorize it. And so I stuck my head out and wrote the 
opinion that said that they could impose the fee” (McNeill 1999).
The fee was one of the key long-term innovations, “the implementation of the storm
water management fee was a real innovative part there [Tulsa] to create some financing”
(Greer 1999). In the words of another entrepreneur, “1 think it's proven to be absolutely
essential to have this fee” (Hinkle 1999). Mr. McNeill also acted in an innovative
fashion by expanding the billing ordinance which required credits to be applied to the
storm drainage utility fee prior to crediting for water use (McNeill 1999). (This
ordinance also provides that sanitary sewer and trash charges be credited before water
charges.)
The establishment of the fee to fund the department necessitated the development 
of the stormwater drainage advisory board. “When we talked about having a fee 
established, we needed to do the typical structuring you would find in any governmental 
unit and that’s to have some sort of citizen watchdog group over the expenditure of the 
money” (T. Young 1999). However, the group also was designed to be an advocate for 
revamping Tulsa’s stormwater infrastructure (T. Young 1999), All three aspects, the 
establishment of the department, the utility fee, and the advisory board, have had a 
dramatic effect on Tulsa’s institutional environment regarding stormwater. “It’s 
institutionalized, the fundamental benefit” (Hardt 1998). The alteration of the 
institutional structure in this manner has allowed Tulsa’s stormwater program to continue 
to grow and flourish in the years following the 1984 flood.
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4 Summary
Following the flood events of 1976 and 1984, Tulsa city leaders were faced with a 
situation in which they were forced to develop the capacity to respond to flood issues. 
More specifically, the city’s proven inability to protect the citizens forced response. The 
city experienced limited success with its initial efforts at floodplain management. The 
institutional structure following the 1976 floods was not receptive to citizens or their 
calls for change. However, they were effective in getting ordinances on the books. Thus, 
they changed the institutional environment somewhat.
The discussions surrounding the implementation of these ordinances lead to the 
development of coalitions (homeowners and developers) arguing over issues of property 
rights. The homeowner coalition felt that the developers were not paying the full social 
costs of their actions, even after the fee-in-lieu system was enacted. The developers, on 
the other hand, felt that they were being unfairly burdened and not being allowed to use 
their own property to its highest potential. The development coalition was winning, “the 
things that we passed in the ‘70's floated along, mostly not being enforced but on the 
books” (C. Williams 1998). This situation is proof that old paradigms die hard, and that 
motivation of any alternative solutions would require a more dramatic event and an 
effective political coalition.
The dramatic event came in the form of the 1984 floods, which were much worse 
than the 1976 flood. The only thing which had changed in the interim was that 
development had increased in the area (C. Williams 1998). As it happened, the seeds of 
an effective political coalition had taken office just 19 days prior to the flood. While the 
overwhelming devastation forced public attention on the issue, it took political courage to
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effect the solutions.
“Sometimes you know what’s right, but it requires people who do have the 
political courage to stand up for what’s right, even if it may not be perceived at 
that time by the public or the other parties involved that this is what needs to be 
done. And there were individuals who did that, like the mayor [Teny Young] and 
like the street commissioner [J. D. Metcalfe]’’ (Hinkle 1999).
The personal qualities of these two entrepreneurs, as well as the rest of the team they
assembled, proved to be a key ingredient in the success of Tulsa’s successful innovation
regarding flash flood hazard mitigation.
Another key was the ability of these individuals to utilize outside expertise,
particularly scientific and technical expertise. “I think our success is several things. It is
thinking ahead and having a wide, diverse group of people doing that thinking” (Hardt
1998). The entrepreneurs widened their thinking by bringing in nationally recognized
consultants with previous experience designing multi-purpose detention basins. They
also networked with natural hazard mitigation experts such as Gilbert White and Ian
McHarg. Finally, since they knew that they could not accomplish all that they wished to
within the confines of the city government, they forged a highly successful parmership
with the COE, another source of outside expertise. This high level of intellectual
leadership from outside the city was not evident in the other cases studied as part of this
research.
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Chapter 4
The Metropolitan Environmental Trust
1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the retrospective assessment for the municipal 
solid waste recycling (Metropolitan Environmental Trust) case. The timeline developed 
for this case is presented in Appendix B: Municipal Solid Waste Recycling and The 
Metropolitan Environmental Trust Timeline.
As the narrative description of the case shows, the perception by the Tulsa 
citizenry of solid waste has changed over the time period examined. What was once 
something which was given little regard soon became seen as a potential environmental 
hazard. In addition, where once little thought was given to the means of disposal, the 
citizens now not only accept recycling, but are asking for expanded services.
The entrepreneurs active in this case wanted to achieve more than public 
acceptance of recycling. They wanted to do so while building a bridge between the 
private and public sectors. Thus, they undertook a variety of strategic actions while 
building the Metropolitan Environmental Trust (The M.e.t.), which were aimed at both 
building acceptance of recycling and achieving private sector buy-in. Specifically, they 
have built their program in small increments. They strategically sought functions which 
were not being filled by the member communities and which could be successfully done 
at minimal cost. This building upon their successes, one small step at a time, increased 
the private sector interest and response.
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A second strategic move, again aimed at building private sector buy-in, has been 
for The M.e.t. to remain a small organization. This strategy also has the added advantage 
of keeping the organization from becoming a typical bureaucracy. The kinds of 
individuals necessary to keep this type of innovation going are extremely dedicated to 
their ideals, and have a strong sense of public service which surpasses their paychecks. 
This type of person is not generally comfortable working within mature government 
agencies, but prefers to “push the envelope”.
This chapter first presents a narrative description of the pertinent events which 
took place. This is followed by a discussion of the key innovations, the barriers which 
were overcome in their development, and the strategies which were employed.
2 Case Description
As the 1970's began, the nation was realizing that its traditional methods of waste 
disposal were inadequate and that new answers would be needed. Issues pertaining to 
solid waste management soon began to overwhelm local governments. As a result, the 
federal government increased its involvement in solid waste policy making with the 
enactment of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (PL 89-272, 79 Stat. 992) and later 
the Resource Recovery Act of 1970 (PL 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227). In addition, large private 
firms began offering solutions such as waste-to-energy (WTE) and mega-landfills, often 
forming public-private partnerships with local municipalities.
The City of Tulsa was one such municipality where public-private partnerships 
were thriving. In late 1972, the city refuse department collected approximately 41% of 
the total City of Tulsa residential refuse, with the remainder collected by private hauling 
companies (Patton & Stefanic 9/9/1973; Williams Brothers Engineering 1972). Solid
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waste collected by the city was disposed of in one of two city-operated sanitary landfills. 
The Mohawk Landfill, located in the floodplain on the east bank of Bird Creek, was 
considered full, and consideration was being given for its expansion. The Union Landfill 
was operated in depleted strip mining land under lease by the city, and had an estimated 
remaining lifetime of 2-3 years (Williams Brothers Engineering 1972). Tulsa private 
refuse haulers were utilizing six privately owned sanitary landfills.
By late 1973, near record levels of complaints regarding trash service were being 
logged by the City of Tulsa, and the refuse department was losing approximately 
S190,000 per year (Patton & Stefanic 9/9/1973). In addition, the Oklahoma Solid Waste 
Management Act of 1970 (Title 63 Oklahoma Statutes (O.S.)) charged municipal 
governments with developing plans to adequately dispose of solid waste generated within 
their incorporated limits. This act also created a State Solid Waste Advisory Committee 
to recommend rules and regulations to be adopted by the State Board of Health, which 
was granted enforcement powers.
In December of 1971, the Indian Nations Council of Government (INCOG), with 
grant monies obtained from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
commissioned Williams Brothers Engineering to develop both short-term and long-term 
regional solid waste management plans. Short-term recommendations were released in a 
report dated September, 1972 (Williams Brothers Engineering 1972). Seven of the 
twenty recommendations for the City of Tulsa were aimed at eliminating the operating 
deficit of the refuse department. The Oklahoma Solid Waste Management Act of 1970 
(Title 63 O.S.) also prohibited depositing wastes in floodplains. Therefore, replacement 
of the Mohawk landfill with a new landfill to be located in north Tulsa was also
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recommended. Additionally, a second new landfill, to be located somewhere in east 
Tulsa, was suggested along with taking efforts to expand the life of the Union Landfill.
Perhaps the most sweeping recommendation pertained to the coordination of 
public and private collection efforts. The report suggested that if  private collection 
efforts were to continue in the city, that franchised service areas be established. The city 
would bill customers directly and charge the private haulers a fee for this service. While 
alternative methods of solid waste disposal were discussed in the report, sanitary 
landfilling seemed to be the only option given serious consideration.
Williams Brothers released their long-term recommendations in April, 1974 
(Williams Brothers Engineering 1974). Noting that little activity had occurred relative to 
their short-term recommendations, this report included no new recommendations for the 
City of Tulsa. Instead, it reiterated the need for implementation of the previous 
suggestions as soon as possible. It also considered the feasibility of forming a regional 
trust authority for solid waste, but concluded that such a venture would not be 
appropriate due to the lack of activity on their previous recommendations.
In contrast to the first report, this report gave much consideration to alternative 
disposal options such as recycling or incineration. A pilot recycling program was 
conducted in conjunction with the League of Women Voters, the Tulsa refuse 
department, the Tulsa City-County Health Department, and INCOG staff. The program 
expenditures far exceeded its revenues, and as a result, the report cited a low probability 
of success for a household recycling program in Tulsa.
The report was more optimistic, however, regarding the potential for incineration 
by the city. The process is explained in great detail within the body of the report, and
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incineration with heat recovery was cited as the most viable solid waste disposal option 
available to the city aside from sanitary landfills. A suggestion was made that mutual 
plans be developed with Oklahoma Natural Gas Company or Public Service Company of 
Oklahoma (PSO) as soon as possible. The report cautioned, however, that the City of 
Tulsa must gain control of disposal of all refuse generated within its limits before this 
option would become economically feasible.
2.1 Tulsa’s Waste-to-Energy Plant
Soon after the release of the second study, Williams Brothers Engineering began 
to look into the possibility of locating a refuse-derived fuel (RDF) plant in Tulsa. In late 
1977, the Tulsa Energy Resource Recovery Authority (TERRA - which later became the 
Tulsa Authority for the Recovery of Energy, or TARE) was formed and received a start­
up loan/grant from the U. S. Department of Energy (Holmes n.d.). The authority’s stated 
purpose was to examine the potential for an incineration plant in Tulsa. The city 
commissioners also served as the members of the authority. By early 1978 the Mustang 
RDF Co. and PSO were pushing for the siting of a boiler-fuel producing plant. The plant 
would collect refuse, separate and shred it at a recycling plant. Paper, wood and other 
combustibles would then be used for fuel at PSO’s Oologah plant to generate electricity, 
while scrap metals would be recycled. There was much public opposition to proposed 
plant locations, however (Kelley 1/13/1978; Anonymous 1/14/1978).
In the meantime, the city was facing landfill problems (Pearson 5/12/1978). It 
was paying for a lease on one landfill which was full; under contract to take trash to 
another which wasn’t licensed by the city and judged to be substandard by the City- 
County Health Department; preparing a contract to buy land for a third; and looking at a
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possible location for a fourth. The city refuse department was operating under a $1.7 
million dollar deficit, and the city commissioners were considering a rate increase or 
service reduction (Rehg 6/16/1978; Marier 6/16/1978). It is within this context that the 
city commissioners adopted a new ordinance regulating refuse collectors which required 
the city’s license number to be painted on all trucks, rates to be posted, a lower license 
fee, and a limit to the hours in which trash could be collected (Logue 6/30/1978).
Acting as TERRA, commissioners approved engineering and cost estimates for 
the first transfer station which would be required under the Mustang RDF proposal in 
November, 1978. An independent consultant’s report indicated that the trash-to-fuel plan 
was a viable option if the city could maintain the availability of approximately 250,000 
tons of refuse per year (Marier 11/19/1978). In July, 1979 the city took its first steps to 
gain this control when TARE requested bids for a five-year collection contract for the 
northeast quadrant of the city. Tulsa Refuse, Inc. (TRI), a consortium of private haulers, 
was awarded the contract. It was later extended to cover 75% of the city instead of the 
original 25%. The Mustang proposal later became infeasible, however, due to revised 
load forecasts by PSO. By this time the city had made its commitment to the idea of 
incineration clear.
In 1980, Alternate Energy Systems approached the city with a letter of intent firom 
Sun Refining and PSO wanting to build a WTE plant. Subsequently, this firm was 
acquired by Midwesco, a Chicago-based engineering and construction firm. The terms of 
the contracts with Sun and PSO required construction to begin by May, 1984. 
Unfortunately, Midwesco/AES did not have the technology or funds necessary to begin 
construction by this deadline. In February 1984, Ogden Martin Systems, Inc. was invited
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to become involved in the incineration talks and suggested utilizing their proprietary 
Martin GMBH technology. If built, this would be the first time this European technology 
was used in the United States.
In order to salvage the original contracts between PSO and Sun, time became an 
essential component in the ensuing contract negotiations between the city and Ogden 
Martin. Additionally, since this was the first such plant to be built by Ogden Martin in 
the United States, all parties were negotiating without previous experience or historical 
data. The agreement which was ultimately reached to build a two-bumer plant included 
provisions for the city to assume a major portion of the construction costs while Ogden 
Martin would retain ownership and operate the plant. The city also agreed to provide a 
certain tonnage of solid waste to the plant annually, and to reimburse Ogden Martin for 
some of the operating costs. TARE approved the plans in April, 1984; bonds were 
issued, contracts and permits renewed, and construction began within three months. In 
1985, after a solid waste weighing program was undertaken, the need for a third burner 
was identified. The first two units became operational in October of 1986, and the third 
unit one year later.
From the time it first became operational, the city experienced difficulties with 
the WTE plant. The price of natural gas did not reach the levels which had been 
projected when the plant was built. As a result, the city was forced to raise the rates for 
residential trash collection twice between June, 1987 and April, 1989 (Buchert 1992). In 
August, 1988, in an effort to ensure the financial success of the WTE plant, the city 
passed an ordinance requiring all trash generated within the city to be disposed of at the 
plant (Hofftnan 6/29/1988; Zubeck 1/17/1989). However, the private haulers which were
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servicing the city’s commercial accoimts were by-passing the WTE plant and utilizing 
cheaper landfills. In response, the city initiated the Commercial Refuse Accounting 
Billing System (CRABS) in April, 1989. The system was set up such that the city billed 
the customer for waste disposal and the hauler for collection and transportation; thus, the 
haulers would no longer have incentive to by-pass the WTE plant. Disposal rates were 
based on the type of business and the building square footage.
This system met with much opposition, culminating in a lawsuit by the Overhead 
Door Company which charged the city with assessing a tax without the vote of the 
citizens. CRABS was eventually replaced with a system based on the size of the trash 
container used and its frequency of pick up. The new system went into effect in 
February, 1991.
The political environment surrounding solid waste management in Tulsa could 
not have been worse. In addition to the furor surrounding CRABS and irritation of 
residential customers over rate hikes, the city was sued by Ogden Martin in May, 1989 
over its failure to reimburse the company for sales and ad valorem taxes (as per their 
agreement with the city). In an effort to rectify the situation. Water and Sewer 
Commissioner Charlie King appointed a seven-member Solid Waste Advisory Board to 
review all facets of the WTE plant. It examined the possibility of purchasing the plant, 
altering the service contract with TRI, creating new residential service classes and 
altering the CRABS system. In addition. Mayor Roger Randle, having asked Ogden 
Martin to renegotiate the operating contract and meeting with opposition, appointed Bob 
Dick to examine the total solid waste disposal situation in Tulsa. Dick issued a report in 
July, 1990 which suggested the city implement citywide recycling to handle any solid
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waste generated in excess of the WTE plant capacity (Zubeck 7/2/1990). Mayor Randle 
(and his successor. Mayor Savage) supported recycling, but only if it would not result in 
fee increases. It was within this political environment that the Metropolitan 
Environmental Trust (The M.e.t.) was formed.
2.2 The Evolution of The M.e.t.
During the time the WTE plant was under construction, a growing awareness of 
the regional nature of Tulsa’s solid waste disposal problems emerged. These problems 
included: (1) rising collection and disposal costs; (2) increasing volumes of solid waste 
requiring disposal; (3) difficulties in permitting and siting new landfills; (4) and a belief 
that the majority of the area landfills would close in the near future (due to new 
regulations). In response to these problems, the INCOG board of directors established a 
Regional Solid Waste Advisory Committee in November, 1985. Members included 
elected officials, employees of local governments, engineers specializing in landfill 
design or resource recovery techniques, private citizens, and waste haulers. Additional 
support was available through INCOG, the local and state health departments, and 
Tulsa’s solid waste and legal departments. The committee’s mission, originally, was to 
determine where to site the region’s next landfills; however it quickly evolved into a 
broader examination of all available solid waste management alternatives.
Solutions recommended by the group were divided into the general categories of 
volume reduction, siting recommendations, and regulatory issues (Regional Solid Waste 
Management Advisory Committee 1986). In regard to volume reduction, the group 
suggested a 62.5% reduction in waste volume via material reuse and recycling and the 
soon-to-be completed WTE facility. They suggested using drop-off centers, and having
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some of the centers located outside the city limits (Buchert 1998). This was one of the 
first examples of the municipalities taking a regional approach to the solid waste 
problems. They also identified the inunediate need for the construction of two new 
landfills and possibly some transfer stations, laying out stringent guidelines for landfill 
siting. Finally, they suggested the establishment of a Regional Solid Waste Management 
District with representation from each jurisdictions’s Regional Solid Waste Planning 
Committee (to be established) and INCOG staff.
This final suggestion, in particular, was carefully researched to determine what 
forms of Interlocal agreements were possible under Oklahoma statute (S. Young 1999). 
Included in the discussion of the different forms, was whether or not the decision-making 
practices of each structure agreed with a set o f values the committee had agreed was 
important. The reason for the intensive study of the different alternatives was the 
previous failure of a regional sewage treatment authority (S. Young 1999). The INCOG 
board of directors had made it clear to the advisory committee that they did not wish to 
have a repeat of that failed project.
The structure which was eventually agreed upon became the Northeast Oklahoma 
Solid Waste Management Authority (NOSWMA) in February, 1988. (It was renamed 
The Metropolitan Environmental Trust - The M.e.t. in 1990). In the beginning, the 
primary focus of the organization was to continue to site new landfills (S. Young 1999). 
During this same time, however, groups of people were going ahead with other projects 
geared toward recycling. For example. Liberty Glass and the Tulsa World began to 
sponsor the “Get Off Your Glass - Recycle” campaign, with collection bells located 
throughout the city, and a donation made to the United Way for every ton of glass
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collected (Greene 2/27/1989). In June, 1988 the City of Owasso opened its recycling 
center, paying for recyclable items and charging less than local landfills for people to 
dump their trash (Martin 9/3/1989). American Waste Control began operating the Tulsa 
Transfer and Recycling Station, separating recyclables before sending waste to the WTE 
plant (Averill 5/7/1989).
These various efforts were complemented by the area’s first collection event for 
household hazardous wastes, specifically oil and batteries, held in December, 1989 
(Radzinski et al. 1990). The weekend event took place at the county fairgrounds in 
Tulsa, and was co-sponsored by NOSWMA, Tulsa County, and the city solid waste 
management department. The response was tremendous, far exceeding anyone’s 
expectations. Shortly afterwards, NOSWMA became The M.e.t. and began searching for 
a new service-oriented focus (Miner 1999). It was determined that all of the member 
cities were interested in some sort of waste reduction program, and the focus quickly 
became recycling with an emphasis on public education. In Jime, 1990, The M.e.t. 
published its first regional recycling directory, providing interested parties with an easy 
means to locate recycling opportunities in their area (M. Patton 1995).
It quickly became clear that a one-size-fits-all solution to recycling would not be 
an appropriate strategy for The M.e.t. to pursue. Tulsa’s WTE plant created a special set 
of problems which had to be overcome if a recycling program were to be successful 
there. In addition, several other cities were already operating successful recycling 
programs of one sort or another. In November, 1990 the Tulsa city council appointed a 
citizens committee to study recycling within the city. In May, 1991 The M.e.L
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contracted with CH2M Hill to perform a regional recycling study to evaluate regional 
recycling alternatives and potential markets for recyclable materials.
The Tulsa Citizens Recycling Advisory Committee released its final report in 
October, 1991 (Tulsa Citizen's Recycling Advisory Committee 1991). The plan called 
for three phases of recycling programs to be adopted, with each followed by an 
evaluation of participation and affordability. The first phase was to include three to four 
drop-off centers located throughout the city. Nine to twelve months later, this would be 
followed by a pilot curbside program. Finally, curbside recycling would be made 
available to all Tulsa citizens within two years from the date the report was released. The 
report was met with mixed reactions by the city administration. However, it did hire its 
first recycling coordinator (Michael Patton) in April, 1992. His two primary missions 
were public education and the study of possible recycling programs which the city could 
adopt (M. Patton 1998 ).
Meanwhile, The M.e.t. underwent a change in leadership, as director Susan 
Young was replaced by Roger Miner. The organization had continued to sponsor bi­
annual household hazardous waste collection programs at the coimty fairgrounds, adding 
antifreeze collection. By surveying the patrons of these events, it was determined that 
many of the surrounding localities would be better served by an opportunity for similar 
events closer to home. With this in mind. The M.e.t. took the program on the road to 
Bixby with a portable recycling trailer in May 1992 (Colberg 5/28/1992). At the same 
time, it also proposed building a permanent collection center at the fairgrounds, which 
would begin by collecting just oil, antifireeze and batteries, but soon expand into a 
recycling buy-back center.
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The final CH2M Hill report was released in September, 1992, (CH2M Hill 1992) 
and an implementation task force was formed to plan a recycling program. Meanwhile, a 
private recycling firm wanted to begin curbside collection of recyclables in Tulsa, but 
was told that the trash belonged to the city and no one other than TRI could pick it up 
(Elliott-Basmore 9/7/1992). The City of Tulsa seemed to be sending mixed messages 
regarding its commitment to recycling. At the same time it was hindering the recycling 
businesses from picking up waste, it was attempting to stimulate the market for recycled 
paper products by issuing an executive order giving preference to recycled paper.
By November, The M.e.t.’s implementation task force had finished its work and 
recommended a regional approach to recycling with Tulsa acting as an anchor for area 
drop-off centers (The M.e.t. Implementation Task Force 1993). While the CH2M Hill 
report showed that a reduction in yard waste would have a greater impact on the waste 
stream, it was felt that regional drop-off centers would be the best way to begin as the 
public was more familiar with this, more traditional, form of recycling (CH2M Hill 
1992). This was also a solution which was entry level and required as little capital 
investment by the member cities as possible. The idea was presented to the Mayor 
(Susan Savage) who responded favorably and asked if used motor oil could be collected 
at the drop-off centers (M. Patton 1998). The drop-off center plan was approved 
(including provisions to accept used oil) by the member communities in December, 1992.
The idea was to start slowly, only collecting a few items and adding additional 
capacity over time (M. Patton 1998). A key to keeping the capital costs low was to 
design the centers around easily transportable trailers which are used as collection bins. 
The first center opened for operation in April, 1993, while The M.e.t. sponsored what it
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thought would be the last oil, battery, and antifreeze collection event. In July, the city 
and The M.e.t. co-sponsored the “7 Days Not to Waste” public education campaign as a 
formal kick-off to the recycling centers (Colberg 7/25/1993). The event included 
demonstrations of how to prepare materials for recycling, a series of newspaper articles, 
discussions about earth-friendly alternatives for the house and garden, environmentally 
friendly shopping advice, grasscycling and composting demonstrations, and landfill 
tours.
The centers were a big success; however, it was quickly determined that 
attendants were spending too much time answering questions, instead of sorting 
materials. The decision was made to add an information kiosk at each center. In 
addition, it was realized that the need still existed to hold the household hazardous waste 
collection events. So, in October, 1993, another collection event was held; this time 
adding pesticides, paint and other types of household chemicals. This was the first time 
in the State of Oklahoma the public was given an opportunity to recycle such materials 
(Gilroy-Gibson 10/31/1993). There are currently 10 centers in operation throughout the 
Tulsa metropolitan area.
The centers have proven to be a good way for the area to begin its recycling 
efforts and educate the public about solid waste. They require little capital investment, 
yet are flexibly designed so that they can be tailored to fit each individual city’s needs. 
True to its original plan, in the years since the drop-off centers began operations The 
M.e.t. has continued to add to the list of items collected. The centers now accept used 
eyeglasses in conjunction with the Lions Clubs (Rasheed 6/4/1997). In addition, some 
centers (where a need was identified) also accept steel cans. Another innovafion has
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occurred in the household pollutant collection events. Used paint collected at the events 
is now offered for redistribution (free of charge). This places the emphasis on the 
preferred hierarchy of reducing, reusing, and then recycling. This serves as a very 
valuable method to inform the public and start them thinking about the hierarchy. Most 
recently, in June, 1998, The M.e.t., in conjunction with Budweiser and Smithey 
Environmental, began its “Barrels Behind Bars” campaign, supplying local businesses 
with collection barrels for bar glass (Mulkins 6/29/1998).
3 Key Innovations
This section will review the key innovations identified through the examination of 
Tulsa’s solid waste disposal situation. The review will focus on the policy conflicts 
which led to each innovation, with consideration being given to the role played by policy 
entrepreneurs and scientific/technical information (STI).
3.1 TERRA and the WTE Plant
The first key solid waste innovations present in Tulsa are the formation of 
TERRA and the eventual building of the WTE plant. TERRA is considered crucial in the 
eventual development of The M.e.t. because it publicly signaled Tulsa city leader’s 
commitment to incineration as a means of handling its waste. Later, as The M.e.t. began 
its discussions of recycling options for the area, the WTE plant and its flow requirement 
would become potential obstacles to the success of a city-wide recycling program.
One of the key issues facing the city’s leaders at this time was the realization that
current landfill capacity was inadequate and that the public greatly opposed the siting of
new landfills. The studies conducted by Williams Brothers in 1972 and 1974, emphasized 
the inadequate nature of the landfills the city was utilizing at that time (Williams
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Brothers Engineering 1972; Williams Brothers Engineering 1974). The Mowhawk 
Landfill, which was nearing capacity, was located in a floodplain. The city lost its lease 
on the Union Landfill site in the fall o f 1977, and began utilizing a temporary site 
adjacent to it. In January, 1978, the city commission was looking at a potential landfill 
site in Wagoner County, the third site to be considered in a year’s time (Anonymous 
1/14/78). Earlier potential sites were dropped from consideration due to public 
objections.
The conflict over potential landfill sites continued to grow throughout much of 
the late 1970's. Management of this conflict marks the first use o f scientific/technical 
information in The M.e.t. case study. The Williams Brother’s studies utilized both soil 
type and floodplain maps in determining potential sites for new landfill construction. In 
addition, the second study presented a scientific analysis of different waste disposal 
techniques. The record indicates, however, that the information germane to landfill 
location was not used to effectively reduce conflict. “They never did come up with a 
site; never did build a landfill” (Buchert 1998). This forced city leaders to give serious 
consideration to alternative waste disposal technologies (particularly incineration).
On the other hand, the city was quite successful in using the scientific/technical 
information regarding incineration to redefine the solid waste problem from one of siting 
new landfills to one of financing an incineration plant Newspaper articles were 
particularly useful in changing the nature of the problem. With headlines like “City Still 
Faces Problems With Landfills” (Pearson 5/12/78) and “City must find landfill site 
quickly” (Anonymous 5/13/78), they served to reinforce in the public’s mind the idea 
that a landfill crisis existed and incineration was the most viable option out of the crisis.
110
In addition, many editorials appeared clearly promoting incineration (see for example, 
Anonymous 1/14/78; Boone 2/6/78). From the city’s perspective, incineration was a 
“technological solution” to the landfill crisis. In reality, it only served to postpone the 
need for the city to give serious consideration to recycling. In addition, it was a solution 
which was only available to residents of Tulsa, but something which had to be considered 
when The M.e.t. was devising regional recycling strategies.
In addition to the public’s protests regarding the location of new landfill sites, the 
city commissioners were also forced to contend with a growing discontent with the solid 
waste services provided within the city. Service was being provided chaotically by both 
the city and private contractors. Some customers were having difficulty obtaining 
service in areas not served by the city. This problem was particularly acute in remote 
areas where the driving distance made it financially imfeasible for private haulers to 
operate. In addition, the city refiise department was continuing to operate under a deficit 
and was considering cutting services or raising rates (Rehg 6/16/78). Conflicts arose 
both among the commissioners and between the commission and the city solid waste 
director over how to deal with the discontent and financial difficulties. The authority 
appears to have provided the commissioners with a forum in which to deal with this 
conflict while insulating themselves from political repercussions.
The formation of TERRA required overcoming no political or bureaucratic 
obstacles. The city commissioners were firee to form the authority. Within such a non­
political framework, they were more firee to explore the potential implications of 
adopting incineration technology. Conflict in this instance surrounded the potential 
locations of recycling plants required under the Mustang RDF proposal. One particularly
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important conflict arose when residents of a north side neighborhood found that 
preliminary studies indicated it was a potential recycling plant location (Kelley 1/13/78).
In December, 1977 the Tulsa Urban Renewal Authority sought permission to re­
zone the property from the light to medium industrial category. The neighborhood 
residents perceived this act as part of a secret scheme to locate the plant without their 
involvement and consent. Adding fuel to the fire was the appearance o f a memo which 
implied Mustang would begin a public relations campaign to sell the site to area 
residents. The company did admit, however, that it planned to step up its efforts to sell 
the concept of refuse-derived fuel to the city. The memo prompted Mayor Robert 
LaFortune to assure the public that the authority had not undertaken final site selection. 
The site had, thus far, only been used for planning purposes to investigate the feasibility 
of the concept. The formation of the authority was a strategic move by entrepreneurial 
city officials aimed at easing the process of bringing RDF technology to Tulsa.
By giving TERRA revenue generating powers and thus, the ability to finance the 
plant, the city commissioners had only to worry about site selection. It was thought at 
the time that it would be easier to site a recycling plant than a landfill. The 
commissioners did not have to look too far afield to observe how onerous recycling plant 
site selection could become, however. United Electric Co. had previously tried to site 
such a plant in St. Louis and been unable to do so (Boone 2/6/78). That city’s leadership, 
still facing refuse problems, was reviving the idea in early 1978, but without the aid of an 
authority specifically designed to carry out the plan.
In the end, the Mustang proposal became infeasible due to revised load forecasts 
made by PSO, and TERRA never had to actually site a recycling plant. The failure of the
112
Mustang proposai did not mean the end of the concept of solid waste incineration for 
Tulsa. TERRA survived as TARE; and in April of 1984, the second key innovation was 
approved by the authority. This was the mass bum incinerator, or WTE plant, which was 
eventually built and operated by Ogden-Martin.
3.2 The Waste-to-Energy Plant and Flow Control
The building of the WTE plant appeared, on the surface, to have solved Tulsa’s 
solid waste problems. However, in reality, it simply postponed the need for Tulsa to find 
new landfill space. In addition, the city was required to deliver a certain tonnage of solid 
waste to the plant annually, the so-called “put-or-pay” clause. Initially under this clause, 
the city was often having to pay due to inadequate amounts of trash being delivered to the 
plant. This situation led to the next innovation, the 1988 passing of the ordinance 
(Ordinance Number 17426) which required all solid waste generated in the city to be 
disposed of at the WTE plant. When this ordinance was first enacted, many of the 
private haulers, in an effort to save money, ignored the requirement and continued to 
dispose of commercial trash at private landfills. In response, the city initiated its CRABS 
billing system.
The rationale behind the CRABS system was that the city would gain economic 
flow control over the waste stream. The problem then became one of determining 
equivalent service units for which to bill. The city had previously been successful with 
the stormwater utility fee, and envisioned using a similar fee for trash. In the words of 
one policy entrepreneur, “So the idea through a small brainstorming session was if storm 
water can do it and have an equivalent unit, why can’t trash do it?” (M. Patton 1998 ).
The new charge was for the disposal of trash, not the collection. After a pilot study was
113
conducted, it was determined that the amount charged would be based on type of 
business and size of building. “In trash, obviously there’s some business variances. A 
warehouse will produce less trash per square foot than a restaurant would” (M. Patton
1998). The city felt like too many categories would make the system too complicated. It 
therefore placed all businesses into one of 10 categories (M. Patton 1998). It was clear 
from the outset, that 10 categories were not enough, and that more information was 
needed regarding Tulsa’s commercial waste stream.
The trash haulers were very receptive to the new system, because it allowed them 
to dump for free, reducing their operating costs. “And so Tulsa was able to have a 
dynamic where the government got involved, the citizens felt like there was more control 
over trash, and the haulers felt like we were partners in billing and allowed them some 
profit” (M. Patton 1998). The business community, however, was adamantly opposed to 
the system. CRABS eventually led to a lawsuit against the city, in which the Overhead 
Door Company claimed the city was assessing a tax without the vote of the people. Due 
to the nature of its business, this company generated almost no onsite waste. Under the 
CRABS system, however, they were being charged for disposal, a charge which they felt 
was unfair. The nature of Tulsa’s billing system forced the company to continue to pay 
the fee while protesting it in the courts. “If you pay partially on your bill, they take the 
money off the other areas but not your water. So any arrears amount is considered 
arrears on the water, and they’ll shut your water off’ (M. Patton 1998).
The suit, which became a class action suit, was eventually settled {Overhead 
Door Co. o f  Tulsa, Inc. v. City o f  Tulsa 1991). The terms of the settlement required the 
city to enact a new commercial billing system by February 1 ,1991. The new system
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bases the charge on the number of container yards of refuse disposed of per month. The 
entrepreneurs were able to use the debate over the CRABS system to their advantage. 
“[But] bottom line, people became more aware of their trash stream, and that was one of 
our goals” (M. Patton 1998). In addition to the debate serving an education role, the 
system which was enacted as a result of the settlement allowed for the gathering of 
technical information regarding the nature of the commercial waste stream which was 
previously unavailable. “The haulers in some cases had maybe a card or 3 x 5 notes of 
where they picked up trash. The guy knew where to drive but their billing and 
everything else was pretty low tech, and probably not very accurate” (M. Patton 1998). 
The new system forced the haulers to quantify the waste streams. The large number of 
small haulers operating in Tulsa allowed the entrepreneurs to use their strategy of 
encouraging private-public parmerships to obtain this information. “Two policemen in 
town set up some software programs on their own as a small business and went around 
and helped (the haulers) install them” (M. Patton 1998).
The furor over the CRABS system is a typical example of the sharp value 
conflicts which often come into play during environmental policy development. Firstly, 
the lawsuit was representative of the continual dialogues over the nature of government 
involvement (M. Patton 1998). The business community clearly did not want the city to 
tell it what to do with its trash. Secondly, it was felt that the city had no right to levy a 
charge on business simply for generating solid waste. These value conflicts represent 
serious impediments to the successful implementation of a solid waste recycling 
program.
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Flow control in Tulsa exhibited many of the characteristics identified in the 
literature review as key to social learning. First, the institutional environment was 
changed when the city took over billing for disposal of trash. Second, both 
scientific/technical information and values played a role in the formation of the ultimate 
solution. Both the initial CRABS system and the current rate system are based on 
technical information such as the nature of the waste stream as generated by different 
types of businesses, and a compaction factor for accounts serviced by compaction trucks. 
Values and beliefs were incorporated in the system as a result of the lawsuit brought forth 
by Overhead Door Company. The city was successful in overcoming this obstacle to 
flow control through its willingness to work with the parties involved, particularly the 
Chamber of Commerce (M. Patton 1998). Finally, the innovation was indeed 
precipitated by a crisis, the crisis of not having the volume of trash disposed of at the 
WTE plant required in the operating contract.
3.3 NOSWMA and The Metropolitan Environmental Trust (The M.e.t.)
The building of the WTE plant had eased Tulsa’s solid waste worries, but only 
temporarily. The city still needed to landfill the ash and was running out of places to do 
so. In addition, by the late 80's/early 90's, the city was often generating more trash than 
the WTE plant could handle and was paying to landfill the excess. Landfill capacity was 
a problem not only for the city of Tulsa, but for many of the other municipalities in the 
region. The feeling that landfills were going to be in short supply was a nationwide 
phenomenon resulting from recent changes in federal legislation. “In response to that 
there was a real commonly agreed upon policy judgement that government needed to get 
its act together and begin to respond by having a formal organization that would literally
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go out and try and permit a landfill and build it” (Miner 1999). Clearly, more landfill 
space was needed, however, siting would be difficult. “The INCOG member 
governments had citizens who were very upset about the INCOG landfill siting process, 
and those member governments were expressing those concerns to the INCOG staff...”
(S. Young 1999).
INCOG, wanting to address the problem, decided to form a citizen’s advisory
committee to look at siting issues, a solution with which they had had much success in
the past (S. Young 1999). The committee developed a landfill siting process, based upon
sound scientific/technical information and value criteria (S. Young 1999). Even though
the proposed sites were based on both scientific information and values, no landfills were
ever sited as a result of the process. However, in the words of one entrepreneur, “that
process under INCOG led to larger questions that really began to get people like myself
who were city managers in the area to begin to be a little more informed about those
issues and to begin to meet and talk among ourselves about them” (Miner 1999).
The committee also suggested the formation of a permanent body which would be
responsible for solid waste issues. Due to the failure of a similar board for sewage
treatment some years earlier, a concerted effort was made to research the types of entities
which were allowable under the Oklahoma constitution.
“So the citizens committee was charged to research various forms of interlocal 
agreements, joint powers agreements. What was possible under Oklahoma statute 
and what was possible under the Oklahoma Constitution because we didn’t want 
to do anything that would require constitutional changes, but we would have 
considered things that might take relatively minor legislative changes” (S. Young 
1999).
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The structure which was eventually agreed upon became NOSWMA (later The M.e.t.), 
its mission was comprehensive solid waste policy for the region. “I really think it was a 
creature o f the folks who were the leaders in the various communities in the Tulsa metro 
area” (Miner 1999). This is the next key innovation in Tulsa’s solid waste case.
One of the first obstacles which needed to be overcome by The M.e.t. was a 
hesitancy on the part of the member governments to accept a regional board. ‘There was 
not a real friendly relationship between Tulsa and its suburbs” (S. Young 1999). As a 
result, much of the initial efforts were spent on educating the communities about the 
nature of the authority and its activities (S. Young 1999). Particularly, getting the city of 
Tulsa to buy into the structure of the authority. “What the goal o f the citizens committee 
and the INCOG board when they signed off on the structure was a one-community, one- 
vote decision-making entity, and a contribution of finances on the basis of population”
(S. Young 1999). The authority was quite effective at educating the public, not only 
about the nature of their activities, but also about all issues regarding solid waste.
The local media, particularly the Tulsa World, was particularly helpful in gaining 
acceptance of The M.e.t. and its various programs. What had begun as an adversarial 
relationship, “I think the newspaper in terms of The M.e.t. when it first started... was a 
killer. No matter where they came up with a site, no matter what, the newspaper seemed 
to print all the most negative things about that...” (Buchert 1998) was now a supportive 
one. World was very, very helpful in the public relations aspects and in the public 
opinion shaping, and in educating the people about solid waste issues” (S. Young 1999). 
One entrepreneur remembers a meeting being held to discuss the drop-off centers which 
the head of the newspaper attended. In this particular meeting. The M.e.t. was able to
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announce a drop-off center location which Goodwill Industries had been trying to
procure for many years. “This was a crucial meeting because if we had left this meeting
with things unresolved, he would have instructed a reporter to write a negative story
about it, I think” (M. Patton 1998). In this case, the lack of negative publicity acted in
interest of the entrepreneurs, enabling the program to move forward.
In addition to educating the members on the nature of the authority. The M.e.t.
also had to educate them on the nature of solid waste.
“We developed an actual course in solid waste management. And we taught them 
about recycling and taught them about markets and transportation o f recyclables 
and being able to ... you know, you can’t pick it up if you can’t put it down. And 
we talked about some harmful hazard waste issues. And we talked about yard 
wastes and yard waste composting issues. And we talked various kinds of 
recycling programs. Whether they would be curbside programs or drop off 
programs” (S. Young 1999).
In order to educate the members, Ms. Young herself had to become an expert in solid
waste issues. “I worked closely with a lot of the haulers in the Tulsa area... and they
took me to school on the back of their trucks” (S. Young 1999). Another entrepreneur,
speaking of Ms. Young’s personal education said “if you went into her office at that time,
she had stacks and stacks of stuff... insatiable appetite to read the periodicals in those
areas of interest. So she was very well versed on technical issues, policy issues, and that
kind of thing” (Miner 1999). As the members began to understand solid waste more
thoroughly, their perception of the problem changed. “We began to see a big part of the
problem that we had, not so much in finding a place to bury trash, but in beginning to
change real bad habits that people had as waste generators!’ (Miner 1999).
At the same time, some members began to get involved in some specific
recycling projects, including Broken Arrow’s “Leave it on the Lawn” campaign, drop-off
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programs in Owasso and Sapulpa, and a pilot curbside recycling project spearheaded by a 
private collector (S. Young 1999). In addition, The M.e.t. continued to co-sponsor 
household hazardous waste collection events. Part of the impetus for these events was a 
requirement from the EPA. “And one of the things that Region Six EPA thought... they 
had a director down there, and 1 don't remember his name, but he was very impressed 
with Kansas City’s household-pollutant collection program. So he wanted that in our 
stormwater NPDES program... so we said ‘Okay. We’ll do that”’ (Buchert 1998). The 
program, which relied heavily on corporate sponsorship, was well received. “It was 
incredibly successful, but it showed some interagency cooperation was possible. And it 
brought in some players from the various communities around the area as being able to 
cooperate on solid was management issues” (S. Young 1999). Several key aspects of the 
strategic plan were now in place. Corporate ties had been built, which could be accessed 
in the future as the need arose. In addition, the member communities were beginning to 
believe that cooperation was possible. Finally, the tremendous response to the events 
made it clear to the political decision-makers that recycling was an issue which 
demanded their attention.
As time passed, and landfill siting was no longer a priority. The M.e.t. began to 
search for an identity (Miner 1999). As part of the search, the authority decided that it 
needed to “try and be a little more scientific about the nature of the crisis and the nature 
of the problem, and not be quite so quick to presume that we understood the dimensions 
and the nature of the crisis” (Miner 1999). A study was conducted to determine the 
nature of the waste stream and the impacts different waste reduction schemes would have
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on the waste stream. (CH2M Hill 1992). According to one entrepreneur, the study was
intended to serve three purposes:
“The study was intended to identify the nature of the... CH2M Hill study was 
intended to identify a lot of things. At that time we thought: Boy, we really need 
to understand our particular waste stream here in this area. We need to 
understand it real well.... We also wanted to know about generation rates and how 
they change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction within The M.e.t., and we learned 
that. And then we also made a stab at gauging the potential using different 
mechanisms to have effective waste reduction of one kind or another in each 
jurisdiction. That was really an important component of that study” (Miner
1999).
This component was particularly important from the perspective of the city of Tulsa.
Any recycling effort which was adopted could not adversely affect their contract to 
provide a certain amount of waste to the WTE plant. Therefore, without the assurances 
of non-interference provided by this study, the city of Tulsa would not have readily 
participated in the drop-off center program. Any solution which was adopted would most 
certainly need buy-in from the city to be feasible. Once again, the authority had set out 
to generate information which was previously unavailable to them, yet critical for 
decision-making to proceed. This information was needed in order for them to advance 
their strategy of only choosing projects which they felt they could do successfully 
(Lasker 1999).
In addition, the member communities were polled to determine what gaps in 
service existed. “Well, real quickly we could see that every single commimity shared 
one thing, and that was a robust interest in recycling, in recycling services” (Miner 1999). 
Again, the choice to take on recycling fit with the entrepreneurs’ overall strategy. “And 
it was a case of being able to get people comfortable with some very no-cost projects for 
a couple of years so that we didn’t have to make any difficult or hard-core decisions that
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would stress the relationship that was developing while folks got comfortable with this 
M.e.t. thing” (S. Yoimg 1999). And so, provision of household recycling services 
became the mission of The M.e.t.
An implementation task force, consisting of representatives from each of the 
member communities, was formed to determine the how The M.e.t. would enter the 
recycling business. Eventually, they agreed upon the drop-off centers. At the same time, 
the city of Tulsa was undergoing a public debate about recycling. The city formed a 
citizen’s recycling advisory committee to study the issue. It was felt that if Tulsa 
independently pursued its own strategy, this might hamper the efforts of The M.e.t. to 
establish business at it’s drop-off centers. Concern was especially high since Mayor 
Savage had expressed interest in foregoing drop-off centers and proceeding directly to 
curbside recycling (The M.e.t. Implementation Task Force 11/2/92). It took a politically 
astute entrepreneur (Jerry Lasker, Executive Director of INCOG) to get the city to finally 
buy into the drop-off center plan. “Lasker got the city and the coimty, mostly by having 
the county put pressure on the city to buy into this” (S. Young 1999). The first center 
was opened in April 1993, in the city of Tulsa.
The establishment of The M.e.t. exhibited many of the characteristics identified in 
the literature review as key to social learning. The initial committee set up by INCOG 
was put forth to address a perceived “landfill” crisis. The problem was then redefined 
from one of siting a landfill to one of managing the region’s solid waste stream in a 
comprehensive manner. Enduring behavioral changes are evidenced by the numbers of 
patrons which the drop-off centers receive.
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The institutional environment was forever changed by the formation of The M.e.t. 
and its mission as the authority to deal with solid waste issues. Scientific and technical 
information was very much a part of the discussions surrounding the drop-off centers and 
recycling. In the words o f one entrepreneur, “we learned that we needed to try and be a 
little more scientific about the nature of the crisis and the nature of the problem...”
(Miner 1999). Values were taken into consideration by polling the member cities 
directly to determine what issues they wanted The M.e.t. to address. The centers take a 
systems approach to recycling, with each location catering to the specific needs of its 
geographical area. Technical expertise was utilized in determining the nature of the 
problem and potential solutions, political expertise was used to persuade the city o f Tulsa 
to work within a regional framework. Finally, The M.e.t. provides a shining example of 
successful coordination o f many levels of government and agencies.
4 Summary
This chapter summarizes the key innovations in municipal solid waste recycling 
policy developed by the city of Tulsa over the last 20 years. Solid waste policy 
innovation by Tulsa did not conform to either the “groping along” or “policy planning” 
models as they are outlined in the current literature (Behn 1988; Berman 1980). The 
model which seems to best describe the policy innovations which took place in this case 
is the “strategic innovation” model (Deyle 1994).
In the case of groping along, as with the solid waste case in Tulsa, policies 
undergo continual refinement once they are placed within the context o f their operating 
environment. However, in the groping along model, the policy modifications are not 
aimed at advancing explicit policy goals or strategies. It is clear &om the discussion
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above that the policy entrepreneurs active in this case were acting in a strategic manner. 
Three key elements of the strategy were: (1) building partnerships with the private sector; 
(2) gaining a large number of participants in order to secure political buy-in; and (3) 
building upon successes one small step at a time.
The household hazardous waste events represent perhaps the most striking 
example of private-public parmerships undertaken in this case. The event, which initially 
was envisioned as being open only to residents of Tulsa continues to get support from 
residents of the outlying communities (Buchert 1998). The role played by such 
partnerships in the continued success of The M.e.t. has been critical. In the words of one 
entrepreneur, “It was very much a consensus building process ... a synergy that 
developed that... contributed to the ‘Hey. See what happens when folks work together. 
Look at the potential here. We have some problems that we could get solved’” (S.
Young 1999). One strategy which has helped to foster such partnerships has been for 
The M.e.t. to remain a small organization. “The Metropolitan Environmental Trust has 
two employees, Michael Patton and a secretary. Everything else is done by contract. 
That’s the way right now we want to keep it” (Buchert 1998). While the member 
governments are willing to lend support recycling efforts, they are not financially able to 
fully fund the efforts which have been imdertaken. By strategically utilizing public- 
private partnerships. The M.e.t. has been able to supply solutions which require minimal 
financial investments on the part of the members.
The parmership mentality dominates the relationship between The M.e.t. and the 
recycling public as well. “We’ve developed a relationship with the public that we don’t 
have a lot of money, you have to do most of the work yourself, but we’ll find you an
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answer” (M. Patton 1998). This relationship has helped to both foster The M.e.t.’s 
reputation as the provider o f environmental services and to increase the public’s 
participation rate.
“And now our... I guess I’d say “perception”, the public’s perception of us is that 
the mess involved must he an incredibly environmental thing. So we’re asked to 
do a lot more work than we possibly have opinions on. We are drug into landfill 
gas issues and ozone meetings and everything else because we have some 
credibility” (M. Patton 1998).
Much of the credibility of The M.e.t. is a result of the last part of their strategy, to 
build upon successes one small step at a time. However, strategy alone was not sufficient 
to build the reputation which The M.e.t. has garnished. A certain type of person is also 
needed in order to successfully execute the strategy. “Again, it gets down to the people 
who are involved in this, and how they can manipulate the system and get people to do 
things” (Lasker 1999). This case serves to show that the “or” in the previous sentence 
should be changed to an “and”. Not only does it take persons who are comfortable in the 
political arena, but these persons must also be able to function in the bureaucratic arena 
as well.
“But there appears to me to be two kinds of folks that I needed to move public 
policy. And one o f those kinds of folks is an intensely political -  and by that I 
don’t mean party politics, but political in terms of knowing personal relationships 
between people; what values individual people have; what values individual 
people hold; what strings individual people have, and the knowledge of that type 
of information so that you can develop coalitions and develop consensus. The 
other kind of person that you need almost an evangelist -  someone with perhaps a 
vision and a drive and desire and enthusiasm to drive, to keep pushing and to be 
almost a cheerleader of a project” (S. Young 1999).
The case of municipal solid waste recycling in Tulsa was lucky to have had hoth types of
persons active as entrepreneurs.
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While the efforts undertaken in this case were definitely strategic in nature, they 
were not so to the point that the policy planning model of innovation is aptly descriptive. 
Extensive examination of the outcomes of potential actions were not examined. Detailed 
implementation plans did were not drawn up and followed. When queried about how 
The M.e.t. determined where to go from the early successes, one entrepreneur responded 
“What can we do that’s cheap, and what can we do that we can raise money on, and what 
can we do and do well?” (S. Young 1999). The expected response under the policy 
planning model would have been “What outcomes most closely match our policy goals, 
and what actions achieve those outcomes?”.
Final support of the strategic policy innovation model is supplied by the 
important role played by scientific and technical information in this case. Specific 
technical information regarding solid waste and recycling was needed in order to educate 
the public and government officials about the programs The M.e.t. undertook. This 
information was gathered from technical journals, scientific papers, as well as waste 
haulers themselves. Additional information regarding the precise nature of Tulsa’s waste 
stream was needed for decision-making. This information was not readily available to 
the entrepreneurs and was generated over the time period covered by this case. The 
CRABS system and its replacement allowed the city to quantify and characterize the 
commercial waste stream. The studies undertaken by CH2M Hill and the Citizen’s 
recycling committee generated specific information regarding the nature of residential 
waste streams in the municipalities. This type of information was critical to estimating 
the impacts of proposed policies, and would not have been used in the groping along 
model.
126
Works Cited
Anonymous. 1978 14 January, "City Checks Eastern Site for Landfill". Tulsa Tribune. 
Tulsa, OK
Anonymous. 1978 14 January, "Where to Recycle". Tulsa World. Tulsa, OK
Anonymous. 1978 13 May, "City Must Find Landfill Site Quickly". Tulsa Tribune.
Tulsa, OK
Averill, David. 1989 7 May, "Transfer Station Another Step In Recycling". Tulsa World. 
Tulsa, OK
Behn, Robert D. 1988. Management by Groping Along. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management Vol 7, No 4: 643-63
Berman, Paul. 1980. Thinking About Programmed and Adaptive Implementation:
Matching Strategies to Situations. Why Policies Succeed or Fail. Editors Helen 
M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann, 205-27. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Boone, Byron V. 1978 6 February, "Lesson For Tulsa". Tulsa World. Tulsa, OK
Buchert, Michael. 1992 12 October. Briefing for the Tulsa Authority for Recovery of 
Energy. Tulsa, OK
Buchert, Michael, Tulsa Public Works Department. 1998 21 July. Personal Interview. 
Tulsa, OK
CH2M Hill. 1992 September. Solid Waste Characterization and Waste 
Reduction/Recycling Study: Phase I Final Report. Tulsa, OK
Colberg, Sonya. 1992 28 May, "Recycling Program To Hit Road". Tulsa World. Tulsa, 
OK
Colberg, Sonya. 1993 25 July, "City, M.E.T. Join Forces To Emphasis Recycling". Tulsa 
World. Tulsa, OK
Deyle, Robert E. 1994. Conflict, Uncertainty, and the Role of Planning and Analysis in 
Public Policy Innovation. Policy Studies Journal Vol 22, No 3:457-73
Elliott- Basmore, Polly. 1992 7 September, "Recycle Tangle". Tulsa Tribune. Tulsa, OK
Gilroy-Gibson, Laureen. 1993 31 October, "Hazardous Waste Collected". Tulsa World. 
Tulsa, OK
127
Greene, Wayne. 1989 27 February, "Tulsa Has a Crush on Recycling". Tulsa World. 
Tulsa, OK
Hoffrnan, Donna. 1988 29 June, "Half Of Trash Taken To Energy Plant". Tulsa World. 
Tulsa, OK
Overhead Door Company of Tulsa, Inc. vs. City of Tulsa, CJ 89-3891. 1990 8 November 
Tulsa County District Court
Holmes, Ron. "Burning Issues". Urban Tulsa. Tulsa, OK
Kelley, Mike. 1978 13 January, "Memo Called Misleading". Tulsa World. Tulsa, OK
Lasker, Jerry, Indian Nations Council of Governments. 1999 1 April. Personal Interview. 
Tulsa, OK
Logue, Stephen. 1978 30 June, "City Ok's Refuse Hauler Ordinance". Tulsa Tribune. 
Tulsa, OK
Marier, Ralph. 1978 16 June, "City Mulls Increase In Trash Collection Rate". Tulsa 
World. Tulsa, OK
Marier, Raiph. i978 19 November, "City To Weigh Trash-Fuel Recycling System".
Tulsa World. Tulsa, OK
Martin, Linda. 1989 3 September, "Owasso's Recycling Center Rakes In Trash". Tulsa 
World. Tulsa, OK
Miner, Roger, BFI Waste Systems. 1999 1 April. Personal Interview. Tulsa, OK
Mulkins, Phil. 1998 29 June, "Bars, restaurants, hotels - recycle your glass!". Tulsa 
World. Tulsa, OK
Patton, Ann and Vem Stefanic. 1973 9 September, "Refuse Woes Pile Up And So Does 
Garbage". Tulsa World. Tulsa, OK
Patton, Michael. 1995 9 July. Brief Historv (Timelinel of The Metropolitan 
Environmental Trust. Tulsa, OK
Patton, Mike, The Metropolitan Environmental Trust. 1998 30 May. Personal Interview. 
Tulsa, OK
Pearson, Janet. 1978 12 May, "City Still Faces Problems With Landfills". Tulsa World. 
Tulsa, OK
128
Radzinski, Mark, Mike Wright, and Susan Young. 1990 13 February. Tulsa County Used 
Motor Oil and Lead-Acid Battery Collection Event. Tulsa, OK
Rasheed, Aesha. 1997 4 June, "Recycling Group Adds Eyeglasses To Collection Site". 
Tulsa World. Tulsa, OK
Regional Solid Waste Management Advisory Committee. 1996 December. Final Report. 
Tulsa, OK
Rehg, Yvonne. 1978 16 June, "Trash Fee Increase Pondered". Tulsa Tribune. Tulsa, OK
The Metropolitan Environmental Trust Implementation Task Force. 1992 2 November. 
Task Force Meeting Notes.
The Metropolitan Environmental Trust Implementation Task Force. 1993 6 April. 
Recvcling Depot Program Proposal. Tulsa, OK
Tulsa Citizen's Recycling Advisory Committee. 1991 30 October. Report of the Tulsa 
Citizen's Recvcling Advisorv Committee to Tulsa Citv Council. Tulsa, OK
Williams Brothers Engineering. 1972 September. Solid Waste Management Studv for the 
INCOG Region: Phase I. Tulsa, OK
Williams Brothers Engineering. 1974 April. Solid Waste Management Studv for the 
INCOG Region: Phase II. Tulsa, OK
Young, Susan, City of Minneapolis. 1999 25 February. Personal Interview. Norman, OK
Zubeck, Pam. 1989 17 January, "Trash-to-energy plant use shows increase". Tulsa 
World. Tulsa, OK
Zubeck, Pam. 1990 2 July, "Bob Dick Says Strategy Evolving". Tulsa Tribune. Tulsa, 
OK
129
Chapter 5 
Ozone Alert!
1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the retrospective assessment for the Ozone 
Alert! case. The timeline developed for this case is presented in Appendix C: Ozone 
Alert! Timeline.
In contrast to the Mingo Creek and Metropolitan Environmental Trust cases, 
which were crisis driven, the driving force behind this case was compliance with 
environmental regulations. However, the fear that Tulsa could potentially violate these 
regulations in the near future, resulting in economic penalties, created a crisis-mentality 
in the minds of many entrepreneurs. The possibility that federal regulators might impose 
their own compliance strategies served as an impetus for the private sector to “buy into” 
the programs promoted by the policy entrepreneurs active in this case. The threat of the 
“federal hammer” has also served as a key component in keeping the public’s attention 
focused on air quality issues to a much greater extent than the health effects associated 
with “dirty” air.
The result o f Tulsa’s efforts to remain in attainment for ozone is a compendium 
of voluntary measures which are to be taken by the participants on an “as-needed” basis 
known as the Ozone Alert! program. However, scientific certainty did not drive the 
choice of actions. While there are some indications as to the nature of Tulsa’s ozone 
problem, much uncertainty still remains. Along with science, economics, i.e. what 
measures the city could undertake inexpensively, played a large role in determining the 
measures to be included in the Ozone Alert! program.
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The voluntary and episodic nature of the program indicates willingness on Tulsa’s 
part to make some short-term adjustments which are required to become sustainable. 
However, it is unclear what long-term adjustments, many of which are also required for 
sustainability, the city is willing to take. Another facet of sustainability which is evident 
in this case is the creation and maintenance of successful partnerships. The ability of the 
entrepreneurs to forge these partnerships is well documented in the case presented below. 
2 Case Description
The first federal Clean Air Act (CAA) (PL 88-206) was passed in 1963 in an 
effort to improve the nation’s air quality. The CAA amendments (CAAA) of 1970 (PL 
91-604), however, effectively rewrote the act (Plater et al. 1992). The 1970 CAAA 
established National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) specifying maximum 
levels of six criteria pollutants for outside air. Ozone is among the six criteria pollutants 
regulated under the CAA. In the mid-1980's, Tulsa was designated as a “non-attainment” 
area for ozone (Travis et al. 1996). Non-attainment designation for an area occurs when 
the air fails to meet the NAAQS for any given pollutant.
Ozone is a highly reactive form of oxygen (O3), colorless and odorless at normal 
ambient concentrations. At higher concentrations, ozone is a blue gas with a pimgent 
odor. Unlike other criteria pollutants, ozone is not emitted directly into the air. It is 
formed through chemical reactions of oxygen and nitrous oxides and volatile organic 
carbons in the presence of sunlight (Oklahoma Dept, of Environmental Quality 1996). 
Ozone may cause adverse health effects because it is known to damage lung tissue, 
reduce lung function, and sensitize the lungs to other irritants. Lung damage can result 
from both acute and chronic ozone exposure. Animal tests indicate that prolonged,
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chronic exposures can result in structural damage to the lungs (Oklahoma Dept, of 
Environmental Quality 1996). Elevated levels of ground level ozone has also been 
known to affect the ecosystem. Plants such as soy beans, alfalfa, com, oats, and 
deciduous trees are especially sensitive to low levels of ozone (Oklahoma Dept, of 
Environmental Quality 1996). The fact that ozone, unlike some other criteria pollutants, 
is a public health threat helped to motivate public response to the Ozone Alert! program.
During the late 1980's designation as non-attainment was hurting Tulsa 
economically, as new manufacturing facilities were effectively prohibited from locating 
in Tulsa (Anonymous 4/18/1989). By 1989, Tulsa believed it had sufficient data 
justifying its removal from the non-attainment list. The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) would not remove Tulsa from the list due to disagreements over the 
state’s air quality improvement plan (Johnson Adams 6/1/1989; Fox 6/14/1989; Everly- 
Douze 8/2/1989). In response, an Air Quality Task Force, consisting of representatives 
from Tulsa businesses and government, as well as air quality experts was formed to enlist 
the aid of Tulsa’s congressional delegation in pressing EPA to take Tulsa off the non­
attainment list (Pine and Lasker 1998; Johnson Adams 9/20/1989; Martindale 
9/21/1989).
One congressman who was particularly important in this regard was U.S. Rep. 
Mike Synar, D-2nd District, who was a member of the House subcommittee drafting the 
CAAA of 1990 (PL 101-549). “Mike Synar was very instrumental in getting that done 
(JL)’’ (removing Tulsa from the non-attainment list) (Pine and Lasker 1998). Rep. Synar 
was instrumental in getting all of the key parties to meet and discuss potential measures 
which would ensure Tulsa’s redesignation as an attainment area. Through the efforts of
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several key congressmen and senators, Tulsa was able to delay the signing of the 1990 
CAAA (Henneke 1999). As a result of this political pressure, Tulsa was officially 
removed from the non-attainment list on October 30,1990 (Associated Press 11/1/1990), 
prior to the enactment of the CAAA on November 17,1990.
In June of 1991, Tulsa experienced an exceedance of the ozone standard, its third 
in three years (Anonymous 6/25/1991). The existing regulations allowed cities to exceed 
the standard only three times at any given monitoring station in a three-year period.
Thus, if Tulsa were to have one more exceedance in 1991, it would have violated the 
standard and could potentially be redesignated as non-attainment. A decision was made 
to reinstate the INCOG Air Quality Task force in order to examine strategies for 
remaining in attainment (Pine and Lasker 1998; Selph 1999).
2.1 The Ozone Alert! Program
The reinstatement of the Air Quality task force as the INCOG Air Quality 
Committee resulted from conversations which took place between INCOG Executive 
Director Jerry Lasker, Tulsa County Commissioner John Selph, Mayor Roger Randle’s 
assistant Susan Savage, and independent consultant and member of the U.S. Clean Air 
Act Advisory Committee Ben Henneke; all of whom had worked together in the past 
(Henneke 1999). The mission of the Air Quality Committee was to develop a volimtary 
program which would allow the city to remain in compliance with the NAAQS for ozone 
(Pine and Lasker 1998).
Concurrent with INCOG’s efforts, the Tulsa City-Coimty Health Department was 
also taking a proactive stance on ozone. Its efforts began by sending letters to the County 
Commissioner’s and Mayor’s office, asking for their help in encouraging behavioral
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changes by the citizens of Tulsa (Anonymous 6/28/1991; Everly-Douze 6/28/1991).
They also began an early public awareness campaign, publishing several steps to help
reduce ozone levels in the local newspaper, including limiting the number of days a given
vehicle could be driven (Anonymous 7/1/1991). Along with the letters to public
officials, the City-Coimty Health Department also sent a letter to INCOG outlining
specifics of Tulsa’s ozone problem and offering 35 suggested behavioral changes the
citizens could make (Caldwell 1991).
The Air Quality Committee and the City-County Health Department soon began
to work together to develop a program. The goal was to avoid any further exceedances
of the ozone standard in 1991. In order to do so, they had to have a program up and
running quickly (Henneke 1999). It was felt that, in order to be effective, the program
should contain at most three or four main message points which would be carried to the
general public (Henneke 1999). The data which the City-County Health Department had
available to them at that time indicated that ozone formation was hydrocarbon
(particularly volatile organic compoimds, or VOC’s) limited. Data also indicated that
approximately 70% of VOC emissions were from mobile sources (Bishop and Van Sandt
1991). The program’s efforts were, therefore, focused on limiting hydrocarbon
emissions, particularly from mobile sources.
The resulting program was a composite of temporary behavioral changes that
Tulsa citizens could make on a voluntary basis as the need arose. Both the voluntary and
temporary nature of these changes were key to the success of the program.
“We came to the conclusion early on, when we started this program, that we were 
not apt to change lifestyles on a total basis. What we would try to do is try to get 
people to do things on those particular days that it really meant something.... You
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know, you do this tomorrow, and then you don’t have to do it for another week or 
two, and then we may ask you to do it again. We thought that wasn’t asking too 
much (JL)” (Pine and Lasker 1998).
The success of a volimtary, episodic program required the coordination and 
cooperation of several agencies and businesses. During the Air Quality Committee 
meetings, the City-County Health Department had agreed to work with the National 
Weather Service to develop a method of predicting the potential occurrence of high 
ozone days (Ozone Alert! days) (Everly-Douze 7/24/1991). This was something which 
had never before been done successfully (Bishop 1999). Tulsa Transit agreed to provide 
free bus rides on Ozone Alert! days (Ryan 7/24/1991). The Tulsa Chamber of 
Commerce agreed to provide a list of businesses which could be contacted the day before 
Ozone Alert! days to inform their employees of measures which employees should take 
to avoid high ozone levels (Pine and Lasker 1998). Finally, some of the local refineries 
agreed to voluntarily reduce the Reid vapor pressure (RVP) of the gasoline they were 
supplying to the Tulsa area from 9.5 to 8.5 psi (Everly-Douze 7/25/1991; Pine and Lasker
1998).
The program was deemed to be successful, winning praise from the EPA almost 
immediately (Everly-Douze 7/27/1991). In its first year the program contained the 
following key components: 1) encouraging citizen’s to take advantage of free bus rides or 
to carpool if buses were not available; 2) reduction of RVP in local gasoline; 3) 
development and refinement of Ozone Alert! prediction capabilities, and; 4) massive 
public relations campaign (over 70 newspaper articles promoting the program appeared 
between June 1 and October 1 o f this year). In addition to these major components, 
several other programs were initiated on a trial basis during the first summer. These
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included free emissions testing (Everly-Douze 8/24/91) and discount repairs for 
emission systems (Anonymous 8/27/91).
After meeting with success the first year, the program was continued (and still 
continues) in the following years. At the end of each ozone season (May I - September 
30) the program is evaluated to determine what did and did not work particularly well 
(Anonymous 10/31/1991; Pine and Lasker 1998). Participants are then given the 
opportunity to make suggestions regarding program changes to be implemented the 
following year. One of the most innovative changes made during the 1992 ozone season 
was the MERIT trading program discussed below.
2.2 The MERIT Program
.A.t the beginning of the 1992 ozone season, INCOG began negotiations with the 
EPA to implement a pollution-réduction emissions trading program (Everly-Douze 
5/14/1992). The program, the Maximum Emissions Reduction by Intersource Trading 
(MERIT), is aimed at encouraging actions which reduce emissions from mobile sources 
and providing credits to stationary sources for those actions.
Developed by a multi-stakeholder group which included representatives from 
environmental groups, local and federal governments, as well as industry, the program 
was initiated as a three-year pilot program (Everly-Douze 7/12/1992). It allowed both 
industries and individuals to earn saleable credits for voluntarily reducing the emissions 
they created. In addition, since only 90 percent of a given credit could be sold, the 
program would have an overall effect of continuously reducing local air pollution 
(Everly-Douze 7/12/1992).
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While created in Tulsa, the MERIT program was never implemented there 
(Lasker and Pine 1998). It was thought that the other voluntary measures which industry 
was already taking were working well enough that an emissions trading program was not 
needed (Lasker and Pine 1998). However, the program went on to serve as a model 
emissions trading program for the EPA, which adopted much of the innovations 
developed as part of the program in their open market trading system (Henneke 1999). It 
has, however, been successfully implemented in other areas of the country (Maurer 
8/30/1996).
2.3 Further Improvements to the Ozone Alert Program
While the Ozone Alert! program continued to win awards (see for example 
Anonymous 3/24/1993), the entrepreneurs continued to make changes in the program 
with each ozone season. In 1993, for example, Tulsan’s were urged to refrain from 
mowing their lawns on Ozone Alert! days, and green “Thumbs up” posters were provided 
to gas stations selling low RVP fuel. In addition, a federal transportation grant was 
secured which enabled INCOG to purchase a mobile automobile emissions testing lab 
(Everly-Douze 6/19/1993). This lab was then made available to the employers and the 
general public to test their vehicles.
New program implementations in 1994 included a contest to create a slogan and 
logo for the Ozone Alert! program (Anonymous 2/8/1994). In addition, exceedances of 
the ozone standard on two consecutive days in Jime prompted the Air Quality committee 
to ask the business community to take additional measures such as offering flextime 
(Holland I I 6/24/1994). In July of that year, a third gasoline supplier agreed to 
voluntarily reduce the RVP of the gas it supplied to the Tulsa market. Meanwhile, the
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other two suppliers reduced their RVP to even lower levels (Everly-Douze 7/8/94).
These incidents also prompted a visit to the EPA Region 6 offices in Dallas by a 
delegation of Tulsa officials and congressional members (Everly-Douze 7/16/94). At this 
meeting, the delegation asked for both technical assistance and some kind of credit for 
the voluntary efforts the city bad taken to keep its ozone levels below regulatory limits. 
This meeting, in addition to addressing some of Tulsa’s immediate needs, also served to 
open the door with the EPA for the Flexible Attainment Region (FAR) agreement which 
was signed in late 1995.
2.4 The FAR Agreement
The FAR agreement is the result of efforts by Tulsa officials to encourage the 
EPA to enter into a “demonstration project” whereby the city could avoid being placed 
on the agency’s ozone non-attainment list (Anonymous 7/30/1995). The goal of the 
project was to allow Tulsa to tailor an individual strategy for reducing ozone levels 
instead of adopting a nationally mandated program (Travis et al. 1996). On August 22, 
1995, Tulsa was the first city in the nation to receive designation as a flexible attainment 
region by the EPA.
The FAR agreement, which is to remain in effect for 5 years, includes the 
following key provisions (City of Tulsa 1995):
1) Continuation and expansion of the Ozone Alert! program
2) Development of Real Environmental Strategies for Partners in Ozone Negation 
Systems (RESPONSE) measures, including revisions to the State Implementation 
Plan (SIP)
3) Creation of the Tulsa Ozone Prevention Strategy (TOPS) to study ozone 
formation processes in the Tulsa area
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The RESPONSE measures are a list of actions which the city and INCOG agreed 
to implement in the event an exceedance of the ozone standard occurs. The list was 
prioritized such that the first exceedance triggers the implementation of the first 
RESPONSE action, the second exceedance the second action and so forth. The 
agreement also allows for the concurrent implementation of more than one measure in 
order to take advantage of potentially synergistic effects (City of Tulsa 1995). These 
measures include, in order of priority: 1) creating a “smoking vehicle hotline”; 2) 
conducting public “car care clinics”; 3) implementing a “Clean Fuels Fleets” program; 4) 
expanding “Employee Commute Options Awareness’ programs for local businesses, and; 
5) creating an “Ozone Information Hotline” (Turner 1997).
In addition to the RESPONSE measures, SIP RESPONSE measures were also 
developed. These measures are quantifiable and enforceable and require revisions to 
Oklahoma’s SIP (Travis et al. 1996). Once the EPA has determined that Tulsa has 
experienced a violation of the ozone NAAQS, implementation of SIP RESPONSE 
measures will begin immediately. The agreement then allows the measures “adequate 
opportunity to work before issuing a ‘SEP Call’ or redesignating Tulsa as a non­
attainment area” (City of Tulsa 1995).
It was further agreed that the first two SIP RESPONSE measures would be 
implemented, whether or not a violation occurred, as soon as possible following the 
signing of the FAR agreement. These were the initiation of a SIP revision mandating a 
maximum RVP of 8.2 psi and the introduction of legislation to include a vehicle fuel 
system pressure test. The required legislation for both of these programs has passed and
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they are to be put into place as soon as possible following the determination by the EPA 
that a violation of the ozone NAAQS has occurred.
The TOPS program is intended to study the effectiveness of the FAR control 
methods, as well as more accurately identify the sources of ozone in the Tulsa 
metropolitan area. Actions included in this portion of the FAR agreement include: 1) 
revision and expansion of the emissions inventory; 2) create a more accurate model to 
predict the probability of exceeding the NAAQS, and; 3) evaluate the contribution of 
precursors transported from outside the airshed to ozone levels within Tulsa’s airshed. 
These efforts remain under way at the current time (Turner 1997).
Tulsa’s iimovative approach at remaining in attainment for ozone has continued 
to grow over the past decade. The Ozone Alert! program fax notification currently 
includes over 450 businesses and companies (Espinosa 5/12/1999). The city has 
garnered much recognition and numerous awards for their approach, which has served as 
a model for many other municipalities (Turner 1997). Given the current state of 
uncertainty surrounding the ozone NAAQS, it is unclear what additional actions the city 
will need to take to remain its attainment status (Myers 10/22/1999). However, the 
ozone issue remains a priority with the current administration (Kitz 1999).
3 Key Innovations
This section will review the key iimovations identified through the examination of 
Tulsa’s Ozone Alert! case. The review will focus on the strategies employed by the 
policy entrepreneurs which led to the specific innovations. Consideration will also be 
given to the role played by scientific/technical information (STI) in advancing the 
innovations.
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3.1 Ozone Alert!
The first key innovation in the Ozone Alert! case study is the development of the
Ozone Alert! program itself. Both the political and technical success of this program
helped the policy entrepreneurs gamer the cooperation of key EPA officials in
negotiating the FAR agreement. Several imique innovations can be found within the
broad category of innovation which became the Ozone Alert! program. The first of these
is the formation of the INCOG Air Quality Task Force.
This task force was initially formed in order to expedite the removal of Tulsa
from the non-attainment list before the signing of the 1990 CAAA.
“The mission of that Air Quality Task Force at that time was to go to our 
congressional delegation and press them into getting EPA to take us off, to 
recognize our three years’ worth of clean data, and take us off the non-attainment 
list before the new act was signed (JL)” (Pine and Lasker 1998).
According to documentation made available by INCOG, three main issues were blocking
Tulsa’s attainment redesignation: 1) redesignation is not made until the city meets both
the technical (monitoring data show compliance) and administrative requirements (i.e. an
approved SIP); 2) questionable methods of interpolating ozone levels during EPA
mandated monitor downtime, and; 3) administrative requirements should be reflective of
the specific pollution problems in each city to the maximum extent possible (INCOG
1989). The task force was successful in its mission, with Tulsa being officially removed
from the non-attainment list on October 30, 1990 (Associated Press 11/1/1990), prior to
the enactment of the CAAA on November 17,1990.
The successful redesignation of Tulsa prior to the enactment of the 1990 CAAA,
clearly shows the entrepreneurs engaged in strategic activities. Considering that the
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Ozone Alert! program began by reinstating this committee following the 1991 
exceedance, it is no surprise that the entrepreneurs again acted in a strategic manner. 
“Strategy is a big part of forming that policy. I say that and it was for the FAR also 
(GP)” (Pine and Lasker 1998).
In their interviews, many entrepreneurs discussed specifics of the strategy which 
was followed. The strategy can be summarized as follows: 1) keep the program simple;
2) build upon small successes; 3) forge parmerships; 4) make continual improvements, 
and; 5) educate.
3.1.1 Simplicity
Simplicity was required both due to the speed with which the program was initiated, and
to keep public participation levels high (Selph 1999).
“Our goal was to have it out the door in only a few [more] days. In other words, 
we were very much focused on not having the monitors go off again. And yet, at 
the same time, we wanted to have a program that would be kind of robust and 
popular. You know, that people would understand. So we ended up deciding that 
we would only have three or a maximum of four message points” (Henneke 
1999).
The entrepreneurs also knew that they would not be able to fashion a program which was 
perfect from a regulatory standpoint (Henneke 1999). But, they did want the public to 
make voluntary changes which would have a positive impact on Tulsa’s ozone levels. 
“That’s what we look at, is what’s feasible. What can we get people to buy into on a 
voluntary basis without forcing it on them?” (Selph 1999). The decision to focus on 
reducing hydrocarbon emissions from mobile sources is just one example of this strategy. 
By focusing on actions with a high probability of success, the entrepreneurs were able to
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very quickly deem the program a success. They could then build upon their success, by 
garnering further media attention.
3.1.2 Building upon Success
This strategy was particularly important in helping to overcome one o f the initial 
obstacles they faced, prediction of ozone. When he was first approached to develop a 
prediction model, Ray Bishop’s response was “Well, that’s something that has been tried 
in a lot of places. It’s never worked before’’ (Bishop 1999). This sentiment was echoed 
by many of the partners involved, including the National Weather Service. The 
particular concern was what to do if a high ozone day was predicted, and one did not 
occur (Pine and Lasker 1998). According to Eddie Terrill, Oklahoma Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) Air Quality Division Director, “It was as if you called one 
and didn’t go over, you didn’t know what you were doing. You made a mistake doing it. 
And getting over that was a problem and something we were conscious o f” (Terrill 
1999). The answer to this dilemma involves the strategy of building upon successes, you 
simply declare the program a success. “Every time we call one and then we don’t have 
an ozone exceedance, let’s claim that that’s because of all the brilliant things that the 
citizens did” (Henneke 1999).
3.1.3 Successful Partnerships
The realization by state and federal government officials that they would not be 
held out as scapegoats should they incorrectly predict high ozone levels was key to their 
joining the partnership (Pine and Lasker 1998). The partners involved in this program 
consist of public officials (at all levels o f government), private corporations (such as the 
refineries and distributors), environmental and health advocates, and the media (Pine and
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Lasker 1998). “So bringing everybody to the table was the key element of getting buy-in 
and also of exchange of ideas of where we could get reductions (GP)” (Pine and Lasker
1998).
While the health effects of ozone have been documented, the entrepreneurs
emphasized the costs of non-attainment in their efforts at motivating parmerships. “I
think people are much more willing to listen and to absorb that message if in fact they
realize that not only is this a public health problem, but it’s going to affect their
pocketbook” (Selph 1999). While discussing the nature of the partnership, Gaylon Pine,
Manager of Environmental Engineering Services at INCOG commented,
“And that’s been the key, that we all have the common goal of staying in 
attainment for whatever motive mat we have to stay in attainment. That we all 
want to do mat. Some is for heaim. Some is for cost. Some is for inconvenience. 
But having mat common goal puts our mind toward creating work on how we do 
that (GP)” (Pine and Lasker 1998).
One strategy which me entrepreneurs employed to get industry actively involved
was, instead of telling them
“This is what we want you to do”, asking mem what mey could do. “We got all 
me players around me table and said, ‘Okay. You tell us what you’re going to do 
in your particular area to bring about some reduction [in hydrocarbons]. No 
matter how small, you tell us what you can do (JL)” (Pine and Lasker 1998).
A key component in getting me refineries to reduce me RVP of gasoline was me personal
relationship which already existed between Ben Henneke and Sim personnel.
“The chief operating officer (CEO), he is now CEO, of Sun was on me U.S. 
Alternative Fuels Council wim me and also on me Clean Air Act’s Advisory 
Committee which had just recently been appointed.... So I called [him] up as 
soon as we had mat first alert and talked to him” (Henneke 1999).
The effort put forth by Sun (reducing RVP) was critical, especially given me significant
financial burden me company would bear (approximately $500,0000 me first year).
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“When I told him how much it was going to cost, he took a deep breath because 
Sun was not particularly profitable at that moment, and he said, ‘Well, it’s the 
right thing to do. Let’s do it.’ So at a very crucial moment, having a very senior 
executive of an employer and a refiner that produced a product for Tulsa and 
somebody with real stature nationally, stepped forward and spent corporate funds, 
took a risk that the corporation would be damaged by doing the right thing 
environmentally” (Henneke 1999).
When Sun agreed to produce lowered RVP fuel for the Tulsa area, the entrepreneurs
were then able to use that as leverage with the other producers to gamer commitments
(Henneke 1999).
Many of the entrepreneurs emphasized that the attitude of the Sun executive is 
reflective of the overall community in Tulsa. According to former Tulsa mayor Rodger 
Randle, this community spirit results from Tulsa initial leaders’ attitude that social 
standing was related to what you did for the community. “We have a great tradition in 
Tulsa of people having a sense of community responsibility.... We are beneficiaries of 
the history of a sense of community identity and mutual obligation among all of us as 
citizens” (Randle 2000). According to Randle, this sense of duty toward the community 
also extended to those professionals who become civil servants in Tulsa (Randle 2000). 
Dr. William Potter, environmental chemist at The University of Tulsa, commented that 
this attitude is particularly evident in the mayor and her staff (Potter 1999).
This attitude appears to be just as prominent in Tulsa’s business commimity. 
Comments such as “we traditionally have had a very positive and constructive business 
community” (Randle 2000) and “Tulsa’s business commimity is so enlightened from the 
standpoint of where ‘we’re willing to do whatever needs to be done to make Tulsa a 
better city. And that’s a pretty broad perspective” (Cole 1999) were heard frequently 
during the interview process. The Chamber of Commerce’s assistance in setting up the
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fax notification procedure was particularly important. They sent out a solicitation to their
members, asking them to endorse the Ozone Alert! program by informing their
employees the day before predicted Ozone Alert! days (Henneke 1999). “And that's
been one of the keys to our success is the business sector has been good to support this
and have developed some neat little strategies every year” (Selph 1999).
Another key partner in this effort was the public. The Ozone Alert! program is
deliberately voluntary and episodic.
“We came to the conclusion early on, when we started this program, that we were 
not apt to change lifestyles on a total basis. “The city and INCOG felt like there 
was a need to put a program together that was episodic and voluntary in order to 
stay in attainment.... If you can do that in a way that is purely voluntary and do 
things ahead of the curve, then it’s less expensive and you might come up with 
some ideas that hadn’t been thought of before” (Terrill 1999).
Such a voluntary, episodic program would have no chance of working without the
public’s involvement. Obtaining the public’s buy-in on the program was a major
obstacle in the success o f the program. “The bigger problem was getting the buy-in of
citizens. And it wasn’t the fact that they didn’t want to, it’s a matter of education.
We’ve got to let them know what they do does make a difference” (Terrill 1999). This
sentiment was echoed by other entrepreneurs, “The most important thing was convincing
the general public that if  they did something that it made a difference. That was the
biggest problem we had (JL)” (Pine and Lasker 1998). The episodic nature o f the
program also helped to gain the public’s participation. Had they been asked to make
permanent lifestyles changes, a voluntary program would have had less chance of
success. “It only happened occasionally. If we’d have had 50 Ozone Alerts! in a
summer, the program wouldn’t have worked” (Henneke 1999).
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Several strategies were followed in order to gain the much needed public buy-in.
One approach which helped was the use o f industry partners to educate their employees.
“That probably had as much to do with it as anything because if you can get a few 
of the key industries to change their work schedules or the time they bring people 
to work, it can make a big difference on your private patterns and things like that” 
(Terrill 1999).
Another key component of the strategy to win the public’s buy-in was the media.
“They made a point of getting something on the news every Ozone Alert! day and 
many days in between. The public got the story.... it was something that, and I 
don’t know whether it’s unique to the city of Tulsa and the people there or not, 
but they picked up on it. They liked the idea that there was something they could 
do to control their destiny” (Bishop 1999).
The media was especially helpful in preventing the public from becoming too blase about
the Ozone Alert! program, especially after the program had been in place for several
years (Terrill 1999).
“It’s difficult to keep people’s motivation level up. And that’s a struggle we’ve 
had, and we knew that we were going to have.... and you do your best to work 
with the members of the media as well as the press, the printed press to keep that 
message out there in front of them. That: ‘Gosh, folks, this is really important. 
This is a critical issue for Tulsa. And we know you are getting tired of it. We are 
too’” (Selph 1999).
3.1.4 Continuous Program Improvements
During the first year of the Ozone Alert! program, the entrepreneurs focused on 
only a few key components aimed at reducing hydrocarbon emissions from mobile 
sources (primarily automobiles). “So knowing that mobile source was the major 
hydrocarbon emitter, that was the area that was attacked first” (Bishop 1999). However, 
another component of the overall strategy has been an effort to continuously improve the 
program every year.
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“We continue to try to improve upon the program each year, to look at it at the 
end of the ozone season to determine what worked, what didn’t work, what can 
we do better next year and so on. And then begin, at that point, the planning 
process for next year’s program. We don’t wait until two weeks before the 
beginning of ozone season to say “Oh gee. What are we going to do this year?”’ 
(Selph 1999).
The program improvements can be placed into two generalized categories: 1) those 
aimed at improving the modeling efforts, and; 2) direct program improvements.
As discussed earlier, at the beginning of the program many of the key partners 
expressed a hesitance to predict Ozone Alert! days. The success of the program, 
therefore, required the development of some kind of predictive capability (Terrill 1999). 
Efforts which had previously been made elsewhere had met with little success (Bishop 
1999). Tulsa’s predictive modeling efforts have focused on correlating historical 
meteorological and ozone data (Pine and Lasker 1998; Jeffries 1999). Factors which 
have been found to be important are temperature, wind speed, cloud cover, frontal 
passages, and time of day (Jeffries 1999; Bishop 1999). Development of the model 
required the integration of much STI from various sources. The strategy followed for 
accessing the STI was to look in the scientific literature, attend conferences (such as the 
Air and Waste Management Association (AWMA) and State and Territorial Air Program 
Administrators/Association of Local Air and Pollution Control Organization 
(STAP/ALAPCO), and to make telephone calls (Bishop 1999). Additional information 
and assistance was obtained from the National Weather Service (NWS) in Tulsa. The 
DEQ and NWS personnel have formed a unique partnership, working together to solve 
Tulsa’s ozone problem.
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After the program had been in operation for a few years, Dr. William Potter, a 
professor of chemistry at the University of Tulsa became interested in connecting 
Oklahoma MESONET data with environmental pollution in Tulsa. In recent years. Dr. 
Potter has been working on a model which is not based upon the statistics of historical 
data, but upon real-time meteorological and ambient air monitor measurements. “I had 
some interest in seeing how far the technology could go in terms of determining what 
was in the air and then how to model what was in the air” (Potter 1999). His model uses 
sophisticated interpolation techniques to “predict” the ambient ozone concentrations 
around the Tulsa metropolitan area, based upon near real-time data from monitors. One 
of the promising interpolation techniques which he has investigated is the use of neural 
networks, which can be trained using historical data. Currently, the results of Dr.
Potter’s model are supplied to the Tulsa DEQ office and are utilized as a secondary 
source of information in determining whether or not an Ozone Alert! day is called 
(Jeffries 1999).
The second general category of improvements are those directly affecting the 
Ozone Alert! program. Some of these are a result of suggestions from partners, however 
many result from an increased understanding of and accessability of STI. One 
improvement which is directly based on STI is the “Slow Down and Sweat” program 
implemented recently. In this program, motorists are requested to obey the speed limits 
and not use their automobile air conditioners on the morning commute. Recent updates 
to Tulsa’s emissions inventory suggest that ozone formation may not be hydrocarbon 
limited, but may be NO^ limited (Pine and Lasker 1998). A study conducted by one of 
the industry partners indicated that air conditioning use increased the operating
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temperature of catalytic converters, thereby converting more nitrogen to NO^ (Pine and
Lasker 1998). INCOG also estimates significant NO^ reductions if motorists reduce their
rate of speed (Pine and Lasker 1998).
Another program improvement based upon increased STI is the request that
people not mow their lawns or use other small gasoline powered equipment on Ozone
Alert! days. This program modification was based upon scientific evidence that small
motors were major contributors of ozone precursors (Pine and Lasker 1998; Selph 1999).
This improvement was quite successful.
“We came up with the idea about not mowing your lawn on our own. But that was 
a very major technology breakthrough. Because of all the messages you can get 
across to kind of capture the Ozone Alert! program, saying, "It's hot as hell, and 
the ozone's going to be bad. So tell whoever is telling you to mow the lawn, 
including your own conscience, ‘Gosh, I don't want to do that. It's an Ozone 
Alert! day. I think I'll go have a beer and lie in the hammock instead.’" And that 
really. . .  that captured people's imagination in ways that 'filling up after simset' 
never had quite captured it.” (Henneke 1999).
Examples of program improvements which were not specifically based on STI 
were the smoking vehicle hotline, the improved coordination of downtown Tulsa traffic 
lights, and discoimted time-up offers. The smoking vehicle hotline consists of a toll-free 
number which the general public can call to report vehicles with excessive emissions.
The vehicle owner is then sent a notification of the observation along with advice about 
vehicle repair and maintenance (Turner 1997). This program is purely voluntary, and no 
punitive action results firom the reports.
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 (PL 102- 
240) made Congestion Mitigation/Air (Quality (CMAQ) funds available to all states. The 
CMAQ funding program directs monies to transportation programs and projects which
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will help to achieve NAAQS. Funds are apportioned based upon population of non-
attainment areas; however, states which contain no non-attainment areas are guaranteed a
minimum allocation. The entrepreneurs active in this case successfully garnered some of
Oklahoma’s CMAQ funding to improve the Ozone Alert! program. ISTEA funds have
also been used to upgrade the downtown Tulsa traffic signal system to reduce idling time,
to subsidize free bus rides on Ozone Alert! days (federal regulations limit free bus ride
funding to two years, however), and to purchase portable message boards to inform the
public of Ozone Alert! days (Pine and Lasker 1998). The entrepreneurs were also
successful in securing money from the State Department o f Transportation to fund a
remote sensing program which identified gross emitters (Pine and Lasker 1998). The
owners of the vehicles were then given an opportunity to obtain reduced cost tune-ups.
Funding such as that mentioned above is not easy to obtain. It requires that
changes be made in the institutional environment, particularly at the Federal level.
“The whole public policy on this whole area is, the federal government will put 
some money into areas that are bad [i.e. non-attainment areas]. They don’t put 
money into areas that are good. The only way to get money is to be bad. We are 
trying to convince them that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure 
(JL)” (Pine and Lasker 1998)
The institutional environment was not only a barrier to obtaining funding, it also was a
barrier (especially early on) to program acceptance.
“There was no regulatory support at all, even at Oklahoma DEQ levels and 
certainly none at EPA. In fact, they would say, ‘Well those reductions don’t 
really count because they are episodic, and we don’t do episodic reductions’.
They were just learning at EPA to think about seasonal reductions instead of 
annual reductions. And so the idea of doing something on an episode was totally 
foreign to them” (Henneke 1999).
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This problem was particularly prevalent when the EPA began offering credits for early 
action and did not offer credits for voluntary programs (Bishop 1999). To a certain 
extent, the local institutional environment, particularly that of the communities which 
surround Tulsa, had to be changed as well. “There were other people that didn’t want 
anything to affect the surrounding communities because it was a Tulsa problem, and they 
didn’t really think they had anything to do with it” (Bishop 1999). The relationship 
between Tulsa and its surrounding communities was partially responsible for the belief 
that Stage Two vapor recovery was not a viable option (Bishop 1999).
3.1.5 Education
As discussed previously, public education played a key role in the success of the 
Ozone Alert! program. One component of the general public which the entrepreneurs 
feel is particularly important are children. “I really try to involve kids. We all try to 
educate them as to the benefits of improved air quality.... If they do nothing else but 
make their parents think a little bit, then that’s what we’re after” (Selph 1999). The local 
officials, industry representatives, and entrepreneurs also benefit from the educational 
opportunities present in the program. “We are able to cross-educate one another about 
what motivates us, and what’s important, and what we ought to do (GP)” (Pine and 
Lasker 1998). One strategy which has been particularly useful in educating the elected 
officials has been to take advantage of their regular meetings to discuss the issue of air 
quality with them (Selph 1999). The net result of the education efforts has been 
remarkable. “I would say that through these efforts that we probably have the best 
educated community on ozone and what to do to reduce emissions of any area in the 
country (JL)” (Pine and Lasker 1998).
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3.2 The FAR Agreement
The FAR agreement grew out of Tulsa’s success with the Ozone Alert! program.
Many of the personal relationships which were a key to its success resulted from
interactions initiated during the development of the Ozone Alert! program (Henneke
1999). Particularly important was the personal relationship Ben Henneke fostered
between Mary Nichols at the EPA and Mayor Susan Savage. It also required overcoming
the institutional barriers discussed above.
“1 think it’s very interesting that the FAR and everything that has happened after 
basically was generated from a ‘We want to do it. We can do it better our way, 
and we will find a way to do that. And we will make it happen quickly’ attitude. 
And through public and private partnerships, again, we have been able to do that. 
But there are a lot of little quirks along the way, and breaking down of paradigms, 
changing those anyway (GP)” (Pine and Lasker 1998)
Much of the success of the FAR can also be attributed to a change in attitude in the early
1990's as the federal government began to reinvent itself (Henneke 1999). “EPA was in
need of showing Congress that they were working with the local programs” (Terrill
1999). Part of the entrepreneur’s strategy was to take advantage of this change in the
prevailing paradigm and gain acceptance of the FAR.
“So we caught EPA at a time that they were ..., and this played into part of the 
strategy in developing the FAR, ‘Okay we have EPA under the gtm to be more 
cooperative and to be more friendly to people in general. We can offer them 
something that will do the same thing as their regulations would do, and we’ll do 
it voluntarily, but we’ll do it our way. Things that work here. Things that we 
know won’t work here, we won’t propose to do (GP)” (Pine and Lasker 1998).
Another strategic effort on the part of the entrepreneurs was to secure signatures from ten
different agency representatives. “The goal became to try to have as many people west
of the Mississippi sign the FAR as humanly possible. Because we figured if  we had 400
pages of signatures, it didn’t matter what it actually said. It would have some political
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substance” (Henneke 1999). By garnering many signatures, the entrepreneurs affirmed 
the regional buy-in of the program and it’s fundamental posture of flexibility. Since the 
passage of the FAR agreement, many of the RESPONSE measures have been 
implemented following exceedances.
The entrepreneurs hope that these good faith efforts on their part will allow them 
some flexibility as the EPA reviews its proposed new ozone standard (Pine and Lasker
1998). In July of 1997, EPA issued revised NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter.
The 1997 ozone rules proposed replacing the 1-hour, 0.124 ppm standard with an 8-hour 
average 0.08 standard. An area’s compliance with the new standard is calculated “by the 
3-year average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average ozone 
concentrations measured at each monitor within the area” (64 Fed. Reg. 57,424). The 
new rule was soon challenged in court, however, and a decision is still pending. On May 
22, 2000 the U. S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, a decision is expected 
sometime in 2001. In the meantime, the EPA is enforcing the old standard.
Since the signing of the FAR agreement, Tulsa has become a partner with the U.
S. Department of Energy (DOE) in its “Clean Cities” program. Clean Cities is a program 
designed to encourage the use of alternative fuel vehicles (AFV’s). The program takes a 
voluntary approach toward encouraging AFV use and integrating them into the local 
planning process. “The Clean Cities program thrives on strong local initiatives and a 
flexible approach to the challenge of building alternative fuel markets, providing 
participants with options to address these problems” (U. S. Dept, of Energy 2000). Given 
Tulsa’s previous experience with such voluntary, regional programs, it is not surprising 
they have joined this program. Only in existence since June, 1996, Tulsa’s Clean Cities
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program has already garnered praise from DOE as an “alternative fuel success story”. 
With grants from the Oklahoma Department of Commerce, the DOE, and through a 
partnership with Oklahoma Natural Gas, Tulsa Public Schools have converted over 170 
busses to compressed natural gas. The savings it gamers in fuel costs allows the school 
district to repay the loans.
4 Summary
In contrast to the previous two cases which were responses to actual threats, the
Ozone Alert! case represented a response to a perceived threat for Tulsa. The threat is
characterized as perceived because Tulsa was under no obligation to the EPA to reduce
their ozone levels and while the community knew that redesignation would have impacts,
these impacts were uncertain.
“The non-attainment designation has two major impacts on a city. One is that 
you actually have to do things under the Clean Air Act including stuff like offsets 
and other controls. But second, it really makes you a less attractive economic 
development location because people moving in have to go through a very 
different permitting process” (Henneke 1999)
In this case, the mere threat that Tulsa would lose any competitive advantage it might
have was enough to spur action (Pine and Lasker 1998; Selph 1999). It is this threat of
the “federal hammer” as opposed to the threats to public health which has captured and
held the public’s attention.
There are several aspects of the Ozone Alert! program which are key to its
success. First off is that it is voluntary and Tulsa’s air is relatively clean. “If you had
been in an area that was very much in non-attainment or never had come into attainment,
I don’t think this would have flown because you can’t do that many things on a voluntary
basis to get yourself back into compliance” (Terrill 1999). The voluntary, episodic
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nature of this program is similar to the flood warning program developed in the Mingo 
Creek case. In both cases, the citizens are being asked to change their behavior, but only 
on a temporary basis. These cases clearly show Tulsa’s willingness to make short-term 
lifestyle adjustments, however, it is less clear whether the city is ready to make the longer 
term adjustments which sustainability requires.
A second key to the success of the program are the successful parmerships which 
have been developed. “Everybody talks about public-private relationships, and to a 
degree it’s semantics in a lot of areas, but let me tell you, in Tulsa it is the reality. The 
public sector and the private sector get together and they make things happen. And it’s a 
very unusual situation” (Cole 1999). Part of the reason why buy-in was readily achieved 
in this case is the compliance driven nature of the crisis. Had businesses and individuals 
not had a personal stake in keeping Tulsa’s air clean, this buy-in might not have been 
achieved (Selph 1999). The wish of the parmers to retain their autonomy and flexibility 
also appears to have played a role in their buy-in. This is not surprising, as recent 
research has demonstrated a parallel situation occurring with private sector innovation 
(Ellington et al. 2000).
The final keys to success identified during the case study are the involvement of 
all levels of government, the timely incorporation of STI, and a systems approach. “It’s 
important for a program like this to be successful, for it to work at all levels. I cannot be 
just INCOG implementing this program. It needs support from the elected officials as 
well” (Selph 1999). As in the Mingo Creek case, the intellectual contributions have 
mainly come from state and federal regulatory agencies. The inclusion of these other 
agencies as key partners has served the entrepreneurs well by opening doors which may
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have otherwise have remained closed (Henneke 1999). A prime example of this is the 
development of the FAR agreement which builds upon the success and recognition of the 
Ozone Alert! program.
As in the previous two cases, the city’s technical capacity was limited. In this 
case, one limiting factor was the difficulties associated with quantifying emissions and 
emission reductions from mobile sources (Pine and Lasker 1998; Terrill 1999). STI was 
used not only to advance the modeling efforts, but also in determining the types of 
program changes to be implemented.
Approaching the problem from a systems point of view was mentioned as key by several 
of the entrepreneurs (Potter 1999; Pine and Lasker 1998; Terrill 1999). As uncertainty 
regarding tire nature of Tulsa’s ozone problem continues to decrease, the specificity of 
the source of Tulsa’s ozone continues to increase. Recent data suggests that a portion of 
the ozone measured at Tulsa’s monitoring stations may result from long-range transport 
from Texas (Owen 6/4/2000). If this source proves to be significant, effective response 
will require a regional effort. Tulsa’s history of successful partnership building will go a 
long way toward helping it to successfully negotiate regional solutions.
The entrepreneurs active in this case acted in a strategic manner. The 
circumstances they found themselves in required strategic action. Not only were there 
barriers present in the institutional environment which had to be overcome, but there 
were financial barriers as well. “The non-attainment areas are getting millions of dollars 
in CMAQ funds to do these programs. We’re doing it on transportation funds (JL)’’ (Pine 
and Lasker 1998). Another factor which Tulsa had to somewhat overcome was its own 
prevailing attitude local initiatives were the only solution (Cox 1999). ‘Tulsa has always
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viewed itself as: Oklahoma City has gets most of the things from an economic 
development standpoint because the legislature is over there. ... And so they feel like 
they have to do things for themselves more so than rely on state government” (Terrill
1999). The reality of the political and financial situation Tulsa found itself in cultured an 
awareness of the limited number of opportunities it would have to change the situation. 
This awareness, in turn, helped the entrepreneurs to recognize windows o f opportunity 
and act upon them.
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Chapter 6 
Decision-Making Schematic
1 Introduction
Four idealized representations of the policy innovation process can be generalized 
from the literature review in Chapter 2: (1) triai-and-error (groping along); (2) controlled 
experimentation (adaptive management); (3) entrepreneurial-led learning, and; (4) 
paradigm shift. The trial-and-error, or groping along, model was proposed to describe 
strategies where little thought is given at the outset to the relationships between outcomes 
of specific policy decisions and explicit policy goals (Lindblom 1959; Etzioni 1967;
Behn 1988; Golden 1990; Sanger and Levin 1992). An idealized version of groping 
along is shown in Figure 2. In this case, the decision-maker, presented with a problem, 
randomly chooses a solution from the set of known solutions. No prior planning for 
optimal decision-making is undertaken. In addition, no examination of solutions other 
than those which are known to have worked in the past is made. The chosen solution 
undergoes continual refinement only after it is placed within the confines of its operating 
environment, providing feedback into the set of possible solutions. (This feedback is 
shown in Figure 2 as the no loop). While some evidence exists supporting trial-and- 
error, the nature of environmental problems is such that much more thought must be 
given to potential solutions at the outset than allowed for in this particular representation.
Controlled experimentation (or adaptive management) is better suited to 
environmental problems (Etheredge 1981; Lee 1993; Holling 1995). This process is
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presented (in idealized form) in Figure 3. Controlled experimentation differs from trial- 
and-error in that a solution is not chosen at random, but is chosen after analysis of 
external information. In addition, the individual performing controlled experimentation 
has a commitment to learning and making mid-course corrections, whereas in trial-and- 
error, no such commitment exists. The learning is shown in the form of feedback loops 
(dashed lines) in Figure 3. Information which is used to guide the choice of solution can 
take the form of environmental data, general knowledge regarding the particular problem, 
and/or individual expertise. In this case, the information is used to eliminate some of the 
known solutions and introduce “theoretical solutions” into the potential solution set. 
“Theoretical solutions” are those which scientific and technical information (STI) shows 
to be favorable, but which have never been implemented in practice. Information is also 
used to determine the probable system response to the implementation of any particular 
solution. Feedback obtained after implementation then serves not only to further refine 
the set of potential solutions, but also to enlarge the body of STI used to guide decision­
making.
In theory, such a holistic model seems ideal because policy decisions are viewed 
as experimental, open to ongoing evaluation and refinement. However, in practice, it is 
very difficult (if not impossible) to construct valid environmental policy experiments 
(Parson and Clark 1995). Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that establishing valid 
controls is nearly impossible. Another obstacle to constructing valid environmental 
policy experiments is the inherent variability of the natural system, and lack of scientific 
certainty on how to interpret such variability. The costs (political, economic, and social)
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associated with doing true policy experiments are also prohibitive. Finally, it is rare that 
a municipality has on staff the expertise necessary to do the analysis and interpret the 
results of environmental policy experiments.
A third idealization extrapolated from the literature review is “paradigm shift” 
(Argyris 1977; Ingraham 1987; Mann 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Deyle 
1994; Schon and Rein 1994). As shown in Figure 4, it is the point of intervention which 
distinguishes paradigm shift from the previously discussed representations . In the 
paradigm shift process, the policy makers question the appropriateness of their operating 
norms, values, and/or policy objectives, resulting in the definition of a new problem for 
which solutions are sought. The learning which takes place has been termed “double­
loop” learning (Argyris 1977), in contrast to single-loop learning, where there is no 
reassessment of the policy problem. Double-loop learning involves rethinking the “rules 
of operation” which govern a system. It requires an acknowledgment that defects exist 
within these rules. The conflicts which often erupt during environmental policy debates 
certainly have the potential to cause discontinuities in traditional thinking and problems 
to be redefined, as suggested by this model (Mazmanian and Kraft 1999). A shortcoming 
of the policy shift idealization is that it does not explicitly allow for external 
scientific/technical information to be brought to bear in decision-making. Given the 
importance of this type of information in environmental policy decisions (Meo et al. 
1994), this representation cannot adequately explain environmental policy decisions.
Another drawback of the first three representations is that they do not allow for 
the effects of what have been termed “policy entrepreneurs” on policy decisions. Given
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the important role these players appear to play in the policy process, their role in 
promoting innovation and social learning must be accounted for.
A fourth idealization, which can be termed “entrepreneurial-led” learning, is 
depicted in Figure 5 (Kingdon 1984; Roberts and King 1989, 1996; Ostrom 1990; Meo 
and Deyle 1993; Mintrom 1997; Zahariadis 1999). According to this model, 
entrepreneurs take an active role in three phases of the innovation/social learning 
process: 1) the creation of new ideas to address a problem; 2) design of solutions, and; 3) 
solution implementation. In order for a particular individual to be considered an 
entrepreneur under this model, they must be active in all three roles. Recent research into 
the nature of entrepreneurial activities, as related to environmental policy decisions, has 
questioned the need for these actors to be active in all three phases as required by this 
model (Meo and Deyle 1993). It appears as if the requirement that entrepreneurs be 
active in all three phases may be too stringent when dealing with complex environmental 
policy decisions. The cases studied in this research suggest that persons may only be 
active in one or two of these roles and still be considered entrepreneurs.
2 Decision-Making Schematic
None of the idealizations discussed above provided a good fit to the 
environmental policy innovations explored as part of this research. What was needed 
was a more generalized decision-making schematic which allows multiple points of entry 
in the process for scientific/technical information as well as policy entrepreneurs. Such a
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schematic was developed, based on the information discovered in the three case studies, 
and is presented in Figure 6.
Development of the schematic proceeded through several steps. The first step 
was an analysis of the idealized representations presented above for applicability to the 
Tulsa cases. During this analysis, both the effectiveness and shortcomings of each 
representation in depicting the events which took place were identified. The second step 
was to combine those portions of the idealized representations which effectively depicted 
the case studies into a working representation of Tulsa. In this first step, all possible 
pathways were considered. The information from the case studies was then used to 
eliminate pathways which did not historically occin. The schematic was then refined 
further through the development of new pathways for the portions of the cases which 
remained to be described. Finally, the roles of both policy entrepreneurs and STI as seen 
in the case studies were incorporated in the representation.
The starting point in Figure 6 is the recognition by the policy entrepreneur that 
Problem A is significant and warrants attention. The search for a solution begins with 
the set of “accepted” alternatives. This set consists of the solutions known to have 
worked in the past for the policy system, and is a result of the prevailing policy 
paradigms, past successes and failures, and individual expertise available within the 
policy system. Once a potential solution is chosen it must be subjected to feasibility 
tests. If the solution is politically, technically, and economically feasible, then it is 
implemented and the system continues with “business as usual”.
171
Start
Y esProblem Feasibility  
. Tests /
Solution A Implem entation
N o
Problem
R ed efin itio n Search for 
new Solutions Entrep.
Y es
R eplication - 
N o learningSolution from 
^ E lsew h ere? /heoretici
Solution
vExists?^
■►( Entrep. N o N o
Adaptation
Y es
Trial
Solutions
Controlled
Experim entation
Trial & Error R e a l iz e d
1— I N o t  R e a l i z e d
Satisfactory
Innovative SolutionsR esponse
Fin^
Figure 6. Decision-Making Schematic
If, however, the chosen solution (Solution A) does not pass one of these 
feasibility tests, the possibility for an innovation exists. The simplest path toward 
Innovation occurs when Solution A is technically and economically feasible, but 
politically unacceptable. Here political entrepreneiu^ enter the system and alter it in such 
a manner as to make the known solution politically acceptable.
An example of this pathway (shown in orange in Figure 6) drawn from the Mingo 
Creek case study was the proposal by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) to use 
detention basins for flood mitigation. The basins originally proposed by the COE were 
single-use, no frills basins (Reynolds 1994). These basins were politically infeasible, 
primarily because the citizens whose homes were located near the first proposed 
detention pond sites protested the placement of these facilities near their homes 
(Flanagan 1998). The decision was then made to alter the design of the detention areas, 
making them multiple-use areas. This decision not only solved the problem of citizen 
resistance (and therefore political infeasibility), it also served to allow the City of Tulsa 
(through the Public Works Department) to maintain control of the floodplains, 
prohibiting further development. In the words of one policy entrepreneur, “It was strictly 
a preservation thing ... preserving our own objectives. In order to save the floodplains, 
you had to make them usable by the public” (Flanagan 1998).
Oftentimes, the entrepreneiu- is unable to make a solution politically feasible. 
They must then begin a search for new solutions. The first search strategy in the 
decision-making schematic is to search for similar situations, and attempt to utilize the 
solutions developed elsewhere. If these solutions are adopted from elsewhere without 
making any changes to fit the cmrent situation, this is simply replication, and no learning
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is said to have taken place. It is possible, however, that the entrepreneur may take the 
solution they have found and adapt it to their unique situation. The learning which takes 
place in this situation is dependent upon the entrepreneur’s skillful blending of 
scientific/technical information and their own tacit knowledge of the local political 
environment. A useful example of this situation drawn from the case studies are the 
buyouts of floodprone homes along Mingo Creek. This pathway is shown in green in 
Figure 6. According to one entrepreneur, the idea came from knowledge that other cities 
had successfully accomplished such buyouts (T. Young 1999).
If satisfactory solutions cannot be found through an examination of other 
responses to similar situations, the entrepreneur must then determine if any “theoretical” 
solutions exist. Theoretical solutions are those solutions which have been proposed, but 
never actually implemented. These may be found in a variety of places. One source of 
theoretical solutions is the scientific or technical literature. Many entrepreneurs and 
politicians do not regularly read such literature, however. Thus, they may also rely on 
their own tacit knowledge of solutions which may have been previously proposed in the 
political arena, and not yet implemented for one reason or another.
The persons responsible for generation of innovative ideas, but not necessarily 
involved in their design and implementation, have been termed “policy intellectuals” 
(Roberts and King 1996). One of their primary functions is to frame the solution so as to 
make it politically feasible. They are responsible for placing a given solution before the 
relevant policy-makers, and providing reasons for its validity. They are often persons 
located outside the direct policy-making system, but who maintain an interest in problem 
solution. An example of a policy intellectual identified in the Ozone Alert! case study is
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Ben Henneke, who some have referred to as an “idea man” (Pine and Lasker 1998). Both 
the MERIT program and the initial concept of the FAR agreement were his ideas.
If such solutions are found and implemented, their results are then “tested” 
against some standard by which adequacy can be judged. This testing provides feedback 
to the existing knowledge-base from which solutions are drawn, thus providing 
incremental advances in theory. Once a successful solution is developed, the system 
continues on. This pathway (shown in blue in Figure 6) represents controlled policy 
experimentation, and, as discussed above, is very difficult to accomplish in actuality 
(Parson and Clark 1995). An example of controlled experimentation from the case 
studies is the MERIT trading program developed as part of the air quality case (Henneke 
1999). However, this program was never actually implemented, and thus, the experiment 
never carried out.
According to the schematic, if there are no theoretical solutions upon which to 
base controlled experimentation, policy decisions can be made in one of two ways. The 
first method is the trial-and-error method. In this method, as in the idealized version 
presented in Figure 2, solutions are generated without any outside influences. They are 
then examined to determine whether or not they are satisfactory. If they are found to be 
satisfactory, they are implemented and the system continues on. If not, alternative 
solutions are chosen (again, seemingly at random) and the process begins again. While 
the literature supports this pathway as plausible (Rehn 1988; Golden 1990), evidence of it 
was not seen in the cases of environmental policy studied as part of this research.
The trial-and-error method of decision making is not only inefficient, the nature 
of environmental problems is such that outside influences must be taken into account
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(Holling 1995). These outside influences include the quantitative measures of 
environmental quality which all solutions must meet, scientific and technical information 
regarding the nature of the problem, and awareness of the political nature of the decision 
environment. The role of the entrepreneur in promoting innovative environmental policy 
in this situation is to interpret these outside influences, taking advantage of windows of 
opportunity which appear to promote innovative solutions. Many of the innovations 
studied as part of this research occurred through this (yellow) pathway in the model. A 
few examples are Tulsa’s hazardous waste collection days, the Ozone Alert! program, 
and Tulsa’s hiring of a recycling coordinator (in the M.e.t. case).
3 Decision-Making Schematics for Case Studies
The decision-making schematic presented above results from information 
gathered from the case studies as well as the literature review. Each of the cases of 
environmental policy innovation presented in the previous chapters displays examples of 
the various pathways of the schematic. This section discusses the relationship between 
the schematic and the individual cases.
3.1 Mingo Creek
In the Mingo Creek case, the initial problem was the significant flash flooding the 
city had experienced over a number of years. The accepted alternative, as shown in 
Figure 7, was to adopt floodplain management policies. Tulsa adopted such policies, 
meeting with only limited success. Their implementation was politically infeasible, due 
to the strong coalition formed by members of the development community. Several of 
the key entrepreneurs were active in the writing and implementation of these policies. 
However, following the 1984 floods, they realized that policies regulating individual
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developments alone were inadequate for solving the city’s problems. “All it was doing 
was just trying to say we won’t make it [flooding] any worse. But it was not turning the 
comer on solving the existing flood problems” (Hardt 1998). Thus, in an effort to not 
only prevent future problems, but also to solve the existing problems, the entrepreneurs 
began to search elsewhere for alternative solutions.
They hit upon the idea of buying out structures which had experienced repetitive 
flooding and also building regional detention areas in conjunction with channelization 
work. They discovered examples of municipalities (particularly Mobile, AL and Rapid 
City, SD) undertaking buy-out programs with varying degrees of success (Flanagan 
1998). However, each of these municipalities had also encountered difficulties with their 
programs, and none had attempted a buy-out on the scale envisioned for Tulsa. Tulsa 
was therefore forced to adapt the idea of buying out properties to fit its unique 
circumstances, following the green pathway shown in Figure 7.
One manner in which the city was able to adapt their buy-out program was in the 
area of funding. As the federal government didn’t have the funds available to support a 
buy-out of the scale envisioned, Tulsa leaders offered to fund half of the cost themselves 
(T. Young 1999). It was fortuitous that the city was in a position to be able to make this 
offer, using interest from larger than expected sales tax revenues. Had they not been able 
to make this offer, the innovation may not have materialized. The idea emerged from 
entrepreneurial blending of STI regarding legal financing methods and the skillful 
political maneuvering of the mayor and street commissioner.
Another idea which the entrepreneurs adapted to fit their unique situation was the
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concept of including regional detention facilities as part of the COE Mingo Creek 
project. “Ron [Flanagan] had latched onto the concept by going to some firms in Denver 
that were doing this exact same thing” (Hardt 1998). Once again, however, their 
entrepreneurial skills would be needed in order to win buy-in from the COE and the local 
citizenry, thus making the project politically feasible. In order to gain political 
feasibility, the entrepreneurs pushed for transforming the single-use facilities into 
multiple-use ones. “Some of the people that lived next to [our projects] later 
acknowledged at the dedication of our facilities that they thought it was going to destroy 
their property values, and that they literally were adamantly against it” (Hardt 1998). 
However, the success of the city’s early multiple-use detention facilities allowed the 
entrepreneurs to sell the COE and citizens on the idea, provided, of course that the city 
fund what the COE considered the “extras”. This pathway is shown in orange in Figure 
7.
As the entrepreneurs began examining the reasons behind the devastation of 1984, 
they soon discovered that the condition of the city’s stormwater infrastructure had played 
a major role. Solutions to the more difficult infrastructure problems were not readily 
available from other municipalities or from current theory. The entrepreneurs, following 
the yellow path shown in Figure 7, determined that in order to solve these problems, and 
also in order to ensure continuity of their efforts, a new city department would have to be 
created. Once again, they combined scientific and technical information to develop a 
trial solution. The information they relied upon most heavily was a consulting report 
which indicated that many of the functions relating to stormwater were being handled by 
different departments within the city (Hinkle 1999).
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Once the department was formed, the entrepreneurs needed to find a stable source 
of long-term operational funding for it. A theoretical solution existed based upon a state 
supreme court ruling that sewers could be treated as a city utility (McNeill 1999). The 
development of the stormwater drainage fee therefore followed the blue path shown in 
Figure 7. The entrepreneurs undertook a controlled experimentation, deliberately setting 
the fee relatively low (Metcalfe 1998) and hoping that the matter would not be contested 
in court. The experiment appears to have been a success, as the fee has never been 
challenged (McNeill 1999) and in the years since its implementation, Tulsa’s citizens 
have come to accept the fee and associate it with a given level of service (Hardt 1998).
The current efforts the city is making at acquisition and flood hazard mitigation 
follow the red path outlined in Figiue 7. They have resulted from system response to the 
other program efforts which the entrepreneurs have undertaken. As discussed below in 
the other case studies, this pathway represents innovations which were not considered 
100% successful. In the Mingo Creek case, however, much of this work is still in the 
planning stages, and it is yet to be determined whether it will result in successful 
innovations or not. Following flooding along Hager Creek in 1994, the city was able to 
buy and clear six homes within a short period of time (A. Patton 1995), indicating that 
these efforts may also be considered successful in the long-nm. This attentiveness to 
system response is a valuable tool for entrepreneurs wishing to iimovate within municipal 
government.
3.2 The Metropolitan Environmental Trust
In the case of The M.e.t., the original problem (Problem A) which the policy 
entrepreneurs encountered was the perceived lack of landfill capacity. The accepted
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alternative, as shown in Figure 8, was to build a new landfill. This option was not 
politically feasible, forcing the entrepreneurs to search for new solutions. Originally, this 
search took the form of developing scientific guidelines for siting new landfills.
However, the mission quickly changed as the problem was redefined into one of how to 
provide recycling services to the member communities (Miner 1999). Once problem 
redefinition had occurred, the search for new solutions began anew.
The entrepreneurs were quite fortunate in that many municipalities across the 
country were also beginning recycling programs “this was a time when trash was being 
discussed all over the country and all these new trade journals came out” (M. Patton 
1998). Thus, they were able to look around and easily find solutions from elsewhere. 
While a curbside recycling program represented a theoretical solution to their problems, 
it was not politically feasible, as it would require raising the trash rates to an 
unacceptable level. Instead, a drop-off program was seen as the answer “Because it was 
easier to implement. You didn’t have to change the trash structure” (M. Patton 1998).
The idea of drop-off centers was not simply replicated in this case. The entrepreneurs 
utilized information specific to each of the participating cities to design portable trailers 
which would keep the costs low and allow each site to individually determine which 
items would be collected. Thus, adaptations occurred and the implementation of drop-off 
recycling centers, followed the green path indicated in Figure 8.
The inclusion o f household hazardous wastes and other unusual items such as 
eyeglasses as part of the items which are collected at the centers follows a different path. 
That path is indicated by the yellow arrows in Figure 8. In this case, there were no
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Figure 8. Decision-Making Schematic for The M e t.
solutions which could be borrowed from elsewhere. Hence, trial solutions were needed. 
However, the trials which occurred were not those of trial-and-error, they occurred due to 
the actions of entrepreneurs skillfully blending their tacit knowledge of the local 
environment with scientific and technical information regarding the nature of the local 
waste stream.
Some of this information was gained through the household hazardous waste 
collection events held at the fairgrounds. Some was gained through a careful researching 
of the laws governing hazardous waste. An example of this is when Mayor Savage 
requested that the centers take motor oil. Goodwill Industries responded that oil was 
hazardous and it would not place its workers in hazardous positions. The M.e.t. 
researched the hazardous waste regulations and realized that "... as long as we kept it 
from homes only, it would not be considered hazardous ...” (M. Patton 1998).
Not all of the innovations which occurred in this case received satisfactory 
responses once implemented. The red path in Figure 8 shows the fate of the CRABS 
commercial billing system. Due to the fact that the WTE plant was the first of its kind in 
the United States, there were no solutions which could be readily borrowed from other 
municipalities. In addition, no theoretical solutions to flow control existed. The 
entrepreneurs then determined that they could use their previous experiences with the 
storm water drainage fee to devise a billing system for commercial refuse disposal. A 
pilot study was conducted to gain the technical information required to determine the 
billing rates. Once implemented, however, the system received a negative response (in 
the form of a lawsuit) from the community. The entrepreneurs were forced to reexamine 
the data upon which charges were determined and develop a more equitable scheme.
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The recent implementation of a voluntary curbside recycling program by the city 
follows the path indicated by blue arrows in Figure 8. This policy is too new to 
determine whether or not it will succeed or fail. However, it is an attempt at a policy 
experiment along the lines suggested by the proponents of adaptive management.
3.3 Ozone Alert!
The Ozone Alert! case to a certain extent is still ongoing. However, the case has 
developed sufficiently to determine the extent to which many of the innovations fit with 
the decision-making schematic presented above. The original problem (Problem A) in 
this case was a violation of the ozone national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS), as 
shown in Figure 9. The solution available from the set of accepted alternatives was the 
imposition of federally mandated-compliance strategies. This option was neither 
politically nor economically feasible. “Tulsa had undertaken a lot of improvements 
mainly in the private sector to meet EPA standards.... And they probably accomplished 
99% of what needed to be done to meet standards. The additional 1% costs, that 1% 
costs so much more than the previous 99% that it was hard to get people (industries) to 
do much more (JL)” (Pine and Lasker 1998). The entrepreneurs then began a search for 
new solutions. In contrast to the previous case, however, this search did not involve any 
re-definition of the problem.
As the entrepreneurs began to look to other municipalities for solutions, they 
quickly found that none existed. While there had been previous efforts made at 
predicting ozone levels, no one had successfully done so (Bishop 1999). To the extent 
that the entrepreneiurs knew, no other municipality had tried to use their predictions in
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efforts to reduce ozone levels. They then began to look for theoretical solutions. Some 
of the theoretical solutions which the entrepreneurs had foimd, however, were not things 
which could be done in a short period of time (Henneke 1999). Therefore, while the 
evaluation of theoretical solutions continued, the intensity of the immediate crisis 
prompted the entrepreneurs to conciurently develop their own trial solutions. Thus, both 
the yellow and blue paths shown in Figure 9 were being followed simultaneously.
The immediate problem facing the entrepreneurs was to not have any further 
exceedances of the ozone standard during the 1991 ozone season (Pine and Lasker 1998; 
Henneke 1999). This led the entrepreneurs to follow the yellow path indicated in Figure 
9. As discussed in the case study, the actions which the entrepreneurs took were based 
upon both the available scientific evidence and the entrepreneurs knowledge of the 
situation. Hence, as shown in the figure, the trial solutions which were developed were 
not akin to those of trial-and-error. Many such trial solutions were developed under the 
Ozone Alert! program. Some of the most successful are the free bus rides, reduction of 
RV? in the local gasoline, and the development of ozone modeling capabilities. The 
constraints were such that some of the initiatives which were developed met with less 
success. For example, the portable infra-red detection of gross polluting vehicles and the 
smoking vehicle hotline were only partially successful. According to one entrepreneur, 
“A lot of people did not like the invasion o f privacy (JL)” (Pine and Lasker 1998). This 
pathway is shown in red in Figure 9.
Concurrent to the development of these solutions, the search for theoretical 
solutions continued, as indicated by the blue arrow in Figure 9. The first theoretical 
solution which was developed was the MERIT trading program. The MERIT program
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resulted from one entrepreneur blending the theoretical construct of emissions trading 
with the concept of operating a trading regime in a voluntary manner (Pine and Lasker 
1998). “But what hadn't been done was to try to figure out how you could do that kind of 
a system [emissions trading] with people being voluntary” (Henneke 1999). While the 
program was developed as part of the Ozone Alert! case, it was never implemented in 
Tulsa. Therefore the path shown in Figure 9 shows question marks leading from the 
controlled experimentation box to the innovative solutions box. However, the program 
has been proven to be an innovative solution elsewhere (Maurer 8/30/1996).
Another theoretical solution which was pursued as part of this case is the flexible 
attainment region (FAR) agreement. It clearly represents a case of controlled 
experimentation, even to the point that it is characterized as a “demonstration 
project’XAnonymous 7/30/1995). It resulted from the entrepreneurs’ realization that, 
theoretically, Tulsa is in the best position to determine what compliance strategies work 
there (Pine and Lasker 1998). The recent proposal of new ozone standards has left the 
status of the FAR agreement in question. It is therefore, as in the case of MERIT, unclear 
whether FAR will ultimately be deemed an innovative solution or not.
4 Summary
None of the representations of innovation extrapolated from the literature review 
portion of this research did an adequate job of explaining the innovation which took place 
in the case studies examined. As a result of the case study analysis, a more generalized 
decision-making schematic representative of the innovation/social learning process was 
developed. The original decision-making schematic developed during this research more 
adequately describes the processes of innovation and social learning. It makes clear the
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points of intervention for both policy entrepreneurs and scientific/technical information 
in the policy-making system, something lacking in the alternative representations.
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Chapter 7 
Policy Entrepreneur Survey
1 Introduction
An analysis which complements the development of the decision-making 
schematic is the determination of the relative importance of several variables in the 
innovation/social learning process identified as important in the literature. This can be 
accomplished by a survey of policy entrepreneurs. Such a survey was developed and 
sent to the policy entrepreneurs interviewed during the development of the case studies. 
The survey was designed to capture the degree to which variables identified in the 
literature as key to the innovation/social learning process were seen in each of the three 
cases. A copy of the survey, in its final form, is included for review in Appendix D: 
Policy Entrepreneur Survey. Of the 28 surveys sent out, 24 responses were received.
The survey was developed in the following manner: 1) a draft questionnaire was 
designed and reviewed in a pilot test for clarity, organization, and design; 2) the pre-test 
reviewers were given the draft survey along with comments from the researcher, 
indicating what information each question was intended to elicit from respondents; 3) the 
judges were then asked to assess whether or not the question effectively evoked the 
intended information; 4) alterations to the survey were made according to the feedback 
received firom the judges. This judging process served as a pilot test for the survey 
instrument.
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The questionnaire consists of 15 closed-ended questions, with answers placed on 
a scale of 1 to 6, depending upon the importance of the variable in the particular question 
(Dillman 1978; Sudman and Bradbum 1982). Two additional questions were not aimed 
at judging importance of variables, and therefore were multiple-choice in nature. The 
survey questions were divided into two parts. The first part (Questions 1-4) focused on 
particular innovations. In these questions, the respondent was asked to choose one of the 
three cases (Mingo Creek, The M.e.t., or Ozone Alert!) with which he/she was most 
familiar, and then identify three specific innovations that occurred within the case. The 
respondent then answered questions regarding the type of information sources utilized 
and difficulties encountered during the implementation of each specific innovation. The 
respondent was presented with lists (based upon information foimd during the literature 
review) of possible information sources/difficulties and asked to rank each according to 
their relative importance.
The second section of the survey (Questions 5-17) consisted of questions which 
were aimed at the overall process of innovation which the entrepreneurs experienced. 
These questions did not refer to specific irmovations, but to the chosen case as a whole. 
Again, the respondent was generally presented with lists (based upon information found 
during the literature review) of a variable number (from 2 to 20) possible information 
sources/difficulties and asked to rank each according to their relative importance.
2 Data Acquisition
Surveys were mailed to 28 policy entrepreneurs who had previously been 
interviewed during the case study analyses. Along with each questionnaire, each 
entrepreneur received a letter explaining the study and the purpose of the survey. The
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instructions encouraged all participants to answer the survey fully, providing additional 
comments as they deemed necessary. Self-addressed, postage-paid envelopes were 
included in the survey package as an incentive to complete and return the questionnaire. 
Follow-up letters, reminding the entrepreneurs about the survey and requesting a 
response, were mailed to non-respondents approximately two weeks after the initial 
mailing. Finally, telephone calls were made to those who still had not responded, asking 
them to respond in a timely maimer.
The response rate, following these repeated attempts to solicit the maximum 
number of responses was 86% (24 of 28 surveys returned). As surveys were returned to 
the researcher, each respondent’s answers were numerically coded and entered into a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Each respondent was given a unique identifier number, 
assigned as the surveys were returned. In addition, a code was entered to identify the 
case with which to identify the survey (1 = Mingo Creek, 2 = The M.e.t., and 3 = Ozone 
Alert!). For 15 of the 17 questions (the rating questions) the coding scheme used was the 
following: 1) answers recorded with a value of 6 (did not access) were assigned a value 
of zero; 2) answers recorded as very important (a value of 1) were coded with the value 
of 5, those recorded with a value of 2 were coded as 4 and so on. For question number 2, 
a value of 1-5 was assigned according to the order in which the answers appeared on the 
survey. For question number 3, the number of the selected answer was coded. For 
question number 8, a value of 1 was assigned to a “yes” response, and a value of 2 was 
assigned to a “no” response. The spreadsheet was then directly imported into Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software for analysis.
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3 Data Analysis
An exploratory factor analysis approach was undertaken to examine the survey 
responses. The use of exploratory factor analysis is suggested when there are no a priori 
assumptions regarding the organization of patterns among a number of variables 
(Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). In this case, the literature suggested that the variables 
about which survey questions were asked were important in the innovation/social 
learning process; however, there was no hypothesized relationship among the variables 
for any given question. According to Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), an exploratory 
analysis “condenses the variables into a relatively small number of factors”, which can 
then be used in further analysis. The goal in constructing factors is to explain the most 
variance possible with the smallest number of factors.
The method of exploratory factor analysis used for this research was principal 
component analysis (PCA). A separate PCA was carried out for each of six of the 
questions on the survey. PCA involves the solution of the characteristic equation of the 
correlation matrix with unities along the diagonal. The result is a series of vectors (called 
eigenvectors), their associated length parameters (eigenvalues), and their principal 
components (factors). PCA factors have the following properties (Nunnally and 
Bernstein 1994): 1) each factor explains the most variance possible in a sample of 
subjects; 2) the PCA method maximizes the variance explained for any number of 
factors; 3) the eigenvalues define the proportion of variance accoimted for by each factor; 
4) the factors are mutually orthogonal both geometrically and statistically.
In performing the PCA analyses, the following rules were used to eliminate 
resulting factors from further consideration and analysis (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994):
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1) factors with eigenvalues greater than I were extracted; 2) variables with loadings 
greater than 0.5 on any given factor were retained; 3) any variables which had cross­
loadings (loadings on more than one factor) greater then 0.5 were eliminated from all of 
the factors in which loadings were greater than 0.5; 4) only factors which had more than 
one variable with loadings greater than 0.5 were retained, and; 5) all variable loadings 
must be in the same direction. If variables loaded in different directions, two possibilities 
were considered. First, consideration was given to recoding the survey responses for the 
variable which loaded in a different direction. If this did not make sense in light of the 
particular question and variable, that variable was then eliminated from the factor.
For each question analyzed, the results o f the PCA analysis are a series of factors 
which are constructed of the “most important” variables for that particular question (i.e. 
they explain the most variance possible). These factors were then subjected to a 
reliability analysis. In the reliability analysis, two things were checked. First, the 
correlation matrix was checked to make sure that all the variables retained for a given 
factor had positive correlations. Second, the reliability coefficient (called standardized 
item alpha in SPSS) was checked, to assure it was greater than 0.7 and greater than all of 
the individual item alphas if the item was removed (AIR). Any factors which produced 
reliability coefficients less than 0.7 were eliminated from further consideration. If the 
reliability coefficient was greater than 0.7 but less than any of the individual item alpha if 
the item was removed, that particular item (e.g. la) was removed from consideration 
because and the reliability analysis was conducted again. This process continued until the 
reliability coefficients were greater than the remaining AIRs.
196
The final step in the statistical analysis of the survey responses was the 
construction of new variables from the PCA factors remaining after the reliability 
analysis. These new variables were assumed to be linear combinations of the variables 
contained within each remaining factor. The linear combination was divided by the 
number of variables in order to standardize all variables by the number of items 
contained in each. As an example, the new variable Probdefl (which consisted of 
variables the respondents considered important in problem definition) was defined as the 
sum of variables la, lb. Id, and If  divided by 4. (Variable la represents the responses to 
question la, etc). The new variables constructed from the PCA analysis were then used 
in one of two manners: 1) linear regression analysis was performed to determine if these 
variables could predict entrepreneur response to certain survey questions, and; 2) a series 
of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) analyses were performed to determine if 
significant differences were observed between the three case studies.
3.1 Principal Component and Reliability Analysis
The principal component analysis (PCA) was performed on questions number 1,
4,5, 6, 8, and 17. For questions 1 and 4, the number of responses received was greater 
than 24, as each respondent was asked to answer questions 1-4 up to three times for each 
of three different innovations. The remainder of the survey questions dealt with the 
entire innovation/social learning process, and respondents therefore only answered these 
questions once. The results of this analysis are included in Appendix E: SPSS Results for 
Policy Entrepreneur Survey. Note that in Appendix E, variable names are assigned 
according to the question which they represent (for example One_A represents survey 
question la). Variable names representing the new variables constructed following the
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reliability analysis are explicitly discussed in the following paragraphs. The following 
discussion highlights the results found in Appendix E.
Question 1 asked the respondents to rank the relative importance of different 
information soiu-ces in determining the nature of the problem (i.e. in problem definition). 
The PCA resulted in four factors which cumulatively explained 77.7% of the variance. 
However, after following the rules presented above, only one multi-variable factor 
remained. This first factor was a combination of the following variables (corresponding 
information sources listed in parenthesis): la (academic journals), lb (magazine articles). 
Id (books), and If (specialized workshops). Relative to the other sources of information 
listed in the question, these four sources were regarded as the most important in defining 
the problem. It is interesting to note that variable le (had discussions with experts) was 
not retained in the PCA analysis, given the important role of experts as shown in the case 
studies. It would appear that expertise, while important in the overall iimovation/social 
learning process, is not imperative in the problem definition phase, but that it becomes 
more important in the later phases such as the seeking of solutions, as indicated in the 
conceptual model.
Reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.7870 for this factor. 
This is greater than the cut-off value of 0.7, therefore a new variable (Probdefl) was 
created using these four variables and the procedure outlined above. This variable was 
then used as an independent variable in the linear regressions and in the across-case 
comparisons discussed below.
Question 4 asked respondents to rank the importance of several barriers to 
innovation, having identified a specific innovation. Six factors explained 72.2% of the
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total variance. Of these six, only factors one and four remained after following the rules 
outlined above. The first factor indicated the following variables were important barriers 
to the innovation/social learning process: 4c (lack of understanding of scientific/technical 
information (STl)), 4g (solution required “thinking outside of the box”), 4m (not enough 
time to adequately analyze STI), 4o (lack of organizational diversity), 4r (lack of media 
support), 4s (lack of recognition), and 4t (fear of not being re-elected).
Four of the six variables found to be important barriers to innovation dealt with 
the institutional structure. Two variables address the ability of the decision-making 
system to incorporate STI. The case studies presented earlier accentuate the fact that the 
ability to effectively incorporate STI is important for innovation/social learning to occur. 
The other two variables address more general institutional structure issues (diversity and 
thinking “outside the box”). An idea supported by both the literature and the case study 
analysis is that the entrepreneurs play a key role in altering the institutional structure such 
that these barriers to innovation are effectively removed.
Reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.7480, therefore a new 
variable (Barrier 1) was created firom these seven variables. This variable was then used 
as an independent variable in the linear regressions and in the across-case comparisons 
discussed below.
The fourth factor indicated that the following variables were important barriers: 4j 
(not acceptable to the public) and 4k (risk of failure). However, reliability analysis 
resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.5558 which is below the acceptable level of 0.7. 
Therefore, no further analysis was performed using these particular variables.
199
Five factors explained 81.2% of the variance for Question 5, which asked 
entrepreneurs to rank the importance of several information sources in the search for new 
solutions. After following the rules for factor retention, the first two factors remained. 
The first factor consisted of the following variables: 5c (personal interviews with agency 
personnel), 5d (federal government sources), and 5g (expert opinions/guidance).
This factor can therefore be interpreted as indicative of the importance to the 
entrepreneurs of outside technical expertise. Again, both the case studies and the 
literature review point to the importance of expertise. However, the research presented 
herein is among the few studies which explicitly addresses how this expertise is 
incorporated into the innovation/social learning process.
The reliability coefficient corresponding to this factor was 0.8531, therefore a 
new variable (Search 1) was created for use in the across-case comparisons discussed 
below.
The second factor was a combination of the following variables: 5h (private 
contract service) and 5i (independent field reports). This factor consists of variables 
which are representative of outside expertise. As mentioned previously, it appears that 
the importance of outside expertise lies in its ability to aid the entrepreneurs in their 
search for new solutions. The reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 
0.7597. A new variable (Search!) was constructed for use in the across-case 
comparisons.
Question 6 asked the entrepreneurs to rank the importance of several factors in 
the process of adapting “borrowed” solutions to Tulsa’s situation. The PCA produced 3 
factors which explained 79.3% of the variance. The first factor is composed of the
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following variables: 6d (personal interviews with agency personnel), 6g (personal 
experience and opinions), 6h (expert opinions/guidance), and 61 (private contract 
service). Once again, these variables reflect the contribution of outside expertise to the 
innovation/social learning process. Not only do experts serve as an aid to the 
entrepreneurs’ search for new solutions, but they are also important in helping them to 
adapt these solutions to their unique circumstances. Reliability analysis resulted in a 
reliability coefficient of 0.8540, therefore a new variable (Adapt 1) was constructed for 
use in the across-case comparison. After following rules for variable retention, the other 
two factors dropped out of the analysis.
In Question 8, the entrepreneurs were asked if they felt the city of Tulsa had 
learned from its experience with environmental policy innovation. If they answered yes, 
they were then asked to rate the relative importance of several variables in the city’s 
ability to learn. PCA analysis resulted in 3 factors which explained 74.8% of the 
variance. However, after following the rules for variable retention, only 1 factor 
remained. This factor is composed of the following variables: 8a (information analysis), 
8c (information flow), and 8d (information use). This factor clearly shows the 
importance of STI in the innovation/social learning process. As shown in the case 
studies and outlined in the conceptual model, the entrepreneurs serve an invaluable role 
in the process of information flow and analysis. Reliability analysis resulted in a 
reliability coefficient of 0.8263, therefore a new variable was constructed (Learn 1) for 
use in the across-case comparison.
Question 17 asked respondents to indicate the importance of several techniques 
which they learned during the innovation process and are currently applying to
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environmental policy decisions. The analysis produced 6 factors which explained 84.3% 
of the overall variance. After following the rules presented above, the first factor 
(consisting of the following variables) remained: 17a (organizational flexibility), 17b 
(development of task forces), 17d (recruitment of technical expertise), 17i (public 
participation/support), 17m (use of volunteers), 17r (conununity involvement), and 17s 
(crisis motivating change).
Reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.8741. However, it also 
indicated that a higher value could be achieved if the variable 17s was removed. The 
reliability analysis was repeated for a new variable which did not include 17s as a 
component, however, once again, the results indicated that a variable should be removed. 
This process was continued until the reliability coefficient obtained was greater than all 
of the resulting reliability coefficients if a component variable was removed. The final 
reliability analysis obtained was 0.8906 for a factor containing the variables 17a, 17b,
17i, 17m, and 17r. A new variable (Apply4) was constructed using these variables for 
use in the linear regression and across-case analyses. The important variables retained for 
this factor are all reflective of the type of institutional environment and structure which 
the entrepreneurs feel is important in the innovation/social learning process. The 
institution should remain flexible, perhaps through the use of task forces developed to 
address specific concerns (such task forces would facilitate the inclusion of outside 
expertise). They also feel that it is important to build public support and community 
involvement, perhaps through the use of volunteers.
The second factor consisted of the variable 17e (accessing external information) 
and 17p (systems/holistic thinking). Once again, the important role of external
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information was underscored in this factor. Approaching the problem from a systems 
point of view was also considered important. This would seem particularly relevant to 
environmental problems, which are often interdisciplinary (and interdepartmental) in 
nature. Reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.7197, therefore a new 
variable (ApplyS) was constructed from these variables for use in both the linear 
regression analysis and the across-case comparison.
3.2 Regression Analysis
Regression analysis was performed to determine if the new variables could 
predict responses to certain survey questions. For example, question 2 asked respondents 
to indicate how quickly they became familiar with the problem (i.e. how quickly the 
problem was defined). Interesting questions to ask regarding this particular survey item 
are whether the types of information found important in problem definition (Probdefl) or 
the important barriers (Barrier 1) are indicative of entrepreneurs’ responses to this 
question. As seen in Appendix E, only the linear regression of the Barrier 1 variable on 
question 2 was statistically significant at the 0.05 level (significance = 0.013). The 
relationship was positive, thus the more important the barriers were considered, the 
longer it took the entrepreneurs to become familiar with the problem.
Question 3 asked the entrepreneurs to rate the ease with which solutions were 
found and adopted. The variables Probdefl and Barrier 1 were again used as the 
independent variables for the regression analysis. The regression involving the problem 
definition variable was statistically significant (P = 0.006), with a positive correlation. 
Thus, the more important the entrepreneims found the information used in problem 
definition, the more difficult they foimd the adoption of solutions. Perhaps this is due to
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the fact that the more informed the entrepreneurs were regarding nature of the problem, 
the more they were aware of limitations regarding any particular solution. The 
regression of the Barrier 1 variable on question 3 was not statistically significant at the 
0.05 level (P = 0.069).
The first portion of question 8 asked the entrepreneurs whether or not they felt the 
city of Tulsa had learned from its past experiences with environmental policy 
innovations. The regression analysis was performed using each of the following 
variables: Learn 1, ApplyS, Apply4, and ApplyS. However, as can be seen from the 
results in Appendix E, none of these regressions were statistically significant. Therefore, 
both the factors that the entrepreneurs felt were important in the city’s ability to learn and 
those which they continued to apply in new policy-making situations were not indicative 
of whether the entrepreneurs felt the city had learned. While these are not the results one 
would initially expect to encounter, perhaps this is because of a discrepancy between the 
entrepreneurs’ and researcher’s definitions of “learning”.
3.3 Across-Case Comparisons
Differences in survey responses among cases was tested by one-way ANOVA. 
The ANOVA was performed using the variables constructed following the PCA analysis. 
The ANOVA results are also presented in Appendix E.
Statistically significant differences (at the 0.05 level) were observed for the 
variables Probdefl (significance = 0.033) and Search! (significance = 0.047). The 
variable Probdefl was most important for the respondents answering for The M.e.t. case. 
This variable rated higher among Mingo Creek respondents than Ozone Alert! 
entrepreneurs. Given that this variable represents journals, magazines, books, and
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specialized workshops, this result is not surprising, as the entrepreneurs in The M.e.t. 
case indicated that they had greater access to these types of information than did the 
entrepreneurs in the other cases (M. Patton 1999). Indeed, at the time The M.e.t. was 
evolving, there existed an abundance of trade journals devoted to the subject of 
municipal solid waste and recycling.
Statistically significant differences also were found for the variable Search!. This 
variable is indicative of the importance of outside expertise in the search for new 
solutions. Again, this variable was most important to the entrepreneurs in The M.e.t. 
case, followed by the Mingo Creek case, and finally the Ozone Alert! case. The 
responses included in this variable are private contract services and independent field 
reports. Once again, the meaning behind the statistical significance is not readily 
apparent and caution should be exercised in its interpretation, given the fact that its 
significance level is quite near the 0.05 level. It is possible that these types of 
information were more readily accessible to the entrepreneurs active in The M.e.t. case 
than the other two cases. It is also possible that lack of access to other types of 
information (such as federal government sources) precluded their use by the 
entrepreneurs active in The M.e.t. case.
4 Conclusions
Table 7-1 summarizes the variables which the entrepreneurs foimd important 
during the innovation/social learning process. These results support several tentative 
conclusions. First, the PCA analysis underscored the importance of scientific/technical 
information (STI) and outside expertise in the innovation/social learning process. Not 
only must the entrepreneurs have access to STI, but it must be of a certain quality (i.e. it
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needs to be credible). Expertise was seen as particularly important in the identification 
and adoption of new solutions, once the problem was well defined. The information used 
in problem definition was indicative of the difficulty the entrepreneurs encountered 
adopting new solutions. Also, barriers to innovation were indicative of the amount of 
time it took entrepreneurs to feel they had clearly defined their problem. Slight 
differences were seen between the three cases for both the types o f information used to 
define the problem and for the nature of the information used in the search for new 
solutions.
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Table 7-1. Summary of Important Variables
Process Important Variable(s)
Problem Definition Academic Journals 
Magazine Articles 
Books
Specialized Workshops
Barriers to Innovation Lack of Understanding of STI 
Solution Required “thinking outside the 
box”
Not Enough Time to Adequately Analyze 
STI
Lack of Organizational Diversity 
Lack of Media Support 
Lack of Recognition 
Fear of Not Being Re-elected
Search for New Solutions Personal Interviews with Agency 
Personnel
Federal Government Sources 
Expert Opinions/Guidance
Private Contract Service 
Independent Field Reports
Adapting Borrowed Solutions Personal Interviews with Agency 
Personnel
Personal Experience and Opinions 
Expert Opinions/Guidance 
Private Contract Service
Ability to Learn Information Analysis 
Information Flow 
Information Use
Characteristics of Learning Environment Organizational Flexibility 
Development of Task Forces 
Public Participation/Support 
Use of Volunteers 
Community Involvement
Accessing External Information 
Systems/Holistic Thinking
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Chapter 8 
Lake Eucha Model Testing
1 Introduction
To determine the applicability of the decision-making schematic, the problem of 
water quality at Lake Eucha, an environmental dilemma currently being faced by the city, 
was examined. Lake Eucha serves as one of two primary sources of drinking water for 
the city. In recent years, high levels of nutrients have been found in the lake, causing 
eutrophication which results in taste and odor problems, as well as additional operating 
expenses for Tulsa’s water treatment facilities.
A somewhat shorter case study was developed documenting the emergence of the 
issue on Tulsa’s policy agenda using the same methods as the previous case studies. A 
survey was then administered to policy elites and technical experts active in the current 
debate over how to maintain Lake Eucha’s water quality. The survey results were 
compared to those of the policy entrepreneurs.
2 Case Description
Lake Eucha was built in 1952 and is owned and managed by the city of Tulsa.
The Lake Eucha watershed encompasses roughly 230,000 acres, approximately 40 
percent of which is located in Arkansas (Lassek 3/12/97). Lake Eucha, in turn, supplies 
water to Lake Spavinaw. The city of Tulsa draws nearly half of its drinking water supply 
from the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed (Savage 1998). In 1995, the city commissioned the 
Oklahoma Conservation Commission (OCC) to perform a Clean Lakes study to 
investigate recurring taste and odor problems associated with Lake Eucha. Clean Lakes
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studies are financed by the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U. S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as well as by a local match.
In early 1997, the OCC released the results of the Clean Lakes study, which found 
average annual total phosphorus and nitrate nitrogen plus nitrite nitrogen concentrations 
increasing dramatically in recent years (Oklahoma Conservation Commission 1997).
The study points to non-point source pollution (NPSP) as one of the most likely causes of 
the increasing nutrient levels. Another pollution source is the city of Decatur, Arkansas 
which has a permit to discharge treated wastewater into the watershed (Lassek 
3/13/1997). NPSP attributes approximately 50% of the nutrients to the lake, while point 
sources contribute roughly 30% (Lassek 5/4/1997). NPSP refers to diffuse pollution 
sources not resulting from a specific location (such as a pipe). It results from runoff, 
precipitation, percolation, or atmospheric deposition which can carry pollutants 
throughout a watershed. While the measured pollutant concentrations from any single 
source may seem insignificant, when combined from an entire watershed, the results of 
NPSP can be significant. NPSP degrades aquatic systems by altering their physical and 
chemical quality and can have dramatic biological effects. Common sources of NPSP 
include urban and agricultural runoff, construction activities, physical changes to stream 
channels, and habitat degradation (Thomann and Mueller 1987).
One primary source of NPSP for the lake is the rapidly expanding poultry 
industry located in the region. According to the OCC report, the amounts of phosphorus 
and nitrogen excreted by poultry in the watershed is equivalent to the untreated waste of 
approximately 11 humans per acre (Oklahoma Conservation Commission 1997). The 
increased nutrient loading to the lake results in algal blooms, which result in low
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dissolved oxygen levels in the lake. This results in taste and odor problems at the tap. In 
order to treat these problems, the city is forced to treat water more extensively. The 
increased treatment efforts not only result in higher operational costs for the city, but can 
also prevent certain industries which require extremely high-quality raw water from 
locating in Tulsa (Pearson 3/16/1997).
2.1 Statewide Response
The report’s implication that the nutrient problems primarily resulted from 
poultry operations sparked controversy among different state agencies and poultry 
producers. Jim Britton, an Oklahoma State University extension poultry specialist, is 
quoted as saying “It was irresponsible for an agency to look at a phosphorus [reading] 
and say it was chicken phosphorus” (Lassek 5/4/1997a). At the time the report was 
released, concern had been mounting throughout the state over issues related to large 
scale animal feeding operations (Ervin 5/8/97). In response. Governor Frank Keating 
formed an Animal Waste and Water Quality task force, comprised of private citizens 
(many cattlemen, poultry or pork producers) and agency representatives. The task force 
was charged with examining the current and past disposal of animal waste and its effect 
on the quality of Oklahoma’s water supply.
The task force presented its final report, which included more than 50 
recommendations, to the governor in December, 1997. One of the recommendations was 
for the legislature to enact a separate poultry industry regulation bill. Later that month, 
the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture (ODA) enacted emergency rules regulating the 
state’s poultry industry. The rules required poultry operators to implement approved 
management plans, soil testing prior to land application o f litter, record keeping
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requirements, storage of litter in covered sheds, and biannual facility inspections by 
integrators (Ford 12/20/1997). Interestingly, while the rules required soil to be tested 
prior to additional land applications, they did not set a permitted level of phosphorus in 
the soil (Anonymous 12/24/1997).
The next year, Oklahoma legislators could ignore the issue of poultry waste no 
longer. Several bills were introduced in both houses, most of which never made it out of 
committee. On May 20, 1998, in Tulsa, Governor Frank Keating signed into law a bill 
that was the first in the nation to impose regulations on the poultry industry (Lassek 
5/21/1998). The law (Title 35 Chapter 17 Subchapter 5 Oklahoma Statutes (O.S.)) 
requires all poultry growers to register annually with ODA, pay a registration fee, and 
maintain an approved animal waste management plan. It requires the large poultry 
corporations to make contributions to an educational program on poultry waste handling, 
further requiring all operators to obtain a given number of hours education annually. 
Regarding land application of waste, it allows land application only by persons certified 
to perform such work and requires soil waste testing prior to land application.
2.2 Tulsa’s Response
The release of the OCC report initiated action by the city of Tulsa. About six 
months prior to its release, the public works department approached the mayor’s office, 
concerned about citizen reaction to the study’s results (East 2000). It was decided that 
Tulsa would take a proactive role regarding this issue, preferring to help shape policy, 
rather than having it dictated fi"om elsewhere. The city is acting strategically, forging 
working partnerships with the other stakeholders and advancing the state of the scientific 
knowledge regarding the watershed.
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Much of the city’s actions occiured within the Tulsa Metropolitan Utility 
Authority (TMUA), the agency responsible for maintaining Tulsa’s drinking water 
supply. Utility Board member Richard Sevenoaks commented, “Now we find out a 
community upstream is affecting the drinking water of a population of 550,000 
downstream. We have no choice but to take a leadership role. We know what can 
happen’’ (Lassek 3/13/1997).
After the study results were officially released, Tulsa city officials responded 
quickly, seeking funds for further studies in its 1997/98 budget, and calling for a 
cooperative effort to find solutions to the NPSP problem (Lassek 3/28/1997). Tulsa 
Mayor Susan Savage is quoted as saying, “We must find a solution that makes sense for 
everyone.... We have a tremendous amount to gain if we work together. Nobody wants 
to regulate the agricultural industry. Regulatory responses take the most time and are the 
most difficult to implement” (Lassek 3/28/1997b).
In an effort to become more fully informed regarding the issues surrounding 
animal waste, the city began collecting information from states and cities across the 
country that had programs addressing pollution from animal waste (Lassek 5/6/1997). It 
also began to build a team of experts to develop a comprehensive plan for dealing with 
poultry waste (Lassek 6/8/1997). “A couple of board members went to learn what they 
are doing in another part of the coimtry on litter” (Slaughter 2000). As the issue took on 
statewide importance, Tulsa city leaders actively began to draft model legislation which 
would include the measures it felt were important (East 2000). However, they also knew 
that they could not depend solely upon legislation to solve their problem.
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As they built their team of experts, they were careful to include representatives 
from all interested parties in the discussions. In December, 1997 TMUA board members 
and the mayor met with representatives from the poultry industry in an attempt to 
negotiate a strategy limiting the amount of waste disposed of in the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watersheds during the scheduled March chicken house clean-outs. Patsy Bragg, vice­
chairwoman of TMUA, commented, “This is our window of opportunity to try to make 
the best effort to ensure that whatever litter is spread on fields it is done in a way that 
won’t adversely affect the water supply” (Lassek 12/5/1997). As a result of their 
inclusion, the poultry industry agreed to a 12-step volimtary program aimed at providing 
some “short-term solutions and long-term possibilities for handling waste produced in 
Arkansas and Oklahoma” (Schafer 12/6/1997). One of the important short-term actions 
the industry agreed to was to complete soil phosphorus testing (in both Oklahoma and 
Arkansas) before March 1998. They also agreed to work with the city and INCOG to 
gather information regarding the number and types of poultry operations in the 
watershed, determine how each operation deals with waste, aid growers in finding 
alternative disposal methods in areas with excess soil phosphorus, and participate in 
watershed management teams (Anonymous 12/6/1997).
The city’s efforts to build a team approach toward long-term solutions continued 
into 1998. Early that year, the mayor was asked to become a participant in ODA’s efforts 
to coordinate the efforts of state agencies dealing with poultry waste issues. Oklahoma 
Secretary of the Environment Brian Griffin is quoted as saying, “Mayor Savage and 
TMUA have already shown their ability to play an important part in shaping the solutions 
that we will develop statewide on non-point source pollution” (Lassek 2/9/1998). Tulsa’s
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efforts garnered the city national attention when the mayor was asked to testify before the 
Senate Agricultural Committee during a hearing on animal waste management (Lassek 
3/29/1998). Further national attention resulting from Tulsa’s efforts came when the 
mayor was chosen as one of three members appointed by President Clinton to the 
National Recreation Lakes Study Commission.
As the team continued to search for long-term solutions, several experimental 
efforts were begun. One such effort, which has met with mixed success, was the 
establishment by ODA of a poultry-litter hotline. The hotline allows litter producers to 
link with potential litter buyers outside of sensitive watersheds (Shafer 4/8/1998). One of 
the difficulties with this approach, however, is the large cost associated with transporting 
the litter. The state Conservation Commission also received a large grant from the EPA 
in which specific best management practices will be implemented in Beatty Creek and 
the effects of the practices monitored for 5 years (Lassek and Myers 6/11/1998; Lassek 
4/1 l/1999b). The city has also created a Watershed Management Team and three work 
groups (Lassek 4/1 l/1999a) to continue efforts to address these issues. Together with the 
Indian Nations Council of Governments (INCOG), the city has prepared a watershed 
restoration action strategy (WRAS) in response to the federal government’s clean water 
action plan. The report describes specific public outreach, monitoring and evaluation, 
problem definition, and action goals which are to be met over the coming years.
One obstacle which has hampered the city’s efforts to determine solutions has 
been the small amount of scientific and technical information (STI) which was available. 
The policy surrounding poultry waste has moved much more quickly than the science in 
this case (East 2000). However, Tulsa has been proactive in advancing the state of STI
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as well. “Meanwhile, we proceeded with defining what science information we were 
going to need and contracting for it” (Slaughter 2000). One of the major contributing 
factors Tulsa brings to advancing the STI is a partnership with the law firm Gardere and 
Wynne (East 2000). TMUA board member Patsy Bragg is a partner in the firm. The 
firm has expertise in oil and gas exploration and as such has an excellent global 
positioning system (GPS). They generously helped to create and donated a GPS platform 
for use by the city. The system allows officials to graphically overlay the data which has 
been collected regarding the watershed.
The agreement worked out between the city and the poultry industry 
representatives has advanced this system significantly. As part of the agreement, they 
have provided the city with critical information about the current state of poultry 
operations within the watershed. The database has also benefited from work being 
conducted at Oklahoma State University, particularly regarding soil phosphorus levels. 
The database information is available to the public via TMUA’s website 
(http://www.tulsawater.com/). OCC’s current Beatty Creek project will also serve to 
provide additional STI which the policy-makers can then use for decision-making.
Tulsa’s efforts to find long-term solutions to protect its water quality have been 
remarkable. Currently, the city is attempting to collect the STI it deems necessary for 
informed decision-making to proceed. While the dilemma is too new to determine if 
environmental policy innovations will be devised as part of the efforts, it appears as if the 
city is headed in that direction. Mike Bira, nutrient coordinator for the EPA has stated, 
“Tulsa has taken the leadership role in many regards. The things they are going to be
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deciding in the next three to five years will set a lot o f the standards across the nation in 
the way urban areas approach their water supplies” (Lassek 4/1171999a).
The city has successfully forged partnerships willing to work to solve the nutrient 
problems of Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw. “Everybody’s at the table. You have 
integrators, you have bureaucrats, you have scientists. It’s people who operate the lakes, 
and people who would like to benefit from changing the process as well” (Slaughter 
2000). The WRAS states “an unprecedented spirit o f cooperation has been established 
between parties that have divergent interests in poultry production and animal waste 
disposal” (Indian Nations Council of Governments 1999). Recent reports indicate that 
the lake may be aging more quickly than it was once thought (Anonymous 12/16/1999), 
should this prove to be the case, Tulsa has positioned itself to deal with the aging in a 
positive manner.
3 Participant Survey
A survey questionnaire was sent to policy elites and technical experts active in the 
current debate over how to maintain Lake Eucha’s water quality. The survey was 
designed to capture the degree to which variables identified in the literature as key to the 
innovation/social learning process were evidenced in the Lake Eucha case, and to 
compare and contrast a current environmental policy problem with the cases previously 
reviewed. A copy of the survey, in its final form, is included for review in Appendix F: 
Eucha & Spavinaw Lakes Participant Survey.
As can be seen in the appendix, the survey is nearly identical to that discussed in 
Chapter 7. It consisted primarily o f closed-ended questions, with answers placed on a 
scale o f 1 to 6, depending upon the importance of the variable in the particular question
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(Dillman 1978; Sudman and Bradbum 1982). Some questions were not aimed at judging 
importance of variables, and therefore were multiple-choice in nature. However, as no 
specific innovations have yet been identified, all questions pertained to the overall 
process of policy-making which the respondents are experiencing.
3.1 Data Acquisition
Surveys were mailed to policy elites and technical experts active in the current 
debate over how to maintain Lake Eucha’s water quality. Along with each questionnaire, 
the entrepreneur received a letter explaining the study and the purpose of the survey. The 
instmctions encouraged all participants to answer the survey fully, providing additional 
comments as they deemed necessary. Self-addressed, postage-paid envelopes were 
included in the survey package as an incentive to complete and return the questionnaire. 
Follow-up letters, reminding the entrepreneurs about the survey and requesting a 
response, were mailed to non-respondents approximately two weeks after the initial 
mailing.
Six of the respondents replied that they did not wish to participate in the survey. 
Of the remaining 72 surveys, 22 were returned, yielding a response rate of 31%. As 
surveys were returned to the researcher, the respondent’s answers were entered into a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet in numerical format, coding then in the same manner as the 
policy entrepreneur survey. The spreadsheet was then directly imported into SPSS for 
statistical analysis.
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3.2 Data Analysis
An exploratory factor analysis approach was again undertaken to examine the 
survey responses. The techniques used were the same as those undertaken for the 
entrepreneur surveys discussed in Chapter 7.
3.2.1 Principal Component and Reliability Analysis
The principal component analysis (PCA) was performed on questions number 1,
4, 5, 6, 8, and 17. Question 1 asked the respondents to rank the relative importance of 
different information sources in determining the nature of the problem (i.e., in problem 
definition). The PCA resulted in three factors which cumulatively explained 78.1% of 
the variance. However, after following the rules presented above, only one multi- 
variable factor remained. This factor was a combination of the following variables 
(corresponding information sources listed in parenthesis): la  (academic journals), lb 
(magazine articles). Id (books), 1 f (specialized workshops), 1 g (obtained information 
from government agencies other than my own), and li (internet research). These six 
sources were regarded as the most important in defining the problem. Four of these six 
variables were also considered important in the entrepreneur survey results, and reflect 
the importance of outside information sources in the iimovation/social learning process. 
The two additional variables included by the Lake Eucha survey respondents reflect the 
following: 1) the nature of the case and Oklahoma’s water quality infrastructure is such 
that it would necessarily require inter-agency information exchange, and; 2) the increased 
availability of information via the internet since the cases examined earlier were 
undertaken.
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Reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.7870 for this factor. 
This is greater than the cut-off value of 0.7, therefore a new variable (Probdefl) was 
created using these six variables and the procedure outlined above. This variable was 
then used as an independent variable in the linear regressions discussed below.
Question 4 asked respondents to rank the importance of several barriers to 
solution adoption. PCA results found that 7 factors explained 86.9% of the total 
variance. Of these factors only factors one and two remained after following the rules 
outlined above. The first factor indicated the following variables were important barriers 
to the innovation/social learning process: 4a (inadequate scientific/technical 
information(STl)), 4b (unavailable STI), 4c (lack of understanding of STI), 4d (lack of 
timely STI), 41 (lack of regulatory flexibility), 4p (solution sought too quickly), and 4t 
(fear of not being re-elected). Only two of these variables (4c and 4t) were the same as 
those found in the first factor for this question on the entrepreneur survey. It appears that 
in the Lake Eucha case, the importance of obtaining timely and useful STI has served as 
a significant barrier to policy-making thus far. The lack of clear entrepreneurs in this 
case emphasizes the importance of entrepreneur’s role in the innovation/social learning 
process of providing STI to policy-makers. Perhaps entrepreneurs will emerge to help 
the Lake Eucha decision-makers overcome some of these important barriers.
Reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.8801, therefore a new 
variable (BarrierI) was created from these seven variables. This variable was then used 
as an independent variable in the linear regressions discussed below.
The second factor indicated that the following variables were important barriers: 
4g (solution required thinking “outside the box”), 4i (not acceptable to politicians), and
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4n (difficulties interacting with other agencies). However, reliability analysis resulted in 
a reliability coefficient of 0.7051 but the AIR for item 4i was 0.7451, therefore, this item 
was removed. Repeated reliability analysis using just variables 4g and 4n resulted in a 
reliability coefficient of 0.75, therefore a new variable Barrier] was created using these 
two factors. These variables, seemingly have nothing in common upon first inspection. 
However, one manner of overcoming difficulties interacting with other agencies is to 
think along other than traditional lines. In the entrepreneur survey results, only one 
barrier factor remained. Therefore, a comparison between the two sets of survey results 
is not possible for this factor.
Four factors explained 79.59% of the variance for Question 5, which asked 
entrepreneurs to rank the importance of several information sources in the search for new 
solutions. After following the rules for factor retention, the first factor was the only one 
which remained. The first factor consisted of the following variables: 5b (personal 
interview with academics), 5c (personal interviews with agency personnel), 5d (federal 
government sources), 5e (state government sources), 5f (personal experience and 
opinion), and 5g (expert opinions/guidance).
As was the case with the entrepreneur surveys, this factor can be interpreted as 
indicative of the importance to the entrepreneurs of outside technical expertise. Again, 
both the case studies and the literature review point to the importance of expertise. In 
this case, three additional variables (5b, 5e, and 5f) were considered important.
However, only one of these does not reflect the influence of outside expertise, but that of 
individual expertise. In this case, in contrast to the case studies analyzed earlier, the
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survey respondents were likely to be trained in the area upon which the policy is focused. 
Thus, it is not surprising that this variable would also be included.
The reliability coefficient corresponding to this factor was 0.8930, however this 
was lower than the AIR if item 5f was removed. The process of excluding items with 
AIR’s less than the reliability coefficient underwent several iterations for this question.
A new variable (Search 1) was finally created using only items 5c and 5d (reliability 
coefTicient = 0.9601).
Question 6 asked the entrepreneurs to rank the importance of several factors in 
the process of adapting “borrowed” solutions to Tulsa's situation. The PCA produced 4 
factors which explained 84.3% of the variance. The first factor is composed of the 
following variables: 6b (academic papers), and 6k (public supportiveness). Reliability 
analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.4798, therefore no further analysis was 
done for this factor.
In Question 8 the entrepreneurs were asked to rate the relative importance of 
several variables which they have adopted based on previous experience. PCA analysis 
resulted in 4 factors which explained 81.05% of the variance. However, after following 
the rules for variable retention, only 1 factor remained. This factor is composed of the 
following variables: 8c (information flow), and 8d (information use). This factor clearly 
shows the importance of STI in the innovation/social learning process, and is composed 
of much the same variables as the corresponding factor in the entrepreneur survey. As 
shown in the case studies and outlined in the conceptual model, the role of STI in the 
innovation/social learning process is invaluable. Reliability analysis resulted in a 
reliability coefficient of 0.9088, therefore a new variable was constructed (LeamI).
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Question 17 asked respondents to indicate the importance of several techniques 
which they learned from past policy-making experiences that they are currently applying 
to environmental policy decisions. The analysis produced 6 factors which explained 
87.4% of the overall variance. After following the rules presented above, the first factor 
consisted of the following variables: 17e (accessing external information), and 17i 
(public participation/support). Reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 
0.7528. A new variable (Apply!) was constructed using these variables. One of the 
variables retained as important for this factor (17i) was also considered important by the 
entrepreneurs. However, taken together they are not indicative of any particular tactic 
which was important for the entrepreneurs.
The second factor consisted of the variable 17g (attending 
workshops/conferences) and 17p (networking). Once again, the important role of external 
information is underscored by this factor. Both conferences and networking represent 
opportunities in which the respondents would gain access to additional sources of STI. 
Reliability analysis resulted in a reliability coefficient of 0.8167, therefore a new variable 
(Apply5) was constructed from these variables.
3.2.2 Regression Analysis
The regression analysis was performed in order to determine if the new 
variables could predict response to certain survey questions. For this case, only variables 
which could predict the response to question 3 were considered in the regression analysis. 
Question 3 asked the respondents to rank the ease with which initial solutions were found 
and adopted. In the regression analysis the variables Probdefl and Barrier 1 were both 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Probdefl had a positive correlation with
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question 3 (significance = 0.088), suggesting that the types of information accessed in 
problem definition had made finding and adopting an initial solution more difficult. 
Barrier 1 was also positively correlated with question 3 (significance = 0.003), suggesting 
that the barriers which respondents foimd important had hindered the finding and 
adoption of solutions. These results are possibly reflective of the fact that no 
entrepreneurs have yet emerged to aid policy-makers as outlined in the conceptual model. 
They could also be indicative of the fact that the persons queried are not utilizing the 
appropriate information sources, or are not using them in the required manner.
4 Conclusions
Table 8-1 summarizes the variables which the survey participants found 
important, and contrasts them with those foimd important by the policy entrepreneurs. 
The survey analysis revealed many instances in which the policy elites active in the Lake 
Eucha debate were faced with many of the same barriers as the entrepreneurs interviewed 
in the case studies. Particularly important is the inadequacy of the STI available to 
participants. Given that many of the respondents were scientists, presumably able to 
access and understand a wide variety of STI sources, this finding is particularly 
meaningful. If the scientific community cannot access or adequately interpret STI, there 
is little hope that politicians and bureaucrats will find the STI useful. This underscores 
the need for policy entrepreneurs, who can cross institutional boimdaries and tap into the 
knowledge of experts (political and technical), to participate in the iimovation/social 
learning process. While both of these entrepreneurial roles appeared important in the 
Lake Eucha survey, it has yet to be determined whether such persons will emerge during 
the policy-making process.
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Table 8-1. Summary of Important Variables
Process Important Variable(s) Important Variables(s) - 
Eucha
Problem Definition Academic Journals 
Magazine Articles 
Books
Specialized Workshops
Academic Journals 
Magazine Articles 
Books
Specialized Workshops 
Other Government 
Agencies 
Internet
Barriers to Innovation Lack of Understanding of STI 
Solution Required “thinking 
outside the box”
Not Enough Time to 
Adequately Analyze STI 
Lack of Organizational 
Diversity
Lack of Media Support 
Lack of Recognition 
Fear of Not Being Re-elected
Inadequate STI 
Unavailable STI 
Lack of Understanding of 
STI
Lack of Timely STI 
Lack of Regulatory 
Flexibility 
Solution Sought too 
Quickly
Fear of not being 
Reelected
Solution Required 
“thinking outside the box” 
Difficulties Interacting 
with Other Agencies
Search for New 
Solutions
Personal Interviews with 
Agency Personnel 
Federal Government Sources 
Expert Opinions/Guidance
Personal Interviews with 
Agency Personnel 
Federal Government 
Sources
Private Contract Service 
Independent Field Reports
Adapting Borrowed 
Solutions
Personal Interviews with 
Agency Personnel 
Personal Experience and 
Opinions
Expert Opinions/Guidance 
Private Contract Service
N/A
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Ability to Leam Information Analysis 
Information Flow 
Information Use
Information Flow 
Information Use
Characteristics of 
Learning Environment
Organizational Flexibility 
Development of Task Forces 
Public Participation/Support 
Use of Volunteers 
Community Involvement
Accessing External
Information
Public
Participation/Support
Accessing External 
Information
Systems/Holistic Thinking
Attending
Workshops/Conferences
Networking
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Recommendations
1 Introduction
Environmental policy makers are currently wrestling with the question of how to 
adapt their strategies and approaches for dealing with environmental problems toward 
more sustainable ends. Doing so will require the development of innovative policy 
measures which enable society’s institutions to better cope with competing demands for 
its natural and human resources. The City of Tulsa, OK, has earned a reputation as a 
remarkably innovative government with respect to municipal environmental policies and 
programs. Three examples of Tulsa’s innovative environmental policy are the Mingo 
Creek flood control program, the Metropolitan Environmental Trust, and the Ozone 
Alert! program.
The three environmental policy cases were innovative and adopted outside the 
boundaries of the traditional policy making model. Understanding the process of 
environmental policy innovation, and its complementary process of social learning, 
remains incomplete, however (Healy and Ascher 1995; Pielke 1995). The purpose of this 
research was to begin to fill in the gaps in understanding regarding the innovation/social 
learning process for environmental policy through a qualitative inquiry of the three 
innovative policy measures mentioned above. The study was intended to determine what 
factors have contributed to the city’s ability to leam firom its experiences.
The goal of this research was the development of a decision-making schematic for 
the process of policy-oriented social learning which took place in Tulsa. To build this
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schematic, a retrospective assessment of the process of environmental policy innovation 
as undertaken by the city was conducted. In addition, a policy entrepreneur survey was 
administered to detail the type of information entrepreneurs utilized, their perceived 
difficulties in the process, the factors they judged to be important in overcoming barriers 
to innovation, and whether or not they believed social learning had occurred.
To determine the applicability of the decision-making schematic, a somewhat 
shorter case study was developed documenting an emerging environmental policy issue 
on the policy agenda using the same methods as in the previous cases. A survey was then 
administered to the policy elites and technical experts active in this debate. The aim of 
this survey was to determine the degree to which the decision-making schematic agrees 
with the current decision-making paradigm operating in the city of Tulsa.
2 Decision-Making Schematic
None of the idealized representations of the innovation/social learning process 
found in the literature provided a good fit to the environmental policy innovations 
explored as part of this research. What was needed was a more generalized decision­
making schematic which allows multiple points of entry in the process for 
scientific/technical information as well as policy entrepreneurs. As part of this research, 
an original decision-making schematic was developed which illustrates the pivotal role of 
entrepreneurs and scientific and technical information (STI) in the process.
Development of the schematic proceeded through several steps. The first step 
was an analysis of the idealized representations presented above for applicability to the 
Tulsa cases. During this analysis, both the effectiveness and shortcomings of each 
representation in depicting the events which took place were identified. The second step
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was to combine those portions of the idealized representations which effectively depicted 
the case studies into a working representation of Tulsa. In this first step, all possible 
pathways were considered. The information from the case studies was then used to 
eliminate pathways which did not historically occur. The schematic was then refined 
further through the development of new pathways for the portions of the cases which 
remained to be described. Finally, the roles of both policy entrepreneurs and STI as seen 
in the case studies were incorporated in the representation.
Following the flood events of 1976 and 1984, Tulsa city leaders were faced with a 
situation in which they were forced to develop the capacity to respond to flood issues. 
More specifically, the city’s proven inability to protect the citizens forced response. The 
city experienced limited success with its initial efforts at floodplain management. The 
institutional structure following the 1976 floods was not receptive to citizens or their 
calls for change. However, they were effective in getting ordinances passed. Thus, they 
changed the institutional environment somewhat.
The discussions surrounding the implementation of these ordinances led to the 
development of coalitions (homeowners and developers) arguing over issues of property 
rights. The homeowner coalition felt that the developers were not paying the full social 
costs of their actions, even after the fee-in-lieu system was enacted. The developers felt 
that they were being unfairly burdened and not being allowed to use their own property 
to its highest potential. The continued arguing between coalitions is proof that old 
paradigms die hard, and that motivation of any alternative solutions would require a more 
dramatic event and an effective political coalition.
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The dramatic event came in the form of the 1984 floods, which were much worse 
than the 1976 flood. As it happened, the seeds of an effective political coalition had 
recently taken office. While the overwhelming devastation forced public attention on the 
issue, it took political courage to effect the solutions. The personal qualities of the 
entrepreneurs active in this case proved to be a key ingredient in the success of Tulsa’s 
successful innovation regarding flash flood hazard mitigation.
Another key was the ability of these individuals to utilize outside expertise, 
particularly scientific and technical expertise. The entrepreneurs widened their thinking 
by bringing in nationally recognized consultants with previous experience designing 
multi-purpose detention basins. They also networked with natural hazard mitigation 
experts such as Gilbert White and Ian McHarg. Finally, since they knew that they could 
not accomplish all that they wished to within the confines of the city government, they 
forged a highly successful partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE), 
another source of outside expertise.
Solid waste policy innovation by Tulsa did not conform to conventional 
innovation models either. The policy entrepreneurs active in this case were acting in a 
strategic manner. Three key elements of the strategy were: (1) building partnerships with 
the private sector; (2) gaining a large number of participants in order to secure political 
buy-in; and (3) building upon successes one small step at a time.
The household hazardous waste events represent perhaps the most striking 
example of private-public partnerships undertaken in this case. The role played by such 
partnerships in the continued success of The M.e.t. has been critical. One strategy which 
has helped to foster such partnerships has been for The M.e.t. to remain a small
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organization. While the member governments are willing to lend support recycling 
efforts, they are not financially able to fully fund the efforts which have been undertaken. 
By strategically utilizing public-private partnerships. The M.e.t. has been able to supply 
solutions which require minimal financial investments on the part of the members. The 
partnership mentality dominates the relationship between The M.e.t. and the recycling 
public as well. This relationship has helped to both foster The M.e.t.’s reputation as the 
provider of environmental services and to increase the public’s participation rate.
Much of the credibility of The M.e.t. is a result of the last part of their strategy, to 
build upon successes one small step at a time. However, strategy alone was not sufficient 
to build the reputation which The M.e.t. has garnished. A certain type of person is also 
needed in order to successfully execute the strategy. Not only does it take persons who 
are comfortable in the political arena, but these persons must also be able to function in 
the bureaucratic arena as well. In this case, Tulsa was fortunate to have had both types of 
persons active as entrepreneurs.
Finally, the role played by scientific and technical information in this case 
deserves mention. Specific technical information regarding solid waste and recycling 
was needed in order to educate the public and government officials about the programs 
The M.e.t. undertook. This information was gathered from technical journals, scientific 
papers, as well as waste haulers themselves. Additional information regarding the 
precise nature of Tulsa’s waste stream was needed for decision-making. This 
information was not readily available to the entrepreneurs and was generated over the 
time period covered by this case.
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In contrast to the previous two cases which were responses to actual threats, the 
Ozone Alert! case represented a response to a perceived threat for Tulsa. The threat is 
characterized as perceived because Tulsa was under no obligation to the EPA to reduce 
their ozone levels and while the community knew that redesignation would have impacts, 
these impacts were uncertain.
There are several aspects of the Ozone Alert! program which are key to its 
success. First is that it is voluntary and Tulsa’s air is relatively clean. A second key to 
the success of the program are the successful partnerships which have been developed. 
Part of the reason why buy-in was readily achieved in this case is the compliance driven 
nature of the crisis. Had businesses and individuals not had a personal stake in keeping 
Tulsa’s air clean, this buy-in might not have been achieved. The wish of the partners to 
retain their autonomy and flexibility also appears to have played a role in their buy-in. 
The final keys to success identified during the case study are the involvement of all levels 
of government, the timely incorporation of STl, and a systems approach. As in the 
Mingo Creek case, the intellectual contributions have mainly come from state and federal 
regulatory agencies.
As in the previous two cases, the city’s technical capacity was limited. In this 
case, one limiting factor was the difficulties associated with quantifying emissions and 
emission reductions firom mobile sources. STI was used not only to advance the 
modeling efforts, but also in determining the types of program changes to be 
implemented.
The entrepreneurs active in this case acted in a strategic manner. The 
circumstances they found themselves in required strategic action. Not only were there
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barriers present in the institutional environment which had to be overcome, but there 
were financial barriers as well. The reality of the political and financial situation Tulsa 
found itself in cultured an awareness of the limited number o f opportunities it would 
have to change the situation. This awareness, in turn, helped the entrepreneurs to 
recognize windows of opportunity and act upon them.
None of the representations of innovation foimd in the literature review portion of 
this research did an adequate job of explaining the innovation/social learning process 
which took place in the case studies examined. As a result of the case study analysis, an 
original decision-making schematic of innovation was developed. The new schematic 
more adequately describes the processes of innovation and social learning. It makes 
clear the points of intervention for both policy entrepreneurs and scientific/technical 
information in the policy-making system, something lacking in the alternative 
representations.
3 Surveys
Many of the case study results and decision-making schematic’s features were 
upheld by the survey analysis. Particularly important was the role played by scientific 
and technical information (STI). The inadequacy and inaccessibility of STl is a serious 
barrier which must be overcome for environmental policy innovation/social learning to 
occur. The entrepreneur plays a key role in overcoming this barrier. One important 
method used to overcome this barrier is to consult with experts firom outside the policy­
making circle. Entrepreneurs also often serve multiple roles, facilitating the flow of 
information and ideas between the various agencies involved in environmental decision­
making.
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4 Recommendations
The goal of this research was to develop a decision-making schematic for the 
environmental policy innovation/social learning process using the experiences of the city 
of Tulsa, OK. Based upon the results of this research, the following issues are 
recommended for further evaluation and study:
( 1 ) Other municipal-level environmental policy innovations should be identified 
and evaluated. Such studies would allow for the adequacy of the decision-making 
schematic to be further studied.
(2) Given the differences between the policy-making process at the mimicipal 
and federal levels, it is unclear whether or not this schematic would be applicable 
to federal-level environmental policy innovations. Research detailing the 
similarities and differences between the innovation process at both levels would 
be useful to policy-makers.
(3) Additionally, the determination of whether the decision-making schematic is 
applicable to policy the innovation/social learning process in areas outside the 
environmental arena was beyond the scope of this research. Certainly, policy 
innovation occurs in all areas of public policy making. Further research into the 
nature o f policy-making in all areas is warranted, especially an examination of the 
utility of the schematic for describing innovations in areas other than 
environmental policy.
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(4) Finally, while not the focus of this study, there are different types of 
entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs can be classified according to a typology 
presented by Roberts and King (1996). A differentiation the roles played by 
different types of entrepreneurs in the innovation/social learning process could be 
made.
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Appendix A
Mingo Creek Timeline
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Date
1964
1965
1966
1968
1970
1971
1972
Area
- local -
- street -
- engineer -
- mayor -
- local -
- local -
- mayor -
- local -
- Mingo -
- local inn. -
- national -
- local -
- local -
- local iim. -
- street -
Event
Ian McHarg hired by Tulsa as a consultant
Robert LaFortune was street commissioner 
from 1964 to 1970
Paul W. Gulley was city engineer from 1965 
to 1972
James M. Hewgley Jr., Republican was 
mayor from 1966 to 1970
Mingo watershed annexed to city
Legislation was proposed that would 
regulate floodplains and use these areas as 
open-space areas
Robert LaFortune, Republican, was mayor 
from 1970-1978. Joseph Coleman was 
street commissioner from 1970-1972
Corps, presents report “Flood Plain 
Information: Mingo Creek” in March
Mother’s day flood along Mingo and Joe 
creeks $340,000 (1994 dollars) in damages
Tulsa joined National Flood Insurance 
Program’s emergency program, promised to 
adopt federal regulations
NFIP issues block rate maps in August
September: Labor Day floods: Flat Rock, 
Bird, and Haikey Creeks flood
December. Bird Creek floods again
Tulsa joins “regular” NFIP program, 
adopted new 100-year standard, promises to 
regulate land use
Sidney W. Patterson was street
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commissioner from 1972 to 1976
1973
1974
- engineer ■
- local -
- Mingo -
- Mingo
- local -
- national
- local
1975 local inn.
- national -
C. Harold Miller was city engineer from 
1973 to 1986
April and May floods cause $2.11 million 
(1994 dollars) in damages along Bird Creek
Storms on June 8 cause flooding on Joe,
Fry, Haikey, and Mingo Creeks. $40.24 
million (1994 dollars) in damages. After 
this flood Tulsans for a Better Community 
formed to lobby for flood relief. Met at 
Carol William’s house
September 19: Mingo floods again, third 
flood of year for some residents. This 
marks the beginning of Tulsa’s “great 
drainage war”. TBC membership grew.
Congressman James Jones took part in 
public flood meetings
The American Public Works Assn. releases 
a report about 100 communities 
w/successful detainment basins, suggests 
turning these into multi-purpose areas would 
be easy
Bob Miller drove to Rapid City to study 
their floodplain acquisition program. Made 
a slid show of his findings and presented it 
to Mayor LaFortime. LaFortune told city 
engineers to get a consultant working on this 
(consultant made recommendation in 1975)
city engineers come up with the Mingo 
Creek Improvement project. The city 
decides to widen part of Mingo Creek and 
clear 33 houses
Gilbert White publishes an article on flood 
hazards in the U.S. This is important, 
because he gave the same basic advice to 
Tulsa
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1976 - Street - Robert Franden was street commissioner
from 1976 to 1978
- local - James E. Goddard, floodplain consultant,
submits recommendations to the city: 
cooperate with the Corps, implement 
floodplain management program, in-site 
detention, and adopt incentives to encourage 
these items (a tax adjustment would support 
these measures)
- local - Corps releases records of public meetings in
April and May. Carol Williams was present, 
asking about combining open space areas 
with recreational areas, Ann Patton asked 
several questions, and a Mr. Sheridan put 
forward the idea of a flood warning/forecast 
system
- Mingo - Memorial Day flood; Mingo, Joe, and
Haikey Creeks flood. 3 deaths, $75 million 
(1994 dollars) in damages, 3,000 buildings 
affected. 2 of the deaths were on Mingo 
Creek. Citizens gather at city hall. C. 
Williams now took lead in petitioning for 
floodplain acquisition
- local - TBC merged with neighborhood groups to
form the Homeowners Coalition
- local - Corps releases ‘Tulsa Urban Study: Plan of
Study” in August. Outlines course of study 
to approach problems facing Tulsa
(fall) - local inn. - Floodplain building moratorium enacted
- local inn. - Street commissioner Robert Franden hired
first full-time hydro logist Charles Hardt, a 
former consulting engineer
- local inn. - Franden also hired Stan Williams as city
planner, to draft city policies
- local - Ann Patton writes article “Will Someone
Please Make Those Floods Go Away?” in
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- local inn
national 
local -
- national -
time to remind people of the upcoming 
symposium. Notes that the federal 
government has spent $9 to $12 billion on 
flood control projects since 1936, but yearly 
damages due to floods are still $1 to S2 
billion and growing
Floodplain Management Symposium in 
Tulsa (Oct. 14-16). Speakers: Ian McHarg, 
Herbert Poeitner (“Mr. Drainage”), James 
R. Jones, Don Barnett (Rapid City Mayor), 
Col Anthony Smith (head of the Tulsa 
District COE), and various others. The 
company J.D. Metcalfe worked for 
sponsored McHarg to come to Tulsa.
Hall & Corwin publish case study of 
Bellevue WA
Team One, Inc. and Flanagan and Assoc, 
submit report “Flood Information Study for 
Tulsa Metropolitan Area Planning 
Commission”. An information gathering 
report. Focuses on Mingo and Joe Creeks
Water Resources Development Act. 
Encourages non-federal flood control work. 
Work completed under way prior to federal 
authorization will count towards non-federal 
share o f costs
1977 - local inn. -
- local inn. -
- local inn. -
- local inn. -
Developed comprehensive floodplain 
management policies, regulations, and 
drainage criteria
Enacted stormwater detention regulations 
for new developments
Started an early alert warning system
Began master drainage planning for major 
creeks
- local inn. - City of Tulsa “forged a partnership” with the 
COE
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local inn. 
local -
- local inn.
1978
- local -
- mayor -
- local inn.
- local -
- national -
City passed flood control bond issue
Homeowners Coalition brought in Don 
Barnett who was the Rapid City Mayor 
during the 1972 flood. Barnett spoke to the 
city commission and the mayor
Special federal legislation allows Tulsa 
credit for reimbursement for Mingo work 
undertaken since 1974 - in the event that 
federal funding was ever approved
Corps releases “Report on the Flood of May 
30,1976"
James M. Inhofe, Republican, was mayor 
from 1978 to 1984
Tulsa adopts earth change ordinance, gives 
power to city over alterations to Tulsa’s 
landscape
Flanagan and Assoc, submit report “Public 
Facilities, Urban Flooding, and the Natural 
Land-Use Policy”, encouraging land use 
planning and combining floodplains, urban 
parks, and open space to get the most out of 
taxpayer money
President’s Water Policy Initiative: places 
nonstructural techniques on equal level as 
structural
- street - J. M. Hewgley HI street commissioner from 
1978 to 1984
1979 - local - Bob Miller resumed lobbying for floodplain 
acquisition City and Corps favored 7-10 
miles of channelizations, plus 23 upstream 
detention basins. City commissioner 
Norma Eagleton listened to Miller’s ideas, 
and had the city staff develop a proposal. 
This led to a plan to purchase 30 houses in 
the Mingo floodplain. This area was turned 
into a basin nickiiamed “Porkchop”
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1980 - national - U.S. Dept of Interior releases “A Process for 
Community Flood Plain Management".
This report emphasizes the fact that 
floodplain management is a process, not a 
recipe. This report goes over the process. 
Tulsa seems to have taken this process to 
heart.
(March) - local Corps submits report “Mingo Creek: Interim 
Feasibility Study” which recommends the 
construction of 23 detention basins and 7.5 
miles of channelization.
- local -
1981 - local
Smith-Biffle-Dittrich Companies submit 
“Mingo Open Space/Recreation Plan” to the 
OK Conserv. Comm. This report had the 
EXACT same form as the Corps study of 
Mingo Creek - to facilitate the joint use of 
the two. Detailed how to integrate park and 
open space improvements with flood control 
programs. Very detailed document
INCOG submits the “Regional Park and 
Recreation Plan 1980-2000" This points out 
that Tulsa, with lands already owned plus 
the purchase of low-lying areas, could 
satisfy the current and expected need for 
parks. Also, this points out that federal 
monies for parks have been cut off. The 
report points out that multiple-use facilities 
could still use federal money for 
construction
1982 - local Corps releases ‘Tulsa Urban Study Flooding 
Overview Report” The Corps admits in this 
document that detainment basins could be 
combined with recreational uses. The 
associated “Summary Report” commented 
on the fact that recreation land was needed, 
and that floodplains are good areas for 
recreation
1984 - mayor - Terry Young, Democrat, was mayor firom 
1984 to 1986. J.D. Metcalfe was street 
commissioner firom 1984 to 1990
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- Mingo - Memorial Day Flood, worst Tulsa flood. 14
deaths, 288 injuries, damage to 7,000 
buildings, and $257 (1994 dollars) in 
damages. Mingo accounted for almost 70% 
of the cost of damages. The current 
administration had only been in office for 19 
days. Tulsa is now leading the nation in 
federally declared flood disasters (9 in 15 
years)
- local inn. - Metcalfe and Young assembled the first
Flood Hazard Mitigation Team
- local inn.- Hired 3 consultants: Charles Hardt (former
city hydrologist) of McLaughlin Water 
Engineers, Stan Williams (former city 
planner and formerly of FEMA) a practicing 
attorney, and Ron Flanagan (a planning 
consultant)
- local - City Commissioners Walter Hall and Roy
Gardner opposed the acquisition of flooded 
houses
- local inn.- Moratoria placed on rebuilding structures
damaged by the flood
- local inn. - New strategy developed: relocated 300
flooded homes and a 228 pad mobile home 
park, $10.5 million in flood control works, 
and $2.1 for master drainage plans; total > 
$30 million
- local - Corps holds Mingo Creek field conference.
Discusses plan 8a - 7.5 miles of 
channelization and 23 detainment basins. 
Multiple use not mentioned in report
1984-1985 - local - Tulsans approved o f $70 million in capital
improvement projects to correct drainage 
and flooding problems
1985 - local iim. - Department of Stormwater Management
created, has centralized responsibility for all
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1986
- local inn.
- local -
- mayor -
- local inn.
Sept.- Oct. - local
- local
1987
1988
engineer ■
- local
- mayor -
- national -
city flood, drainage, and stormwater 
programs
A new maintenance program cleaned silt 
and debris from major creeks and tributaries
Corps releases report over May 27,1984 
flood. States the futility of piecemeal 
approach to flood control measures
Dick Crawford, Republican, was mayor 
from 1986 to 1988
Stormwater utility fee established to fund 
the Dept, of Stormwater Management: fee 
exclusively for floodplain and stormwater 
management activities (maintenance etc.)
Arkansas River Flood. A levee broke, 
leading to around $3 million in damages. 
Mitigation efforts from 1984 proved 
successful in areas (like the mobile home 
park) were cited as saving the city money in 
this flood
Wright Water Engineers no working with 
Tulsa. Several documents from this period 
indicate that the City Treasurer has sought 
the advice o f Ann Patton and Stan William 
in allocating bond money. Also, Ann is the 
person that flooded Garden City residents 
wrote to.
Charles Hardt was city engineer from 1987 
to 1990, when he became director of Public 
Works.
Association of State Floodplain Managers 
awards Tulsa its Local Award for 
Excellence
Roger A. Randle, Democrat, was mayor 
from 1988 to 1992 (resigned 7/13/92)
Flanagan submits his report “Multi-Purpose
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1990
- local
- local
1991
- local
national -
1992 - mayor -
- national -
Planning For Greenway Corridors”, 
prepared for EPA, FEMA, and NFIP. Quote 
“If flood problems could be solved in Tulsa, 
they could be solved anywhere”.
Wright Water Engineers holds flood 
management workshop in April
Tulsa Public Works Department 
(consolidates all public services into one 
dept) publishes stormwater plan for the 
years 1990-2005
League of Women Voters publishes their 
“Stormwater Study”
A joint document produced by the National 
Park Service, the Ass. of State Floodplain 
Managers, and Ass. of State Wetland 
Managers used Mingo as an example of 
good planning
Susan Savage, Democrat, served as Mayor 
Pro Tem, elected 8/25/92 to fill Randle’s 
unexpired term
Tulsa’s floodplain management program 
given FEMA’s Outstanding Public Service 
award
- national
- national
Received nations highest rating in the 
National Flood Insurance Program’s 
community rating system. Tulsa now 
paying lowest rates
Association of State Floodplain Managers 
awards Tulsa its Local Award for 
Excellence
1993
1994
local - 
national
Ann Patton writes “From Harm’s Way”
Tulsa Public Works Dept, has assembled a 
lengthy list of communities and nations that 
have been sent info on Mingo Creek projects
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- local - Ann Patton writes “From Rooftop to River”
1995 -national- Rita Henze talks about the success in Tulsa
(and current programs to buy out flood 
prone houses before the next flood) at the 
19“* annual conference of the ASFM. Ann 
Patton spoke about pre-flood mitigation 
planning. Carol Williams presented 
“Acquisition One Bite at a Time: The 
Logical Way”
248
Appendix B
Municipal Solid Waste Recycling and 
The Metropolitan Environmental Trust Timeline
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Date Area Event
Early 70s - local - Williams Brothers engineering looking at
RDF (refuse derived fuel) for Urban Ore 
project. PSD (Public Service Co. of 
Oklahoma) offered $50,000 for feasibility 
study.
8/73 - local - Responsibility for trash service switched
from police commissioner to water and 
sewer commissioner. Current refuse 
superintendent is Tommy Neumeyer. M R.. 
Hall is president of independent trash 
haulers association.
9/73 - local - Near records levels of complaints logged
regarding trash service. (Service provided 
by both the city (41% of those who want 
service) and private haulers). Proposals 
discussed include mandatory bagging of 
trash, no rate hikes, continued landfilling 
(versus incineration). Refuse department 
losing $ 190,000/year.
9/73 - local - Williams brothers engineering does a solid-
waste management report for INCOG.
Phase I of a 2 part study, phase II dealing 
with recycling was to be issued in Nov.
11/23/76 - local - City commission considers new landfill
ordinances which "strengthens control of 
sanitary landfills, particularly in reference to 
flooding, drainage, covering of wastes, 
pollution, and hazardous waste disposal." 
Also would increase penalty for violations.
11/77 - local inn.- TERRA (Tulsa Energy Resource Recovery
Authority) was formed with $400,000 start­
up loan/grant from DOE. According to Les 
McCright TERRA was started because the 
city wanted an incineration plant. The city 
commissioners sit as the authority (it later 
becomes TARE {Tulsa Authority for the 
Recovery of Energy}).
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1/13/78 - local - Furor erupts over proposed siting of
Mustang RFD Co. proposed boiler fuel- 
producing plant. Water and Sewer 
Commissioner John P. Thomas Jr. has made 
the plant one of the major goals of his office 
(he supposedly initiated the ides for the 
plant in 1975). Mustang is really pushing 
this technology in the press, using the word 
recycling in conjunction with it.
1/78 -local- City looking for a new landfill site to
replace the one at 81st and Union which was 
the subject of a district court challenge in 
1977. Wagoner county site is the third site 
the city has considered in the past year.
3/78 - local - Solid waste director is Phil Richmond.
"Recycling" plan being pushed by Public 
Service Co., The Resource Sciences Center 
of Tulsa, and Mustang RFD Co. is to collect 
refuse, separate and shred it at a recycling 
plant, use paper, wood and other 
combustibles as fuel at PSC's Oologah plant 
to generate electricity, and recycle scrap 
metals.
5/78 - local - City will run out of space at the landfill at
83rd and Union by the end of May. Two 
possibilities for new sites under 
consideration.
5/78 - local - Mustang RFD Co. wants a site for recycling
plant chosen by August 1.
5/78 - local - Metcalfe protests the city's decision to
approve "emergency" contract (versus 
seeking competitive bids) with BFI to use its 
Discount Sanitary landfill for two years 
while the city prepares a new site.
6/16/78 - local - City commissioners consider a rate increase
or service reduction in order to wipe out a 
$1.7 million operating deficit in the refuse 
department Customers currently pay $3.50
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6/21/78 - local -
6/30/78 - local inn.-
11/7/78 local
1/19/78 - local -
per month for three weekly pickups (two in 
yard, one at curb).
City currently paying for a lease on one 
landfill which is full; under contract to take 
trash to another which isn't licensed by the 
city and judged substandard by the City- 
County Health Department; prepared a 
contract to buy land for a third landfill; and 
looking at a possible location for a fourth.
City commissioners adopt a new ordinance 
regulating refuse collectors. It specifies that 
city's license number be painted on all 
reftise trucks, lowers license fees, requires 
rates to be posted when applying for license, 
and limits pickup hours.
TERRA gives approval for engineering and 
cost estimates for the first of two transfer 
stations which would be needed as part of 
Mustang RDF Co. proposal.
Gordian Associates Inc. recommended that 
Tulsa proceed with the recycling system to 
convert trash to fuel. They said the 
technology was sound but the city must take 
steps to assure that there is plenty of trash 
available to make the plan economically 
feasible (250,000 tons/yr). First talk of flow 
control.
7/79 - local
1980
1983
- local -
local -
TARE asked for proposal for a five-year 
residential waste collection contract. 
Originally was bid for 25% of the city, but 
Tulsa Refuse Inc. (TRI) was actually 
awarded 75% of the city.
AES approaches the city with a letter of 
intent from Sun Refining and wants to build 
a Waste to Energy (WTE) plant.
Ogden Martin gets involved in the 
incineration talks, wanting to utilize Martin 
Gmbh technology.
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12/ 1/83 local - TARE approves a contract with Alternate 
Energy Systems (AES) in March 1982 that 
specifies construction begin by the end of 
the year. Feb, 1983 extension granted until 
Dec 83 because of banker's problems with 
the contract, commissioners denied the 
extension.
12/30/83 - local -
4/84 local inn.-
1985 local inn.-
Ofïicials released feasibility report by HDR 
Techserv, Inc. (Omaha NE consulting firm) 
which says the facility can work as 
designed; the obligations are within the 
demonstrated technical capabilities of the 
respective parties; the plant can be built with 
the money being raised; the annual revenue 
and expense projections are based on 
reasonable technical assumptions; all major 
permits have been issued; the 30-month 
schedule is adequate; the facility will have a 
'useful life extending beyond' the final 
maturity of the bonds; the proposed site is a 
good location; enough waste is available to 
make the project profitable' projected 
revenues are adequate to operate and 
maintain the facility, make debt service 
payments and maintain a reserve fund and a 
maintenance fund.
Commissioners granted a 1 month extension 
to AES for beginning construction. City 
agrees to assume more risks in order to 
obtain financing. This includes increasing 
the amoimt of trash to be delivered annually 
as well as monthly quotas.
TARE board members give the WTE plant 
project the OK. Within three months, bonds 
were issued, contracts and permits renewed, 
and construction began.
Regional Solid Waste Management 
Advisory Committee formed as part of 
INCOG
2/3/86 - local - Patty Eaton (Water and sewer 
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commissioner) takes over supervision of 
trash-to-energy plant from finance and 
revenue (Walter B. Hall was finance and 
revenue commissioner, Gary Watts is now). 
They are considering permanently moving 
refuse to water and sewer. {It was moved to 
finance and revenue in 1980}.
WTE plant to be fired up for tests at the end 
of the month.
1988 - local inn.- Liberty Glass and the Tulsa World begin to
sponsor the "Get Off Your Glass - Recycle" 
campaign, with collection bells located 
throughout the city. For every ton of glass 
collected. Liberty Glass contributes $20 to 
United Way.
1/30/88 - local inn.- Northeast Oklahoma Solid Waste
Management Authority (NOSWMA) to be 
formed in February by nine communities. 
Purpose is to locate, finance and construct a 
joint landfill.
3/88 - local irm.- City initiates CRABS (no mention of what
acronym stands for) commercial billing 
system which bills commercial customers 
for waste disposal on their water bill. Rates 
are based on type of business and square 
footage of space. This was started in an 
effort to keep private haulers from disposing 
of trash at cheaper landfills instead of the 
WTE plant.
6/88 - local - City is to raise residential rates ($.37 for
twice a week, $.51 for backyard service and 
$.65 for extra service).
TARE approve an agreement with Ogden 
Martin to pay 90% of the costs for legal 
arbitration of a contract dispute between 
Ogden Martin and Sun Refining. Dispute 
about whether to pay for steam based on 
regulated or deregulated price of natural gas.
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6/88 - local inn.- Owasso’s city owned recycling center opens.
It pays for recyclable items. It also serves as 
a refuse center, charging much less than 
landfills for people to dump their trash. The 
city then hauls the trash to landfills.
8/88 - local inn.- City of Tulsa passes an ordinance requiring
all trash generated inside the city to be taken 
to the WTE plant.
NOSWMA Trust Indenture officiated
4/1/89 - local inn. City raises trash rates again, {twice weekly
(Low generator went from $9.77 to S 12.63, backyard service
rate- went from $12.67 to $15.53, extra service
from $15.57 to $18.43, city service from 
$8.50 to $9.90}. Also a special "low trash 
generators" class started, those who use less 
than 2,000 gallons of water in 3 months of 
the year qualify. All of this is based on the 
doubling of tipping fees from $21 to $42/ton 
at the WTE plant. These are the largest rate 
hikes in history, all to keep the trash reserve 
fund from running out of money. (Tulsa 
Refuse Inc. volunteered to forego a 4% rate 
increase for the second year in a row).
4/89 - local - A citizens Solid Waste Advisory Board was
named to review all facets of the WTE plant. 
They are to examine the possibility of 
purchasing the plant, altering the contract 
with Tulsa Refuse to once-a-week pickup, 
consider creating new residential 
classifications, and alternatives to the 
CRABS billing system. Long range studies 
of regional solid waste disposal solutions 
and the integration of recycling into the 
system are also to be performed.
5/89 - local - Ogden Martin sues the city for failure to
reimburse the company for sales and ad 
valorem taxes. The city is operating 
according to a legal opinion which says it 
cannot reimburse the money.
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5/7/89 - local inn.-
6/89
8/89
- local -
- local -
10/89
12/89
local inn.
- local inn.-
12/89
12/89
1/26/90
- local -
-local/national
- local -
1/30/90 local -
2/90 - local -
American Waste Control is operating Tulsa 
Transfer and Recycling Station (a material 
recovery facility (MRF) of sorts) where it 
separates recyclables from its commercial 
refuse prior to disposal at the WTE plant.
Overhead Door Co sues the city over 
CRABS, claiming it is a tax wWch is being 
assessed without a vote of the citizens.
May and June revenue from trash was 
enough to cover operating costs for the 
WTE plant for the first time since it began 
operations.
Project ReDirectory started as an idea by 
Tulsa school children. Went national the 
next year.
Solid Waste Management Department,
Tulsa county and NOSWMA sponsor first 
weekend collection of used motor oil and 
automotive batteries.
Goodwill Industries in Tulsa begins 
accepting newspaper and aluminum for 
recycling.
Newspaper glut has reduced the price paid 
for used newsprint by about half.
WTE plant reporting a SI.3 million loss for 
the first six months of the fiscal year. 
Revenues from CRABS are lower than 
projected following many adjustments. 
Ogden Martin also billed for a whole year at 
once instead of spreading it out.
Chamber of Commerce forms a task force to 
examine CRABS billing system. Solid 
Waste Department is working with a 
University of Tulsa professor to revise the 
CRABS system.
Susan Young wrote ‘Tulsa County Used 
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Motor Oil and Lead-Acid Battery Collection 
Event” report to get money from the Dept, 
of Health and PSO.
2/1/90
2/16/90
local -
- state -
NOSWMA started event-based bulky waste 
program
BA city officials begin to study possibility 
of recycling.
Special House Interim Committee on Solid 
Waste Disposal and Recycling recommends 
increased recycling and source reduction in 
Oklahoma.
2/22/90 - local -
3/90
3/20/90
- local -
- local -
City Solid Waste Management Department 
recommends a 10% increase in trash rates 
($46 tipping fees) in its preliminary budget 
proposal in order to keep trash operations 
from operating at a deficit.
Solid waste moved to Public Works 
department (Charles Hardt in charge).
Randle asks for meeting with Ogden Martin 
to discuss renegotiation of the operations 
contract for the WTE plant. Ogden Martin 
says they won't meet until the tax payback 
matter is resolved.
3/21/90 - local inn.-
4/90 - local
Owasso city officials passed waste disposal 
regulations requiring grass, leaves and trees 
to be separated from other trash and placed 
in biodegradable bags (available for 
purchase from the city). The project is set 
up as a year-long experiment.
The city of Bixby and NOSWMA begin 
sponsoring a recycling drive to benefit the 
cities parks system. Containers will be 
placed for collection of aluminum and glass. 
They will also sponsor a one-day event to 
collect bulky waste which will be separated 
into metal and non-metal waste (first time 
done in OK).
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4/90
5/8/90
local - 
local -
6/90
7/90
- local iim.-
- local -
7/16/90 - local -
8/90 - local -
8/1/90 - local -
NOSWMA becomes The M.E.T.
Rodger Randle appoints Bob Dick to work 
on the WTE plant. He is to coordinate 
efforts to solve the trash problem with the 
Public Works Dept., Dept, of Finance and 
the Chamber of Commerce task force. Dick 
says he will look at the whole picture, 
including recycling. (Reports issued in 
7/90)
M.E.T. produces first regional recycling 
directory (updated bi-yearly) -  public 
education tool
Antifreeze is added to the hazardous waste 
collections (along with oil and batteries).
The M.E.T. publishes areas first 
comprehensive directory of recycling 
centers in the Tulsa area.
Bob Dick releases his report on the WTE 
plant. He recommends that the city contract 
out the trash service it has been providing, 
renegotiating the contract with TRI, and 
implementing a citywide recycling program. 
Randle supports recycling if it can be done 
with no cost increase to customers. The 
M.E.T. seeks a grant to fund a regional 
recycling center (a MRF} and staffing it 
with jail inmates.
City officials ask Ogden Martin for a 
proposal for recycling household waste. 
Randle says he wants the city to consider 
proposals from many sources. Ogden says 
that their contract allows them to reduce the 
guarantee or trash to take into account 
recycling.
City attorney's office releases an opinion 
that the contract with TRI was not bid 
according to state competitive bidding laws 
and appears to be void. Suggests letting the
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District Court decide whether it is valid or 
should be rebid.
8/22/90 - local Tulsa city officials begin studying recycling 
programs in cities across the country, 
looking at how they may adapt them to work 
in Tulsa.
8/30/90
9/1/90
- local -
- state -
District judge rules that the city of Tulsa 
must pay the property taxes agreed upon in 
the Ogden Martin contract.
State law goes into effect which imposes a 
$.25/month fee on trash bills collected by 
cities. The money will be split between the 
cities and the state Health Dept.. The law 
allows cities that reduce the amount of trash 
taken to landfills to have a proportional 
reduction in the fee - a progressive way to 
encourage recycling and composting 
activities.
10/12/90 - local -
10/12/90 - local -
City reaches a tentative settlement 
agreement regarding the class action lawsuit 
against CRABS. The city agrees to begin a 
new billing system by 2/1/91 and the class 
will receive no refunds.
Tulsa's only plastic recycler (American 
Recycling) closes.
The M.E.T., Business & Industry Recycling 
Program (BIRP), and Oklahoma State Dept, 
of Health sponsor a 2-day recycling 
conference in Tulsa.
10/31/90
11/21/90
- local -
- local -
Survey indicates 84% of Tulsans favor 
voluntary recycling, and about half as many 
favor mandatory recycling.
City council appoints a citizens committee 
to study recycling in Tulsa. Susan Young 
will serve as advisor.
12/8/90 - local - Solid Waste Division report released 
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11/22/90 - local -
comparing three types of recycling 
programs in 13 cities and counties.
Pilot neighborhood curbside recycling 
project begins in Forest Creek subdivision. 
Project is brainchild of a local homeowner 
and a trash hauler.
12/13/90 - local
2/91
2/1/91
local
local
2/3/91
2/21/91
3/21/91
4/1/91
local -
- local -
local
- local
Resource Recovery Systems Inc. proposes 
operation of a dirty MRF outside the WTE 
plant. TRI opposes it, they want curbside 
recycling.
M.E.T. finishes study on Herbicide/Pesticide 
program
New commercial billing ordinance which 
bills according to size of trash container and 
frequency of pick up goes into effect.
TARE (now a citizen's advisory committee) 
will monitor the system and make 
recommendations for changes after 6 
months.
Pride in Tulsa holds its first drive-through 
recycling fair. Collects newspaper, plastic, 
glass and aluminum.
BA officials visit a MRF in South Dakota as 
part of their search for a recycling program.
Owasso makes composting plan permanent. 
The pilot program alone reduced their 
landfill waste by 25%.
The M.E.T. adds household batteries to its 
household hazardous waste collection 
efforts.
4/2/91 local - BA starts a "Don't Bag It" campaign 
modeled against a Texas program. 20 
demonstration homes will receive free 
mulching mowers and fertilizer for a year. 
Any interested party can receive free 
instruction.
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5/29/91 - local -
7/12/91 - local -
The M.E.T. chooses CH2M Hill to perform 
a regional recycling study to evaluate 
recycling alternatives and identify potential 
markets for recyclable materials.
Phillips Co. announces it plans to open a 
plastics recycling plant in Tulsa by 
November.
10/17/91 - local
/91
12/91
1/30/92
- local -
- local
- local -
Citizens Recycling Advisory Committee 
releases its final report to the city council. 
The plan calls for three phases of recycling 
programs, each followed by an evaluation of 
participation and affordability. First phase 
involves three to four drop-off centers. Nine 
to 12 months later, a pilot curbside program 
would be established. It could then be 
expanded citywide, with mixed recyclables 
placed in color coded bags.
Susan Young leaves M.E.T. for 
Minneapolis. (Ms. Domin of INCOG serves 
as interim director until 2/92)
Recycle America ends its collection of 
newspapers due to the losses they were 
experiencing (up to $6000/month).
Phillips Plastics Recycling Parmership 
opens Oklahoma's first plastics recycling 
center, creating a market for recycled 
plastics.
Rodger Randle announces that the city will 
not seek a court ruling on the validity of its 
contract with TRI.
2/92
4/3/92
local
local
Roger Miner becomes executive director of 
The M.E.T.
Tulsa hires its first recycling coordinator 
(Michael Patton). His primary missions are 
education and studying possible recycling 
programs for the city.
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5/28/92
5/30/92
- local 
innovation-
- local -
6/92 - local
im - local -
The M.E.T. takes its oil, antifreeze, and 
battery recycling on the road to Bixby in its 
new recycling trailer.
The M.E.T. proposes building a permanent 
collection/recycling center at Expo Square.
It would at first collect oil, antifreeze and 
batteries, but then expand into a recycling 
buy-back center.
City and TRI argue over proposed rate 
freeze for several months. City wants rate 
to stay frozen until they match OKC’s and 
then use the same formula OKC uses to 
figure rates. TRI wants a three year freeze if 
the city also agrees not to take the contract 
to court.
The M.E.T. looked into a permanent facility 
for its Oil and Battery program. Decided to 
keep it on the road to access outlying 
communities.
TRI contract automatically hikes rates 
$. 19/month. City does not pass cost on to 
customers. TRI puts the money in a trust 
fund until the contract changes can be 
worked out.
9/92 - local CH2M Hill Solid Waste Characterization 
and Waste Reduction/Recycling Study 
finished for The M.E.T.
9/7/92 local -
9/11/92 local
Implementation Task Force was formed to 
plan a recycling program based on CH2M 
Hill report. Its goals were to reduce the 
waste stream, prevent pollution, educate the 
public, and create jobs.
A private recycling firm wants to offer 
curbside pickup for Tulsa residents, but was 
told it would be illegal as the trash belongs 
to the city and only TRI can pick it up.
Mayor Savage signs an executive order
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innovation-
9/15/92 - national -
9/23/92 - local
10/92 local -
10/28/92 - local -
11/8/92 - local 
innovation-
11/19/92
12/4/92
- local 
innovation
- local -
stating that the city will give preference to 
recycled paper when bids are no more than 
20% above regular paper prices. Such 
purchase require city council approval. (The 
state already requires use of recycled paper 
in state offices).
More than 20 national companies (including 
McDonald’s, American Airlines, and Sears) 
launch a campaign designed to create 
demand for recycled goods.
Tulsa city councilors working on a new 
ordinance that will allow private curbside 
recyclers to pick up in the city. Many points 
to be worked out. The final ordinance is to 
be ready in early 93.
City paid $200,000 to landfill 15,000 tons of 
excess trash in the fiscal year ending 7/92. 
This was trash above the capacity of the 
WTE plant. The excess causes long lines 
for trucks waiting to diunp at the plant. 
Several people suggest this money could be 
spent on recycling efforts.
Waste Management of Oklahoma annoimces 
it will open a recycling buy-back center in 
late Nov. or early Dec. The center will 
accept paper (many types), cardboard, glass, 
nos 1 ad 2 plastic, aluminum cans, carpet 
pads.
M.E.T. study recommends a regional 
approach to recycling with Tulsa acting as 
an anchor for area drop-off centers. The 
study shows that a yard waste reduction 
program would have a bigger impact on the 
waste stream than recycling.
Mayor Savage backs a plan to include 
household hazardous waste at proposed 
recycling drop-off centers.
M.E.T. communities approve drop-off
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center plans.
12/15/92 - state - State Health Department officials estimate 
that more than half of the state's 110 landfill 
will close under new federal regulations 
slated to take effect 10/9/93.
2/19/93
4/93
- local -
- local 
innovation-
City council approves funding for Tulsa’s 
portion of the M.E.T. recycling stations.
First M.E.T. center opens in the Holiday 
Hills shopping center. (First portable 
recycling drop-off center in the state). The 
centers use specially designed trailers which 
are divided into compartments and can be 
hauled by a pickup truck.
M.E.T. sponsors a motor oil, battery, and 
antifreeze collection event. This is 
scheduled to be the last collection event.
5/6/93
5/18/93
- local
innovation?-
- local -
6/9/93 local -
7/1/93 - local -
7/7/93 local -
City kicks off its first “Grasscycling” 
campaign.
City and TRI now arguing over who will 
accept complaint calls under the 
renegotiated contract. City wants to accept 
all calls in order to monitor TRI as that’s 
their only way out of the contract. TRI 
thinks the city is looking for a way to nail 
them to the wall.
M.E.T. plans to add information centers to 
its drop-of centers as their attendants are 
spending too much time answering 
questions.
City still has no contract with TRI approved, 
triggering automatic rate hikes. City plans 
to absorb them once again. Contract 
negotiations have been going on for 18 
months.
Jenks changes its residential refuse 
collection system. Will phase in rollaway
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7/25/93 - local 
innovation
7/28/93
9/22/93
10/1/93
- local -
- local -
- national
10/21/93 - national -
10/30/93 - local 
innovation
carts, limited yard waste pickup (with a 
Don’t Bag It/Grasscycling program), and 
city billing. (Trickling down of some of the 
local innovations from other M.E.T. cities).
City of Tulsa and The M.E.T. sponsor “7 
Days Not to Waste” campaign as a formal 
kick-off to the drop-off centers. Includes 
demonstrations about how to prepare 
materials for recycling, a series of 
newspaper articles, discussions about earth- 
friendly alternatives for the house and 
garden, environmentally fnendly shopping 
advice, grasscycling and composting 
demonstrations, and landfill tours.
Jenks recycling drop-off center opens.
Bixby drop-off center opens.
EPA gives landfills that take under 100 tons 
of city garbage per day a 6 month extension 
to meet new regulations. This should allow 
most cities time to find solutions to the 
closing of many landfills.
Clinton signs an executive order revamping 
the government’s procurement policy, 
requiring the use of environmentally 
friendly products, mostly paper, oil and 
tires.
Tulsa holds the state’s first collection of old 
pesticides, paint and other types of 
household hazardous chemicals.
11/93
1/28/94
- local
- local -
Restaurant and Bar glass program studied, 
M.E.T. board voted not to pursue this 
program.
Initial figures show the M.E.T. centers are 
costing 6 times as much to operate as they 
are bringing in from the sale of recyclables.
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2/23/94 - local - Bixby collection center bringing in much 
less recyclables than expected, forcing the 
city to increase its supplemental funding. 
All cities needed to provide supplemental 
funding for their centers, with the amount 
based on the shortage of materials and 
revenues at each site.
2/25/94 local - Tulsa and TRI finally reach agreement on a 
contract. The new contract amendment 
entitles TRI to a rate increase every three 
years, based on the Consumer Price Index.
5/94 - national - The Supreme Court rules that ash produced 
at municipal waste incinerators will not be 
automatically exempt from hazardous waste 
regulations. So far, Tulsa’s ash has never 
tested hazardous.
7/94 - local
In another case, the Supreme Court strikes 
down flow control ordinances, saying they 
restrict free trade. This isn’t expected to 
affect Tulsa because of the way their 
commercial billing is done.
Tulsa gets a chance to use its new chipper to 
chip debris from a storm and offer free 
mulch to the public.
9/24/94 - local - Cerad industries opens a paper recycling 
facility in Tulsa. This increases the types of 
paper which can be accepted for recycling in 
the local area.
10/94 - national - Scrap metal prices begin to rebound after 
several years of being very low.
11/94 - local Gaylon Pine named as interim director of 
the M.E.T.
1/95
1/29/95
local - 
national
Michael Patton becomes head of The M.E.T.
Increased demand for scrap paper has 
increased the price dramatically.
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6/21/95
7/95
10/18/95
10/26/95
2/21/96
- local -
- national
- national
- local 
innovation ■
- national -
3/15/96 - national
3/27/96
8/29/96
local
local
11/21/96 local -
Broken Arrow recycling center begins 
accepting used motor oil.
Used newspaper prices have gone so high 
that there is a thriving trade in stolen 
newspaper.
A national marketplace for buying and 
selling recyclable trash opened at the 
Chicago Board of Trade.
M.E.T. begins giving away used paint 
collected at its household pollutant 
collection events.
The Supreme Court lets stand contractual 
flow control provisions. In such provisions, 
cities only award garbage-hauling contracts 
to companies that agree to deliver trash to 
the government designated facility.
New EPA regulations will require that all 
WTE plants attain the same emissions as the 
top 12% nationally. (Controls to be in place 
by Dec. 19,2000). New controls could cost 
as much as $30 million. The city has until 
December 1997 to notify the EPA whether it 
plans to upgrade the incinerator or to close 
it. These regulations were challenged by a 
Utah incinerator.
Some M.E.T. recycling centers begin 
accepting steel cans.
HDR Engineering Inc. report estimates it 
will cost approximately $132.2 million to 
add pollution control equipment and 
continue to operate the WTE plant for the 
next 10 years. They estimate the cost of 
closing the plant, paying off Ogden Martin 
and landfilling at $133.9 million. The 
landfilling option would reduce estimated 
landfill capacity from 44 years to 16 years.
TARE decides to accept bids for the
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2/27/97 local -
3/14/97
4/23/97
6/4/97
6/7/97
- local -
- local -
- local 
innovation
- local
11/3/97 - local
1/29/98 local -
disposal of the city’s residential trash 
stream.
City opens bids for landfilling. Waste 
Management was the low bidder with a 
price quote 27% lower than the estimate in 
the HDR report (disposal at the quarry 
landfill).
Phillips plastic recycling plant celebrates its 
fifth anniversary (opened 2/92).
M.E.T. told that they have to move their 
recycling center at 21“ and Yale ASAP.
M.E.T. recycling centers begin accepting 
eyeglasses in conjunction with the Lions 
Club.
City and Ogden-Martin officials have been 
negotiating over the retrofit of the WTE 
plant to meet the new clean air regulations. 
The city has offered to pay Ogden-Martin 
$12.47 per ton (the amount Waste 
Management will landfill for under a 25 
year contract) to dispose of the waste and 
allow them to keep all profits from steam 
sales and residual materials.
Ogden-Martin offers to pay for the retrofit, 
but asks the city for an up-ffont payment of 
$18 million, saying it is financial 
recognition for the risk-shifting by the city. 
City admits it may not be able to get out of 
the current contract with Ogden-Martin, thus 
may not be able to landfill.
TARE signs a 20-year landfill contract with 
Waste Management. The new contract is 
for excess waste which is not burned at the 
WTE facility. It has a lower tipping fee than 
the city has been paying, but allows for 
annual adjustments based on the CPI. It also 
gives the city the option to take all of its 
trash to the landfill should the city decide in
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2/10/98 - local -
2007 not to renew its contract for the WTE 
plant.
Projected 1999 city budget increases trash 
rates by 7%. Similar increases are projected 
for 2001,2002, and 2003. Increases are to 
be used to offset the cost of the retrofit.
3/19/98 - local -
6/4/98 - local 
innovation
6/13/98 - local -
7/28/98 - local -
8/7/98 - local -
TARE forms a committee to study recycling 
options in the city of Tulsa. The committee 
has said it will give serious consideration to 
a curbside program.
M.E.T. kicks off its “Barrels Behind Bars” 
bottle recycling program. The bars must 
separate trash into clear, green, and brown 
but it is picked up for free. Smithey 
Environmental services picks up the glass. 
Funding was provided by the M.E.T. in the 
form of a grant to Smithey Environmental.
New city councilor Anna Falling comes out 
against the proposed trash rate hike, saying 
she is banking on U.S. Rep. Steve Largent’s 
ability to delay the EPA mandate. 
(Construction is supposed to begin by the 
end of 1998 on the retrofit).
Anna Falling claims that if the city were to 
implement mandator, recycling they would 
be able to buy cheaper air pollution control 
equipment. This would require getting a 
deadline waiver firom the EPA. Falling will 
not support a recycling plan which increases 
trash rates. She also refiises to release 
details of her plan until the city council and 
mayor agree to support it.
City council approves the 7% trash rate 
increase, to take effect in October. They 
also approved Falling’s request to ask the 
state’s congressional delegation for help in 
obtaining either a delay or financial help 
with the retrofit.
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8/19/98 local
9/24/98 local -
9/24/98
9/25/98
- local
- local
Falling distributes a newsletter to her 
constituents which may contain misleading 
or inaccurate information regarding 
recycling and the WTE plant.
City asks Ogden-Martin to stop burning 
non-city waste at the WTE plant. It is 
questioning the environmental ramifications 
- they may he burning hazardous stuff. 
Ogden-martin agrees.
Phillips announces it is closing its plastic 
recycling center. It cites lack of product as a 
major contributor to the decision.
City refuses to pay a bill Ogden-Martin 
submitted for preliminary retrofit work. It 
questions the validity of many of the 
charges and claims they were double billed 
for others.
270
Appendix C 
Ozone Alert! Timeline
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Date
1971
Area
-national-
5/1/77
7-9/77
1977
1977
2/2/78
2/18/78
2/24/78
5/10/78
6/78
10/13/78
4/79
1979
local - 
local -
- local -
- national-
- local -
- local -
- national-
- state -
- national-
- local -
- local -
- national-
Event
EPA issues standard for photochemical 
oxidants of 0.08 ppm as a one-hour average, 
not to be exceeded more than once in any 
given year.
Tulsa area air quality below EPA standards
An EPA sponsored air quality and 
meteorological measurement study took 
place. A photochemical modeling study was 
also conducted.
states required by Congress to revise SIPs to 
demonstrate that the NAAQS would be 
attained by 12/31/82
CAA Amendments
INCOG volunteers to do clean air planning 
for region
Mayor LaFortime states during a Tulsa City 
Commission that the air problem has to be 
addressed
EPA releases report on nation's air quality, 
OK. has five problem areas
meeting of state Air Quality Council, plans 
for Tulsa opposed by oil and agriculture 
representatives
EPA and DOT release "Transportation-Air 
Quality Planning Guidelines"
no air plan agreed on, plan due at EPA Jan 1
TMAPC completes "Mobile and Area 
Source Emissions Inventory for Tulsa, 
Oklahoma" for the EPA
(EPA) photochemical oxidant standard 
revised to address ozone, established a
272
1979
1979-1980
3/3/80
6/80
7/10/80
9/16/80
1980 
1980
1980
1980s
7/1/81
- local -
- state -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
7/14/81
1981
1981
- local -
- national-
- local -
standard of 0.12 ppm, not to be exceeded 
more than once a year; Cleveland county 
now attainment, Oklahoma and Tulsa 
counties still nonattainment
23 ozone exceedances on 8 days
37th state legislature passes "Oklahoma 
Ridesharing Act"
EPA releases 18 traffic control measures for 
cities to consider under the CAA. Tulsa 
looked at pertinent items
INCOG comes up with a range of 
transportation control measures to consider
INCOG presents a seminar, "Clearing the 
Air" at Tulsa City-County Library
meeting of Transportation/Air Quality 
Public Advisory Subcommittee
two-year vehicle occupancy study finished
Transportation/ Air Quality Subcommittee 
potential members listed- see file
30 exceedances on 9 days
Tulsa classified as nonattainment for ozone
"transportation Control Measures" 
completed aroimd this date, discusses ways 
to improve public transportation. Kevin 
Landergan of MTTA and Jerry Howell of 
INCOG involved
Transportation/Air Quality Citizen's 
Advisory Committee meeting
CAA up for reauthorization
11 exceedances on 4 days
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1982
3/83
6/83
6/23/8
11/15/83
1983
1/18/84
9/18/84
1984 
1984-5
1985 
1985
1985
- local -
- local -
- local -
- national-
local -
local - 
local -
- local
- local
- local
- local
- local
- local
8 exceedances on 5 days
preliminary version of "Evaluation of
Transportation Control Measures" 
ready for evaluaiton (prepared by INCOG)
"Analysis and Evaluaiton of Population 
Consistency" completed by INCOG, a 
metropolitan Tulsa area transportation 
study, a modified version o f a similar report 
done in 7/82
EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus 
speaks at the Annual Convention of Air 
Pollution Control Association, presented 
clean air policy
Tulsa given another year to meet ozone 
standards
7 exceedances on 4 days (as of 7/31)
Metropolitan Tulsa Chamber of Commerce 
responds to John Drake's request and 
supports a recommendation to establish 
statewide anti-tampering emissions control 
legislation
OK State Air Quality Coimcil met in Tulsa- 
Tulsa County only non-attainment county in 
OK. Discussed SLP.
an emissions inventory was performed
Sites 191 and 110 in Tulsa monitored 
hydrocarbon levels.
one ozone exceedance
OTAG (Ozone Transport Assessment 
Group) performed an emissions inventory 
for photochemical grid modelling
the emissions inventory data from 1984 and 
data from a 1985 photochemical modeling
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7/85
6/24/86
7/25/86
7/28/86
4/11/87
3/10/88
5/88
5/6/88
6/3/88
7/7/88
7/14/88
8/9/88
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- state -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- state -
study were used to formulate the SIP 
revision.
Washington State University performed 
hydrocarbon and ozone sampling by means 
of aircraft.
ozone exceedance
exceedance
ozone exceedance
Tulsa has no new air plan for EPA approval
INCOG releases comments on the EPA's 
"Proposed Strategy for Post-1987 
Ozone Nonattainment". Sent to EPA on 
3/15.
Air Quality Service of the Okla State Dept, 
of Health releases "Demonstrating 
Attainment of the Ozone Standard in Tulsa 
County"
INCOG comments on the proposal by the 
Ad-Hoc clean air group
"Major Changes and Clarifications in the 
Proposal by Members of the Ad-Hoc Clean 
Air Group on Ozone and Carbon Monoxide 
Nonattainment" released
INCOG comments on EPA's proposed 
rulemaking regarding SIPs and attainment
Tulsa City-Coimty Environmental Advisory 
Council meeting, John Drake presents 
"Oklahoma's Nonattainment and the Clean 
Air Act"
OSDH submits "Evaluation Report for the 
Tulsa Coimty, Oklahoma Ozone 
Redesignation Request"
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8 / 1 2 / 8 8
8/24/88
9/9/88
9/14/88
12/20/88
1988
- regional-
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
3/22/89
3/23/89
4/5/89
4/18/89
national- 
local -
local -
4/21/89
5/8/89
- local -
local -
EPA Region VI receives state's request to 
redesignate Tulsa as attainment. Request 
was denied.
ozone exceedance
ozone exceedance
Dave Cox in communication with Jerry 
Lasker, Rich Brierre, Irving Frank, and Tom 
Kane about EPA sited deficiencies
"Effectiveness of Air Pollution Control 
Programs in the Tulsa Metropolitan Area" 
released by INCOG
an oil field emission study was performed in 
the areas of crude oil production around 
Tulsa.
Mark Coleman sends memo to OSDH Ad 
Hoc Committee of Clean Air Act Revisions. 
Subject: OSDH recommendations and 
comments to H.R. 99
101st Congress releases a Legislative 
Update of Clean Air Bills
Mark Coleman sends memo to Ad Hoc 
Comm., recommends further review of CAA 
changes, wants meeting 4/28
John Drake, Chief, Air Quality Service, 
sends memo to OSDH Ad Hoc Comm, 
about meeting on 4/28. Includes summary 
of proposed CAA revisions
Dave Cox sends his agency's reactions to 
John Drake
Mark Coleman sends a memo to the Ad Hoc 
Comm, about the status o f the CAAA 
review; includes opinions of comm, with 
regards to recommendations
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7/5/89
8/2/89
8/17/89
local - 
local - 
local -
8/18/89
8/23/89
8/30/89
9/5/89
9/7/89
9/7/89
9/19/89
9/21/89
9/21-2/89
9/25/89
- local -
- national-
- local -
- local -
- local -
- national-
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
ozone exceedance
INCOG releases an Air Quality Update
OSDH Ad Hoc Committee Meeting. Mark 
S. Coleman, Deputy Commissioner for 
Environmental Health Services present. 
Topic: proposed CAA amendments.
Decides EPA will stall about 
approving/disproving the SIP until the CAA 
Amendments are passed. "We have a 
limited window of opportunity in which to 
act" [to get Tulsa declared attainment] 
(memo from INCOG).
INCOG Air Qual Ad Hoc Cmty meeting
Mark Coleman meets w/ EPA officials and 
The National Governors Association Clean 
Air Task Force about CAA amendments
Memo from Mark Coleman to Ad Hoc 
Comm., schedules next meeting, wants to 
discuss clean air act amendments
INCOG Air Quality Ad Hoc Committee 
meeting. Dealt with Tulsa air quality issues, 
Michael D. Graves absent.
OSDH Ad Hoc Committee Meeting
Tulsa’s disapproved request for attainment 
redesignation printed in Federal Register
OSDH Ad Hoc Committee releases 
"Specific Comments to the Administration 
CAA Proposal" DRAFT
INCOG Air Qual Ad Hoc Cmty meeting
EPA Region 6 develops guidance on source 
specific RACT, holds conference call with 
headquarters
send to headquarters (OAQPS & OMS)
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9/26/89
9/28/89
10/2/89
10/3/89
10/11/89
10/12/89
10/16/89
10/18/89
10/19/89
11/21/89
1989
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local
- local -
- local -
- local
- local -
draft of specific guidance from Region 6
headquarters reviews recommendations
headquarters hold conference call w/EPA, 
finalize guidance
EPA meets with Oklahoma Air Quality 
Service
Oklahoma Council Meeting, state and EPA 
reps present
Ad Hoc Committee meeting. Members: 
Jerry Cleveland, Ray Bishop, Larry Byrum, 
Jim Price, Clyde Cole, Jerry Lasker, dave 
Cox, Lee Paden
Lasker writes to Thomas H. Diggs, EPA, 
about the EPA proposed designation of 
Tulsa as non-attainment.
state provides final position on VOC SIP 
call issues discussed on 10/2
Drake writes Jerry Lasker, thanking him for 
the data and statistics submitted by Lasker's 
staff, which became a large part of the 
proposals of control strategies, and in 
showing Tulsa was in attainment
INCOG Air Quality Ad Hoc Cmty meeting, 
present: John Drake, Larry Byrum, Bob 
Curtis, Jim Zink, Larry Pool, Dave 
Bradshaw, Don Phillips, Mel Rice, Jim 
Price, Jerry Lasker, Dave Cox, Bill 
Breisch(sp?), Forrest Miller, Gene Siddall, 
Larry Potts, Bob Dick, Dave Blankenship
INCOG Air Quality Ad Hoc Committee 
meeting
Ad Hoc Committee on Clean Air Act 
Revisions: Larry Byrum, OSDH; David 
Dyke, OCC; John Sharp, ACOG; Bruce
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1/22/90
2/27/90
3/8/90
7/20/90
7/23/90
8/31/90
8/90
1990
1990
11/90
6/24/91
7/11/91
7/23/91
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- national-
- local -
- local -
- local - 
-loc. inn.-
Ball.OEJ/OCAWG; David Branecky, 
OG&E; Jim Wilson, OG&E; Torn Kane, 
INCOG; John Drake, OSDH-AQS; Richard 
Hess, OEJ/OCAWG; Jules Kubri, OSCCl; 
Frank McGilbra, PSO
INCOG releases comments on S. 1630 to 
amend the federal CAA
Gov. Bellmon receives fax from EPA, they 
will propose to place Tulsa in attainment
INCOG releases comments on H. R. 3030 to 
amend the federal CAA, INCOG AQC 
meeting
Sierra Club releases report on improved 
Oklahoma air quality
INCOG Air Quality Committee adopted the 
Ozone Alert program during the 
meeting this day
two ozone exceedances
Tulsa considering switching 25 county 
vehicles to natural gas
INCOG facilitated a working group with the 
function of providing data to EPA and 
ODEQ to document achievement with ozone 
NAAQS (from G. Pine)
Clean Air Act Amendments were passed
Tulsa was redesignated as attainment for 
ozone
Tulsa exceeded the NAAQS limit for ozone 
at two sites, one more exceedance and they 
are off the clean-air list
INCOG AQC meeting
INCOG creates Air Quality Committee,
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7/25/91
7/27/91
7/30/91
8/1/91
8/11/91 
8/26/91 
8/91
11/13/91
12/18/91
1991
2/13/92
4/5/92
5/19/92
6/11/92
- local -
- local - 
-loc. inn.-
- local
- local
- local
- local
- local
- local
- local
- local
- local
- local -
- local
(earlier) organizes the Ozone Alert! program 
on this day, plan unveiled by Randle and 
John Selph, County Commissioner
Tulsa's two refineries announce they will 
participate and sell lower vp gas
EPA happy w/ Tulsa plan
Roger Randle kicks off commuting program 
by not driving his '71 Chevelle during the 
Ozone Alert! Ray Bishop (City-County 
Health Dept.) called the Ozone Alert
all 4,000 Tulsa employees ride buses free 
for the rest of summer
gasoline retailers join in clean air program
ozone alert day
Lydia Chiu of the Tulsa City-County Health 
Department writes "Ozone Reduction in 
Tulsa County From Mobile Sources"
INCOG AQC meeting
INCOG AQC meeting
a total of 4 Ozone Alerts! were called, two 
exceedences
INCOG AQC special meeting
Lasker and Selph meet with William G. 
Roswenberg (Assistant Administrator 
USE?A) and C. Boyden Gray (Counsel to 
the President) to discuss air program
Dave Cox reminds INCOG employees about 
Rideshare and Mass Transit programs
INCOG Air Quality Committee consisted 
of: Jerry Lasker, Michael Graves, Richard 
Hedgecock, Bill Breisch, Jerry Cleveland,
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6/19/92
7/12/92
1992
1/20/93
3/24/93
5/9/93
- local - 
-loc. inn.-
- local -
- local -
- national-
- local -
Mark Prichard, Dave Cox, Jim Doherty. 
Special meeting on this date.
ozone alert day declared
MERIT trading program developed
4 ozone alert days declared, no exceedences
Tulsa targets lawn equipment on ozone alert 
days; reps from Longview, TX in Tulsa to 
learn how to cut air problems. Programs in 
OKC and Evanston, IL already modelled on 
Tulsa
The Public Transit Innovation Journal 
named the MERIT system "most innovative 
metropolitan planning organized sponsored 
program" second year in a row
local refineries imwilling to provide reduced 
vpgas
5/13/93
6/19/93
7/10/93
7/21/93
7/28/93
7/29/93
7/30/93
8/13/93
- local -
- local -
-loc. iim.
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
gas suppliers agree to lower vp to 8.5, would 
not lower to requested 7.8
mobile testing lab made available to major 
area employers to test vehicle emissions, 
city plans to purchase 10 alternative fule 
commuter vans
Thiunbs Up program kicked off- stations 
with low vp fuel get thumb poster
ozone alert day
ozone alert day
ozone alert day
ozone alert day
ozone exceedance, first since 6/24/91 
281
8/18/93
8/20/93 
8/21/93 
11/3/93
1993
1/22/94
2/8/94
2/25/94
4/22/94
5/15/94
6/20/94
6/21/94
6/22/94
6/24/94
6/29/94
7/7/94
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- State -
-loc. inn.-
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
Tulsa hosts National Conference of Mayors, 
gets to brag later about ozone
ozone alert day, eighth this month
rare weekend ozone alert issued
INCOG (Lasker) wants better inspection 
program for vehicles and emissions
ten ozone alerts called, one exceedance (not 
on an ozone alert day)
stricter emissions regulations proposed by 
Rep. Larry Rice. Focuses on tailpipe 
exhaust
contest to develop slogan and phrase for 
ozone alert held
winners announced: Johnny King won best 
logo, Colette Breyland won best slogan. 
Won S300 and $200, respectively
ozone alert season kicked off one month 
early due to warm weather
"try transit week"- wear something green 
and ride bus for free
first ozone alert day of the year
ozone alert, ozone exceedance
ozone exceedance
meeting with city and coimty leaders to 
discuss further voluntary measures
ozone alert day, fourth of year
refineries lowering vp to 8.0 (Sun) and 8.2 
(Sinclair)
Conoco drops vp to 8.0 
282
7/8/94
7/10/94
7/24/94
9/8/94
1994
6/21/95
6/22/95
8/22/95
8/25/95
8/27/95
8/28/95
8/29/95
8/30/95
9/95
10/11/95
4/22/96
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local - 
-loc. inn.-
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- national-
- local -
- local -
INCOG sponsors an automobile emissions 
study, performed by the Remote Sensing 
Institute of the University of Denver
article in Tulsa World lists cities that used 
Tulsa as a blueprint for their clean air 
programs
Ray Bishop quits, claims philosophical 
differences, angry about investigation into 
refinery releases
four ozone alerts, three exceedances 
ozone alert day 
ozone alert day
Mayor Savage and EPA Assistant 
Administrator Mary Nichols sign the FAR.
ozone alert, ozone exceedance
Sunday ozone exceedance, highest since 
1984
ozone alert 
ozone alert 
ozone alert
Mayors meeting in Seattle, Savage brags 
about FAR and partnership with EPA
ozone alert, a rare occurrence in autumn
Tulsa officials remind businesses about the 
upcoming ozone season. Tulsa now 
notifying over 300 businesses on ozone 
days. Many businesses reward employees 
for carpooling
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6/13/96
7/2/96
7/3/96 
11/27/96 
12/4/96
12/10/96
6/23-8/98
6/25/97
11/97
spring 98
7/15/98
7/17/98
7/25/98
8/1/98
- local -
- local -
- local -
- national-
- national-
- local -
- national-
national- 
local -
• local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
- local -
ozone alert
ozone exceedance, no ozone alert issued 
ozone alert
EPA proposes stricter air regulations
Inhofe named chairman of subcommittee 
that oversees clean air issues, part of the 
Senate Committee on Public Works
MTTA toying with idea of cancelling free 
bus rides on ozone days
Glenn Travis, Hilary Kitz, and Heather 
Turner prepare the paper "Innovations in 
Ozone Control; Flexible Attainment Region 
and the Voluntary, Episodic Ozone Alert! 
Program" to be presented at the Air & Waste 
Management Association annual meeting
Clinton approves tougher air regulations
The Air Study Partnership presents the 
report "An Assessment of the Current 
Knowledge of Ozone Air Pollution in the 
Tulsa Metropolitan Area" to INCOG (Air 
Study Partnership = Ed Gibeau, Aeromet Inc 
[Tulsa]; Kit Wagner, Atmospheric 
Information Systems [Norman]; and Dan 
Wilson, Wilson Consulting Group [Tulsa])
"slow down and sweat" program to 
discourage morning use of air conditioners 
in autos
ozone alert day, first of season 
ozone alert
ozone exceedance, no alert 
ozone exceedance 
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8/20/98 - local - ozone exceedance
8/21/98 - local - ozone exceedance (fourth violation of year)
8/22/98 - local - ozone alert, Saturday
9/1/98 - local - ozone alert, ozone exceedance
9/2/98 - local - ozone alert
9/3/98 - local - ozone exceedance
9/4/98 - local - ozone alert, ozone exceedance
9/5/98 - local - ozone alert, ozone exceedance (Saturday)
9/6/98 - local - ozone alert, ozone exceedance (Sunday)
9/7/98 - local - ozone alert
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Appendix D 
Policy Entrpreneur Survey
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Strategic Policy Innovation Project
POLICY ENTREPRENEUR SURVEY
Prepared By
Mark Meo 
Becky Ziebro 
Science and Public Policy Program 
University of Oklahoma
April 2000
Supported by National Science Foundation grant SBR-9618003, "Strategic Policy 
Innovation and Social Learning: Flood Hazard Mitigation, Recycling, and Air Quality in 
Tulsa, OK"
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Thank-you in advance for completing my survey. I have left the following 
two pages blank in order for you to provide additional comments if you desire. If 
you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact me at 405-325-2290.
Becky Ziebro
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N a m e ______________________________
T he questions below  deal w ith three significant cases o f  environm ental policy change and  innovation in the 
City o fT u lsa . For the purposes o f  this su rvey , a  policy iim ovation is defined as “a  p ro g ra m  o r  p ra c tic e  
w hich  is new  to  th e  im p lem en tin g  tn s titu tfo n , an d  w hich is ev id en ced  by  a  ch a n g e  in  s ta n d a rd  
o p e ra tin g  p ra c tic e s”
(e.g., detention ponds).
Please check the case w ith which you are  m ost familiar and to w hich  your answ ers below  w ill correspond.
□ Flash flooding hazard m itigation a long  M ingo Creek
□ Solid W aste R ecycling and The M etropolitan Environmental Trust
□ .A.ir Q uality  and the O zone Alert! program
A pproxim ately how  m any different policy innovations are you fam iliar with in the case you  checked 
a b o v e ? ______
F o r  th e  case  you  check ed  above, p lease a n sw e r  th e  follow ing questio n s (#1-4) fo r  an y  3  policy  
in n o v a tio n s w ith  w h ich  you a re  m ost fa m ilia r , ind ica ting  th e  inn o v a tio n  you a r e  re fe re n c in g ;
.A. innovation # I (Please Describe)______________________________________________________________
I W hen you becam e aw are that you had a  problem w hich required a  response, w hat Inform ation did you 
utilize to specify the exact nanire o f  the problem , and how im portant was each type?
Please circle a number indicating the relative 
importance o] the following, using the scale 
shown at the right.
Vay
imporonl
Scmobhat
Important
Not
Im pcnant
1 2 3 4 5 6
a. O btained inform ation from academ ic journals 1 2 3 4 5 6
b. O btained inform ation from m agazine article I 2 3 4 5 6
c .  O btained inform ation from new spaper articles 1 2 3 4 5 6
d. O btained inform ation from books 1 2 3 4 5 6
e. Had discussions w ith experts 1 2 3 4 5 6
f. .Attended specialized w orkshops 1 2 3 4 5 6
g. O btained inform ation from governm ent 
agencies o ther than m y own ( if  applicable).
1 2 3 4 5 6
h. O btained inform ation from within m y ow n 
governm ent agency ( i f  applicable).
1 2 3 4 5 6
i. Internet Research 1 2 3 4 5 6
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2A. H ow  quickly did you  becom e fam iliar w ith the problem  (please check one)?
0  O ne-tw o m onths □  M ore than a  year □  Six m onths to a  year
□ Two-six m onths □  Still learning
3A. O nce the nanire o f  the  p roblem  w as determ ined, bow  would you  characterize  the  ease with w hich  an 
initial solution was found an d  adopted?
5 Easily found and adopted (please skip question #4  fo r th is innovation)
6 Easily found, had  difficulties adopting
7 Difficult to find, had  to design new solutions
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4A. O f the following possible reasons for difficulties encountered while adopting the chosen solution,
please circle a number indicating their relative
importance, using the scale shown at right.
Voy Somewhat
Important
a. Inadequate scientific/technical inform ation
b. U navailable scientific/technical inform ation
c. Lack o f  understanding o f  scientific/technical 
inform ation
d. Lack o f  tim ely scientific/technical inform ation
e. Too costly
f. Funding m echanism  unavailable
g. Solution required "thinking outside the box"
h. C ity o fT u lsa  bureaucratic strucnire unable to 
accom m odate solution
i. Not acceptable to politicians 
j. Not acceptable to public
k. Risk o f  failure
I. Lack o f  regulatory flexibility
m. Not enough tim e to adequately analyze 
scientific/technical information
n. Encountered difficulties interacting w ith 
o ther agencies/levels o f  governm ent
o. Lack o f  organizational diversity
p. Solution sought too quickly
q. Solution sought too slowly
r. Lack o f  m edia support
s. Lack o f  recognition
t. Fear o f  not being re-elected
2 3
2 
2 
2
>fo( DidoM
Important Act*»
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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B. Innovation tt2
I B. W hen you becam e aw are that you  had a  problem  w hich required  a  response, w h a t inform ation did you 
utilize to specify the exact natu re o f  th e  problem , and how  im portan t w as each type?
Please circle a number indicating the relative ^
importance o f  the following, using the scale shown b^^cnm
at the right.
Somowfaai
Importsnx
a. O btained inform ation from  academ ic journals
b. O btained inform ation from  m agazine articles
c. O btained inform ation from  new spaper articles
d. O btained inform ation ftom  books
e. Had discussions with experts
f. A ttended specialized w orkshops
g. O btained inform ation from  governm ent 
agencies other than my ow n ( i f  applicable).
h. O btained inform ation from  w ithin m y ow n I 2 3
governm ent agency ( i f  applicable).
I. Internet Research I 2 3
2B. How quickly d id you becom e fam iliar w ith the problem  (please check one)?
o  One-two montfts
□ Two-six m onths
□ Six months to a  year
M ore than a  year 
S till learning
Not Did not
Unportint Aecm
3B. O nce the nature o f  the problem  w as determ ined, how  w ould  you characterize the  ease w ith which an 
initial solution was found and  adopted?
1. Easily found and  adopted  (please skip question  #4 for this innovation)
2. Easily found, had  difficulties adopting
3. D ifficult to  find, had  to design new solutions
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4B. O f the following possible reasons for difiicuities encountered while adopting the chosen solution,
please circle a number indicating their relative importance, using the scale shown below.
Vny
Important
a. Inadequate scientific/technical inform ation
b. U navailable scientific/technical inform ation
c. Lack o f  understanding o f  scientific/technical 
inform ation
d. Lack o f  tim ely scientific/technical inform ation
e. T oo costly
f. Funding m echanism  unavailable
g. Solu tion  required  “thinking outside th e  box”
h. City o fT u ls a  bureaucratic structure unable to 
accom m odate solution
i. Not accep tab le  to politicians 
j. Not accep tab le  to public
k. Risk o f  failure
I. Lack o f  regu lato ry  flexibility
m. Not eno u g h  tim e to adequately analyze 
scientific/technical information
n. E ncountered  difiicuities interacting w ith  
o ther agencies/levels o f  governm ent
o. Lack o f  organizational diversity
p. Solution  sought too quickly
q. Solution  sought too slowly
r. Lack o f  m edia support
s. Lack o f  recognition
t. Fear o f  n o t being  re-elected
Somcwhm*
Impoftaot
Noc Did 00*
ImpoftaiU Aceew
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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c. Innovation #3
I C. W hen you becam e aw are that you had a  problem  w hich requ ired  a  response, w hat inform ation d id  you 
utilize to specify the exact nature o f  the problem , an d  how  im portant w as each type?
Please circle a number indicating the relative 
importance o f  the following, using the scale shown at 
the right.
Voy Somewhat
Impottant
N<M Did mot
Important Aecm
a. Obtained inform ation  from  academic journals 1 2 3 4  5 6
b. Obtained inform ation  from  m agazine articles 1 2 3 4  5 6
c. Obtained inform ation  from  new spaper articles 1 2 3 4 5 6
d. Obtained inform ation  from  books 1 2 3 4  5 6
e. Had discussions w ith  experts 1 2 3 4  5 6
f. Attended specialized  w orkshops 1 2 3 4 5 6
g. Obtained inform ation from governm ent 1 2 3 4 5 6
agencies o ther than m y own ( i f  applicable).
h. Obtained inform ation  from  within my own 1 2 3 4  5 6
government agency ( i f  applicable).
i. Internet R esearch 1 2 3 4 5 6
2C. How quickly  d id  you becom e fam iliar with the problem  (p lease check  one)?
o  O ne-tw o m onths
a  Tw o-six m onths
n  Six m onths to a  year
□
o
M ore than  a  year 
Still learning
3C. Once the nature o f  the problem  was determ ined, how  w ould you characterize the ease with w hich an 
initial solution was found and adopted?
1. Easily found and adopted (please sk ip  question #4 for th is innovation)
2. Easily  found, had difiicuities adopting
3. D ifficult to find, had to design new  solutions
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4C. O f the following possible reasons for difficulties encotmtered while adopting the chosen solution,
please circle a number indicating their relative importance, using the scale shown below.
Voy
Imiwiaat
a. Inadequate scientific/technical inform ation
b. U navailable scientific/technical inform ation
c. L ack o f  understanding o f  scientific/technical 
inform ation
d. L ack o f  timely scientific/technical inform ation
e. T oo costly
f. Funding m echanism  unavailable
g. Solution required “thinking outside the b o x "
h. C ity  o f  Tulsa bureaucratic sm icture unab le to 
accom m odate solution
I .  N ot acceptable to politicians
j. Not acceptable to public
k. Risk o f  failure
I. Lack o f  regulatory flexibility
m. N ot enough time to adequately analyze 
scientific/technical inform ation
n. Encountered difficulties interacting with 
o ther agencies/levels o f  governm ent
o. Lack o f  organizational diversity
p. Solution sought too quickly
q. Solution sought too slow ly
r. L ack o f  m edia support
s. Lack o f  recognition
t. F ear o f  not being re-elected
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
S onew tn t
Important
Mot Did 001
Important Aseoi
I f  y o u  w ish to  an sw er qu estio n s #1-4  fo r  m o re  th a n  3 Inn o v a tio n s, p lea se  feel fre e  to  d o  so . F o r the  
r e m a in d e r  o f  th e  su rvey , h o w ev er, p lease  r e fe r  to  th e  w hole c a se  y o u  m a rk e d  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  when 
an sw e rin g  questions.
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s . Using the scale presented below, what was the relative importance o f  the following sources o f information in the 
search for new solutions.
Voy
Inpolanl
Somewhat
bnponant
Not CM not
Important Accta
a. Academic papers 1 2 4 6
b. Personal interviews with academics 1 2 4 6
c. Personal interviews with agency personnel 1 2 4 6
d. Federal government sources 1 2 4 6
e. State government sources 1 2 4 6
f. Personal experience and opinions 1 2 4 6
g. Expert opinions/guidance f 2 4 6
h. Private contract service 1 2 4 6
i. Independent field reports 1 2 4 6
J .  Identified similar problem 
and solution elsewhere
1 2 4 6
k .  Internet resources 1 2 4 6
6. For solutions which were "bonrowed" from another location with a similar problem, please rank the relative 
importance o f  the following in adaptation o f the solution to Tulsa's problem. (Use the scale presented below. If no 
solutions were borrowed, please go to question » T )
a. No adaptation occurred, solution was adopted 
as it was found (Go to question #7)
b. Academic papers
c. Personal interviews with academics
d. Personal interviews with agency personnel
e. Federal government sources
f. State government sources
g. Personal experience and opinions
h. E.xpert opinions/guidance
i. Private contract service 
J .  Independent field reports 
k. Public supportiveness
Very
Impoctanl
Not Didtwc
Imponaiu Aecm
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7. In your experience with policy
innovation, how important did you find the vay somewiai n« d«i«
following factors to be? Please rate using  ^ impomm irapomm
the scale at right. | | I |
a. Cooperation between many agencies 1 2 3 4 5 6
and/or levels o f  government
b. Volunteers 1 2 3 4 5 6
c. User fees and market-like approaches 1 2 3 4 5 6
d. Flow o f information and individuals across 1 2 3 4 5 6
organizational boundaries
e. Flow o f information and individuals across 1 2  3 4 5 6
bureaucratic and political boundaries
f. Planning and analysis as key aspects 1 2  3 4 5 6
g. Public support 1 2  3 4 5 6
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8. Do you think the City ofTulsa has learned from past experience with environmental 
policy innovations?
Yes No
If yes, how important were each o f  the following factors have enabled the city to 
continue to learn? Please use the scale at 
right. Voy
Importsm
Somewhat
Impoitant
Not Did
Important
a. Information analysis
b. Information access
c. Information flow
d. Information use
e. Flexible organizational structure
f. Holistic programs
g. Networking
h. Ad-hoc task forces
i. Leadership
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
9. How important, in your experience,
do you think public support was in the 1 2  3 4 5 6
ultimate success o f  the policy innovation?
(Please circle the correct number using the scale above)
10. If you felt public support was important, please indicate, using the scale above, the 
importance o f each o f  the following factors in motivating public support.
a. Political coalitions 1 2 3 4 3 6
b. Voluntary associations 1 2  3 4 5 6
c. Public awareness/education 1 2 3 4 5 6
d. Political demands on decision makers 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Voy Somewhat Not Didrnt
Im poftn t Important Aceoa
11. How important, in your opinion, was 1 2 3 4  s 6 
private sector participation/activities in the
ultimate success o f the policy innovation? 1 2 3 4 5 6
(Please circle the correct number using the 
scale above)
12. If  you felt private sector participation was important, please indicate the importance 
o f  each o f the following activities using the scale above.
a. Providing publicity 1 2 3 4 5 6
b. Providing resources 1 2 3 4 5 6
c. Providing program piloting/demonstrations 1 2 3 4 5 6
d. Other (specify)_________________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6
13. How important in determining the course
o f policy outcomes were the courts? (Please use 1 2  3 4
the scale above)
14. If you felt the courts were important, please rank the importance o f  the following 
activities, using the scale above.
a. Clarification o f ambiguous statutes 1 2  3 4 5 6
b. Deriving legitimacy for new ideas 1 2  3 4 5 6
15. How important in motivating policy 
innovation was the City Council 
(or City Commission)?
16. If you felt the City Council (or Commission) was important, please rank the 
importance o f the following activities (please use the scale presented above).
a. Development o f study committees 1 2 3 4 5 6
b. Proclamations/statutes/ordinances I 2 3 4 5 6
c. Public hearings/meetings 1 2 3 4 5 6
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17. W hat techniques/approaches did you lean t firom you  involvem ent w ith the po licy  innovation that y o u  
are u sing  now  w hen confronted  w ith environm ental policy questions? (Please check  a ll that apply an d  
indicate their relative im portance, using the  sca le  a t 
right) Very SomcwW  Not PidoK
Important Important Important Aaceaa
o  O rganizational flexibility
□ D evelopm ent o f  task forces
□ Scanning to determ ine how  other 
m unicipalities have dealt w ith sim ilar issues
o  R ecruitm ent o f  technical expertise
o  A ccessing external Information
o  D iscussions w ith experts
o  .Attending w orkshops/conferences
□  U nique funding m echanism s
□ Public participation/support
□ D on’t fear failure
Q D on’t accept failure
a  Intergovernm ental interactions
o  Use o f  volunteers
o  S ingle individuals serving in m ultip le roles
o  Planning and analysis
□ System s/holistic thinking
a  N etw orking
a  C om m unity  involvem ent
□ C risis can m otivate change
□ O ther (please specify)_____________________
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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Appendix E 
SPSS Results for Policy Entrepreneur Survey
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Factor Analysis Question 1
Totil Variance Explained
initiai Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loading:
Component Total % of Variance Cumulatives Total % of Variance Cumulatives
\ 3.016 66.460 31450 3.010 33450 33j450
2 1.648 18506 51.756 1.648 18506 51.756
3 1.259 13591 65.747 1559 11991 65.747
4 1.081 12.015 77.762 1.081 12.015 77.762
5 581 6.452 84514
6 .499 5541 89.754
7 574 4.157 93.911
8 540 3.776 97.687
9 508 2513 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Component Matrfic
Component
1 2 3 4
ONF'A .533
ONE_B .803
ONE_C .601 -.614
ONE_D .723
ONE_E .541 .509
ONE.F .824
ONE_G .570 .507
ONE_H .740
ONEJ .673
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 
a. 4 components extracted.
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Reliability first component question 1
♦** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
R E L I A B I L I T Y
1. 
2 .
3 .
4 .
ONE_A 
ONE_B 
ONE_D 
ONE F
ONE_A 
ONE_B 
ONE~D 
ONE F
A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )  
Mean Std Dev Cases
ONE_A 1.6271
ONE_B 1.9492
ONE_D 2.0678
ONE_F 3.3390
Covariance Matrix
ONE A ONE a
1.8586
.8083
1.1981
.8355
1.9456
.9173
1.2072
Correlation Matrix 
ONE A ONE a
1 . 0 0 0 0  
.4251 
.6222 
.3821
N of Cases
Statistics for 
Scale
Mean
8.9831
1 . 0 0 0 0
.4656
.5396
59.0
Variance
20.3273
1.3633
1.3949
1.4126
1.6040
ONE D
1.9953
1.0111
ONE D
1 . 0 0 0 0
.4463
59.0
59.0
59.0
59.0
ONE F
2.5728
ONE F
1 . 0 0 0 0
N of
Std Dev Variables 
4.5086 4
Item-total Statistics
ONE_A 
ONE_B 
ONE_D 
ONE F
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted
7.3559
7.0339
6.9153
5.6441
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted
12.7849
12.5161
12.0789
11.6470
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.5830
.5943
.6369
.5579
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.4139
.3684
.4562
.3435
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted
.7358
.7298
.7081
.7531
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S S C AL E ( ALPHA)
Reliability Coefficients 4 items
Alpha = .7842 Standardized item alpha = .7870
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Factor Analysis Question 4
T e M V a iln a C i« W n d
IntM BoM valyM ExoseOm Oune e l OoMftd U edhioi
CempOMOt ToM CumiM tve% TeW %olV«lM ee
1 u n o K W 2 1 U I IASI 29.140 k&UA
2 ISIS 17400 42.714 9419 17400 42.714
9 1.72S 1419 81427 1.729 0412 91427
4 1J>7 0494 90.701 1407 1494 90.701
S 1j24 142» 00401 1424 1420 00401
« 1.170 5440 72290 1.170 9440 72490
7 s t s 4419 77.149
I J t7 4429 01.170
# 407 2409 04400
I t 490 2407 07400
11 400 2401 00487
12 412 2408 02422
19 440 1440 04.100
14 402 1400 00470
IS JS9 1407 00449
I t .104 470 07419
17 .ISO 402 00400
I t .124 410 00429
I t I430C42 492 00400
20 kOO#e42 445 100400
BumcUon IMhod; M n d p il ComponMI A n ty tk .
Component Matrti
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6
i^OUR_A 7f&
FOUR_B 556
FOUR_C .985
FOOR.O .549 .710
FOUR.E .555
FOUR.F
FOUR.G 595
FOUR_H 542 .550
FOÜRJ
FOUR_J 577
FOUR_K 581
FOUR_L 546
FOUR.M 510
FOUR.N .820
FOUR.O .703
FOUR.P
FOUR.Q a i l
FOUR_R .824
FOUR_S 533
FOUR_T .611
Extraction Method: Principal Component Anaiyaia. 
a. S eomponenta extracted.
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Reliability (1st component question 4)
Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1 . 
2 . 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
S. 
7.
FOUR_C 
FOUR_G 
FOUR_M 
F0UR_0 
FOUR_R 
FOUR_S 
FOUR T
2.7455
4.3273
2.3636
2.1818
1.7818
1.9818
1.4727
1.4810
.8401
1.4576
1.4918
1.1171
1.3122
1.3724
55.0
55.0
55.0
55.0
55.0
55.0
55.0
Covariance Matrix
FOUR C FOUR G FOUR M FOUR O FOUR R
FOUR_C 
FOUR_G 
FOUR_M 
F0UR_O 
FOUR_R 
FOUR_S 
FOUR T
2.1933
.2515
1.4091
.6582
.2953
.1434
.4003
.7057
.1195
.4394
.3875
.2098
.3609
2.1246
.4141
.1919
.4882
.6027
2.2256
.8737
.4108
1.0791
1.2478
.5515
.7532
FOUR S FOUR T
FOUR_S 
FOUR T
1.7219
.5273 1.8835 
Correlation Matrix
FOUR G FOUR G FOUR M FOUR 0 FOUR R
FOUR_C 
FOUR_G 
FOUR_M 
F0UR_O 
FOUR_R 
FOUR_S 
FOUR T
1 . 0 0 0 0
. 2 0 2 2
.6528
.2979
.1785
.0738
.1970
1 . 0 0 0 0
.0976
.3506
.4130
.1903
.3131
1 . 0 0 0 0
.1905
.1179
.2553
.3013
1 . 0 0 0 0
.5243
.2098
.5271
1 . 0 0 0 0
.3763
.4913
FOUR S FOUR T
FOUR_S 
FOUR T
1 . 0 0 0 0
.2928
R E L I A B I L I T Y  
N of Cases =
Statistics for 
Scale
1 . 0 0 0 0
A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  
55.0
N of
Mean Variance Std Dev Variables 
16.8545 33.2377 5.7652 7
( ALPHA)
Item-total Statistics
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Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
FOUR_C 14.1091 24.7286 .4288 .4963 .7191
FOUR_G 12.5273 28.9946 .3910 .2160 .7283
FOUR_M 14.4909 24.6620 .4456 .5140 .7145
FOUR_0 14.6727 23.2613 .5386 .4125 .6905
FOUR_R 15.0727 25.8835 .5372 .4331 .6968
FOUR_S 14.8727 26.8539 .3428 .2210 .7361
FOUR T 15.3818 23.9071 .5549 .4028 .6871
Reliability Coefficients 7 items
Alpha = .7419 Standardized item alpha = .7480
Reliability
Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1 . 
2 .
FOUR_J 
FOUR K
2.5714
2.4643
1.3465
1.5488
56.0
56.0
Covariance Matrix 
FOUR J FOUR K
FOUR_J 
FOUR K
1.8130
.8026 2.3987 
Correlation Matrix
FOUR J FOUR K
FOUR_J 1.0000
FOUR_K .3849
N of Cases =
Statistics for 
Scale
Mean
5.0357
1 . 0 0 0 0
56.0
Variance
5.8169
N of
Std Dev Variables 
2.4118 2
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Item-total Statistics
FOUR_J 
FOUR K
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted
2 .4 6 4 3
2 .5 7 1 4
Scale 
Variêtnce 
if Item 
Deleted
2 .3 9 8 7  
1 . 8 1 3 0
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
. 3 8 4 9  
.3 8 4 9
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.1 4 8 1
.1 4 8 1
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .5519 Standardized item alpha = .5558
(ALPHA)
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Factor Analysis question 5
Total Vartanca Explalmd
initial Eigenvm ues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadingi
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative K
1 1938 26.M 26.709 lé io 26.70d
2 2.148 19.532 48.241 2.148 19432 48441
3 1.577 14.339 60.580 1477 14.339 60480
4 1.160 10J42 71.121 1.160 10442 71.121
5 1.111 10.095 81.217 1.111 10.095 81417
6 .603 5j*80 86.697
7 .539 4.899 91.596
8 .470 4.274 95.869
9 .265 2j410 98.280
10 .125 1.140 99.419
11 S.386E-02 .581 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Component Matrfic
Component
1 2 3 4 5
FIVE_A .814
FIVE.B .502 .512
FiVE_C .829
FIVE_D .769
FIVE_E .512 .624
FIVE_F
FIVE.G .751
F1VE_H .682
FIVEJ -.621
FIVE.J .639 -.578
FIVE.K 474
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 
a. 5 components extracted.
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Reliability
**• Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis •*•*♦*
R E L I A B I L I T Y
1 .
2 .
3 .
FIVE_C 
FIVE_D 
FIVE G
FIVE_C 
FIVE_D 
FIVE G
A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )  
Mean Std Dev Cases
FIVE_C 3.6957
FIVE_D 4.2174
FIVEG 4.3913
Covariance Matrix
FIVE C FIVE D
1.5850
.7964
.4427
.7233
.2747
Correlation Matrix 
FIVE C FIVE D
1 . 0 0 0 0
.7438
.3945
N of Cases
Statistics for 
Scale
Mean 
12 .3043
1 . 0 0 0 0
.3624
23.0
Variance
6.1304
1.2590
.8505
.8913
FIVE G
.7945
FIVE G
1 . 0 0 0 0
23.0
23.0
23.0
N of
Std Dev Variables 
2.4760 3
Item-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted
FIVE_C 
FIVE~D 
FIVE G
8.6087 
8.0870 
7.9130
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted
2.0672 
3.2648 
3 .9012
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.6846
.6970
.4075
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.5713
.5589
.1663
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted
.5315
.5424
.8166
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Reliability Coefficients 3 items
Alpha = .7408 Standardized item alpha = .7502
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Reliability
*♦* Method 2 {covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis »**••• 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1 .
2 .
FIVE_H 
FIVE I
FIVE_H 
FIVE I
FIVB_H 
FIVE I
2.7826 
2.9565
Covariance Matrix
FIVE H Fr/E I
2.7233
1.6265 2.5889 
Correlation Matrix
FIVE_H
1 . 0 0 0 0
.6125
N of Cases =
Statistics for Mean
Scale 5.7391
FIVE_I
1 . 0 0 0 0
23.0
Variance 
8.5652
1.6502
1.6090
23 .0 
23 .0
N of
Std Dev Variables 
2.9266 2
Item-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted
FIVE_H 
FIVE I
2.9565
2.7826
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted
2.5889 
2.7233
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.6125
.6125
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.3752
.3752
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .7596 Standardized item alpha = .7597
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Factor Analysis Question 6
Total Varianca Explalmd
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loading:
Component Total \  of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cum ulatives
4.WY 46.570 48.570 4.èS7 46.570
2 1.756 17.558 64.128 1.756 17358 64.123
3 1.522 15.217 79346 1322 15317 79.343
4 .756 7.558 86304
5 .463 4.629 91332
6 M 4 3.839 95372
7 .221 2.214 97386
8 .182 1.817 99303
9 I.051E-D2 M 5 99308
10 I.920E-02 .192 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Component Matrtr
Component
1 2 3
SlX_B . f W
SDt_C .634 .621
SDC_D .883
SIX_E .777 .528
sa _ F .634 .578
SOCjB .677
sa_ H .733
S K J .705
SK_J 318 326
sa_K .842
Extraction Method: Principal Compomnt An 
a. 3 components extracted.
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Reliability
**• Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis •***»* 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. SIX D 3.4615 1.4500 13 .0
2. SIX_G 3.5385 1.2659 13.0
3 . SIX_H 4.3077 .8549 13.0
4 . SIX_K 4.1538 1.3445 13 .0
5 . SIX_I 3.0769 1.6053 13 .0
Covariance Matrix
SIX_D SIX_G SIX_H SIX_K
SIX_D 2.1026
SIX_G .9808 1.6026
SIX_H .5128 . 5705 .7308
SIX_K 1.4231 .6603 .6987 1.8077
SIX I 1.1282 .8718 .8077 1.4872
SIX I
2.5769
Correlation Matrix
SIX D SIX G SIX H SIX K SIX I
SIX_D 
SIX_G 
3IX_H 
SIX_K 
SIX I
1 . 0 0 0 0
.5343
.4137
.7299
.4847
N of Cases
1 . 0 0 0 0
.5272
.3879
.4290
13 .0
1 . 0 0 0 0
.6079
.5886
1 . 0 0 0 0
.6890 1 . 0 0 0 0
Statistics for 
Scale
Mean
18.5385
Variance
27.1026
Std Dev 
5.2060
N of 
Variables 
5
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  
Item-total Statistics
S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
S I X D  
S I X G  
SIX_H 
SIX_K 
SIX I
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
15.0769 16.9103 .6784 .6361 .8036
15.0000 19.3333 .5539 .4525 .8355
14.2308 21.1923 .6581 .5224 .3244
14.3846 16.7564 .7757 .7345 .7753
15.4615 15.9359 .6702 .5348 .8109
Reliability Coefficients 
Alpha = .8432
5 items 
Standardized item alpha = .8540
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Factor Analysis Question 8
Total Varianca E xplalm d
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadingi
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative K
f 3 ^ 0 ià .W r 39.775 àà.77S
2 1.817 20.185 S9J60 1.817 20.185 59J60
3 1.333 14.808 74.768 1J33 14.808 74.763
4 .978 10.889 85.637
5 .702 7.802 93.439
6 .268 2.983 96A22
7 .158 1.750 98.172
8 .124 1J81 99.553
9 t.027E-02 M l 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Compomnt Anaiyais.
Component Matrftc
Component
1 2 3
EIGHTJA .820
EIGHT.B .706 -.610
E!GHT_C .852
EIGHT.D .700
EIGHT E .544 .627
EIGHT.F .525 .694
EIGHT.G
E!GHT_H .589 -.588
EIGHTJ
a. 3 components extracted.
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Reliability
Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis ******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )  
Mean Std Dev Cases
I. 
2 . 
3 .
EIGHT_A 4.1818
EIGHT_C 4.4091
EIGHT_D 4.2727
Covariance Matrix
EIGHT A EIGHT C
.8528
.8541
.8827
EIGHT D
2 2 . 0
2 2 . 0
2 2 . 0
EIGHT_A 
EIGHT_C 
EIGHT D
.7273
.3983
.5195
.7294
.4545 .7792
Correlation Matrix 
EIGHT A SIGHT C EIGHT D
EIGHT_A 
EIGHT_C 
EIGHT D
1 . 0 0 0 0
.5468
.6901
1 . 0 0 0 0
.6029 1 . 0 0 0 0
(I of Cases =
Statistics for 
Scale
Mean 
12 .8636
Item-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted
EIGHT_A 8.6818 
EIGHT_C 8.4 545 
EIGHT D 8.5909
2 2 . 0
Variance
4.9805
N of
Std Dev Variables 
2.2317 3
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted
2.4177
2.5455
2.2532
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.6921
.6259
.7351
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.5031
.3961
.5488
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted
.7520
.8163
.7070
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  
Reliability Coefficients 3 items 
Alpha = .8266 Standardized item alpha
S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
.8263
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Factor Analysis Question 17
Tetil Viitane* Explained
Initiai Eigenvaiuea Extraction Suraa of Squared Loadingi
Component Total % Of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulatively
1 6.181 32.6* O JU 12524 12521
2 3J34 17.546 50.075 3534 17546 50575
3 2.122 11.167 81.242 2122 11.187 81542
4 1.889 K888 70.130 1.889 8588 70.130
5 1J24 8.022 78.152 1524 8522 78.152
6 1.178 8.189 84J41 1.178 8.189 84541
7 J95 4.710 89U»2
8 J24 4JU9 93J90
9 A n Z515 95905
10 J83 1MB 97514
11 .251 1J21 99.135
12 .118 .610 99.745
13 I.852E4I2 .255 100.000
14 I.137E-15 5J82E-15 100.000
15 I.053E-18 1.807E.15 100.000
18 i.923E-17 1JH2E-16 100.000
17 -032E.17 4.012E-16 100.000
18 -2.52E-18 •1J25E-15 100500
19 -4.49E18 •2J85E-15 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analyiis.
Component Matrti
Component
1 2 3 4 5 8
seVYi4_A JU
SEVTN.B 545
SEVTN_C .835 510
SEVTN_D .825
SEVTN.E 548
SEVTN.F .814 •513
SEVTN.G .888 514
SEVTN.H 548 592
SEVTNJ .735
SEVTN.J .833
SEVTN_K 592
SEVTN.L .824
SEVTN.M .795
SEVTN.N 583 -514
SEVTN.O
SEVm.P 525
SEVTN.Q 552
SEVTN.R 515
SEVTN.S 547
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analyii*. 
a. 6 componenta extracted.
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Reliability
Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis »»»**•
R E L l A a i L I T Y A N A L Y S I S  -  S C A L E  (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. SEVTN_A 4.1364 .8335 22.0
2 . SEVTN_a 3.5909 1.1816 22.0
3 . SEVTN_I 4.5000 .8591 22.0
4 . SEVTN_M 3.6818 1.1705 22.0
S . SEVTN_R 4.3182 .8387 22.0
Covariance Matrix
SEVTN_A SEVTN_B SEVTN_X SEVTN_M SEVTN_R
SEVTN A .6948
s e v t n ][a .5346 1.3961
SEVTN]~I .3571 .6905 .7381
SEVTN_~M .6645 .9589 .6905 1.3701
SEVTN]”r .2879 .6602 .5000 .6299 .7035
Correlation Matrix
SEVTN_A SEVTN_B SEVTN_I SEVTN_M SEVTN_R
SEVTN A 1.0000
SEVTN ” a .5428 1.0000
SEVTN ”i .4987 .6802 1.0000
SEVTN]]]m .6811 .6933 .6866 1.0000
SEVTN ”r .4118 .6662 .6939 .6416 1.0000
N of Cases = 22.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 20.2273 16.8506 4.1050 5
R E L l A a i L I T Y A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  (A L P H A)
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
SEVTN_ A 16.0909 12.4675 .6266 .4809 .8833
SEVTN_'a 16.6364 9.7662 .7702 .6012 .8546
SEVTN_[l 15.7273 11.6364 .7637 .6086 .8562
SEVTN]'m 16.5455 9.5931 .8120 .6782 .8424
SEVTN"'r 15.9091 11.9913 .7154 .5738 .8664
Reliability Coefficients 5 items
Alpha = .8863 Standardized item alpha = .8906
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Reliability
•• Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this emalysis
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
1. SEVTN_E
2. SEVTN P
Mean
4.1429
4.3333
Std Dev
.7270
.8563
Cases
21.0
2 1 . 0
SEVTN_E 
SEVTN P
SEVTN_E 
SEVTN P
Covariance Matrix 
SEVTN_E S EVTNP
.5286
.3500 .7333
Correlation Matrix 
SEVTN E SE'TTN P
1 . 0 0 0 0
.5622 1 .0 0 0 0
N of Cases =
Statistics for Mean
Scale 8.4762
2 1 . 0
Variance
1.9619
N of
Std Dev Variables 
1.4007 2
Item-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item 
Deleted
SEVTN_E 4.3333 
SEVTN P 4.1429
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted
.7333
.5286
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.5622 
.5622
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.3160
.3160
Alpha 
if Item 
Deleted
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  
Reliability Coefficients 2 items 
Alpha = .7136 Standardized item alpha
S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
.7197
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removëd
Model
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
R/tÔBbÉf
• Enter
a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
std. Error of 
the Estimate
r  ■ .à56* .127 .444 .6036
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR0BDEF1
ANOVA
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression 3.016 3.616 8.272 .006"
Residual 20.781 57 .365
Total 23.797 58
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR0BDEF1
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
Coefficient
Unstandardized
Coefficients
StandardI
zed
CoefUclen
ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t SIg.
1 (Constant) 2.1W .lté 12.314 .000
PR0BDEF1 .202 .070 .356 2.876 .006
a. Dependent Variable: THREE
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removtd
Model
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
1 ÉARR1EIM . Enter
a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .247» .061 .6 ^ 469i
a. Predictors: (Constant), BARRIER1
ANOVA
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression .764 i .761 3.456 .069*
Residual 11.675 53 220
Total 12.436 54
a. Predictors: (Constant), BARRIER1
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
CoefUclentb
Unstandardized
Coefficients
StandardI
zed
CoefRcien
ts
Model B std. Error Beta t SIg.
1 (Constant) .........fST" l l l 6 5 .000
BARRIER1 .144 .078 247 1.659 .069
a. Dependent Variable: THREE
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removëd
Model
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
V  ” APPLY» . Enter
a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: EIGHT
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 "■ .124" .015 -.6^4 2.0187
a. Predictors: (Constant), APPLY4
ANOV/f
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression 1.271 T \ : ï t i .312 .5éi»
Residual 81.501 20 4.075
Total 82.773 21
a. Predictors: (Constant), APPLY4
b. Dependent Variable: EIGHT
Coefficients
Unstandardized
Coefficients
StandardI
zed
CoefRcien
ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t SIg.
1 (Constant) 4.102 2.579 .-iff
APPLY4 .342 .612 .124 -.559 .583
a. Dependent Variable: EIGHT
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removëd
Model
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
Af>f>LV% • Enter
a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: EIGHT
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .186* .03^ •.b-le
a. Predictors: (Constant), APPLY5
ANOVA
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression t 7 i t 1 2.797 .6âô 420-
Residual 78.155 19 4.113
Total 80.952 20
a. Predictors: (Constant), APPLY5
b. Dependent Variable: EIGHT
CoefUclentÈ
Unstandardized
Coefhclents
Standard!
zed
Coefflclen
ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t SIg.
1 (Constant) .689 2.780 .248 .80f
APPLY5 .534 .648 .186 .825 .420
a. Dependent Variable: EIGHT
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Regression
ANOVA
PR0BDEF1
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Between Group: 8.468 1 4.234 3.6^ .Odd
Within Groups 65.219 56 1.165
Total 73.686 58
ANOVA
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression 4.259 1 1.259 .309 .585*
Residual 81.514 20 4.076
Total 82.773 21
a. Predictors: (Constant), APPLY3
b. Dependent Variable: EIGHT
Coefflclenfl
Unstandardized
Coefficients
StandardI
zed
Coefflclen
ts
Model B Std. Error Beta t SIg.
1 (Constant) ^.989 2J92 1.SèS" .111
APPLY3 .322 .579 .123 -.556 .585
a. Dependent Variable: EIGHT
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Oneway
DMCftptiVM
PROBOEF1
N Maan Std. Dovlatioii Std. Error
95% ConSdonc# Intarrai foi 
Mm d
Minimum MaximumLowar Bound Uppar Bound
1.00 .......s r 2.2500 1.0447 2010 1.8387 .00 ItfS
2.00 7 3.2143 S219 3107 2.4541 32745 100 4.00
3.00 23 1.9700 1.1689 2338 1.4875 2.4525 20 3.75
Total 59 2.2458 1.1271 .1487 12520 22395 .00 4.00
Oneway
OM ClfpUvtS
BARRIER1
N Maan Std. Oavlatlon Std. Error
95% Confldanca imarval fo 
Maan
Minimum MaximumLowar Bound UpparBound
1.00 -------ÎT 1850& jH U " .17*1 iO li* " St 4.14
lOO 7 22245 2242 2115 12822 19887 129 327
3.00 21 11555 2178 .1348 12753 14378 1.14 323
Total 55 14078 2238 .1111 11551 15304 27 4.14
ANOVA
BARRIER1
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Between Croupi l- fS T 4.SYS 2.451 .6àé
Within Groups 33.473 52 .644
Total 36.629 54
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Oneway
SEARCH]
DMCHptiVM
N Maan Std. DovlaOoti Std. Error
95% Confldtnco Interval to 
Maan
Minimum MaximumLower Bound UpparBound
1.00 10 i.oAM .W i iAéS 33089 — t a n 2.00 S.o6
zoo 3 3.6667 1.2583 .7265 3409 8.7925 230 5.00
3.00 10 4.1000 1.0220 3232 33689 43311 130 5.00
Total 23 3.9565 S876 3059 33295 43638 130 5.00
ANOVA
SEARCH3
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Between Groupi .490 2 .245 .2 ^ .794
Within Groups 20.967 20 1.048
Total 21.457 22
Oneway
SEARCH2
DMcrlpUvM
N Maan Std. Davlatlor Std. Error
95% Confldanca Interval fo 
Maan
Minimum MaximumLower Bound Uppar Bound
1.00 10 H 5OO 1.4916 4f17 2 O82A t u n 30 5.00
200 3 43333 3887 .1687 3.8182 5.0504 4.00 430
3.00 10 21500 13704 3017 13412 3.0583 .00 4.00
Total 23 28896 13633 3051 23388 33024 .00 5.00
ANOVA
SEARCH2
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
Between Groupi 12.392 2 6.196 3.569 .047
Within Groups 34.717 20 1.736
Total 47.109 22
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Oneway
ADAPT1
DncriplivM
95% Confldanca Interval fo 
Mean
N Moan Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Uppar Bound Minimum Maximum
1.DÔ s 3.9200 .6261 .2800 11426 4Ü 74 16A 4.60
2.00 2 4.3000 .4243 JOOO 4681 8.1119 440 440
3.00 S 3.3333 1J779 .5625 14873 4.7794 1.00 4.60
Total 13 3.7077 1.0412 .2688 3.0785 4J389 140 4.60
ANOVA
ADAPT1
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Group: 1.768 2 .884 .786 48i
Within Groups 11.241 10 1.124
Total 13.009 12
O new ay
LEARN1
OMcriptivn
N Mean StiL Deviatior Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval fo 
Mean
Mlnlmiun MaximumLower Bound Upper Bound
1.00 10 4.1333 4195 4592 3i4f1 4.7196 187 5.00
2.00 3 4.6667 4774 4333 34324 6.1009 4.00 5.00
3.00 9 44333 .7265 4422 3.7749 44918 167 5.00
Total 22 44879 .7439 .1586 34581 4.6177 167 5.00
ANOVA
LEARN1
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groupi .é8é 2 .i44 .598 .56Ù
Within Groups 10.933 19 .575
Total 11.621 21
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Oneway
ANOVA
APPLY4
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups i .4di .944 .407
Within Groups 9.892 19 .521
Total 10.875 21
Oneway
ANOVA
APPLY5
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups .699 2 .350 .691 .SÏ4
Within Groups 9.110 18 .506
Total 9.810 20
APPLY5
OMCdpdVM
N Maan Std. Davfitioii Std. Error
99% Confldofico Intacval to 
Mamn
Wnhnum Maximumt.owaf Bound UpparBound
1.00 16 4.0900 .u a ■ " 3TW USM 44401 3.00 9.00
2.00 3 4J333 .7838 4410 24380 82306 340 5.00
3.00 8 4.4375 .7289 2577 34282 S.048S 3.00 540
TottI 21 4.2381 J003 .1528 34193 44589 3.00 5.00
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N am e
(Please Print)
T he questions below deal w ith the p rob lem  o f  protecting w a te r  quality  in the L ak e  Eucha/Spavinaw 
watershed. This issue is an em erging case  o f  signilicant environm ental policy ch an g e  and innovation faced 
by the C ity o f  Tulsa. T hs survey is designed  to elicit your v iew s on  aspects o f  p o licy  innovation and 
learning in the Lake Eucha/Spavinaw  case. For the purposes o f  th is survey, a  p o licy  innovation is defined 
as “a p ro g ra m  o r  p rac tice  w h ich  Is n ew  to  th e  Im plem enting  in s titu tio n , a n d  w h ich  is evidenced by a 
ch an g e  in s ta n d a rd  o p e ra tin g  p ra c tic e s” .
i. W hen you became aw are th a t you had  a problem  w hich required  a  response, w h a t information d id you 
utilize to specify the exact nam re o f  the problem , and how im portant w as each type?
Please circle a number indicating the relative 
importance o f the following, using the scale shown 
at the right.
v .n r
Im p a rtu l
Som ewàii
In p o ita a t
a. O btained inform ation from  academ ic journals i
b. Obtained inform ation from  m agazine articles I
c. Obtained inform ation from n ew spaper articles I
d. O btained inform ation from  books I
c. Had discussions with experts I
f. Attended specialized w orkshops I
g. Obtained inform ation from  governm ent I 
agencies o ther than my own ( i f  applicable).
h. Obtained inform ation from w ith in  m y ow n 1 
governm ent agency ( if  applicable).
i. Internet Research I
2. How quickly did you becom e fam iliar w ith the problem  (p lease check one)?
0  Onc-two months
□ Tw o-six months
□ Six months to a  year
□
□
M ore than a  year 
Still learning
NoC DW Ml
Im portan t Aw m
3. O nce the nature o f  the p roblem  w as determ ined, how  w ould  you characterize the  ease with which an 
approach toward an initial so lu tion  w as found and adopted?
□ Easily found and  adopted
□ Easily found, had  difficulties adopting
□ D ifficult to find , had  to  design new solutions
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4. O f the following possible reasons for diSiculties encountered while adopting the chosen approach,
please circle a number indicating their relative importance, using the scale shown at right.
V«fT
Im porta it
SofMwbat
Importa#:
N o t DWoot
Im p o r ta n t  A m »
a. Inadequate scientific/technical inform ation
b. U navailable scientific/technical inform ation
c. Lack o f  understanding o f  scientific/technical 
inform ation
d. L ack o f  tim ely scientific/technical inform ation
e. T oo  costly
f. F unding m echanism  unavailable
g. Solution  required “thinking outside the box”
h. C ity  o f  T ulsa bureaucratic structure unable to 
accom m odate solution
1. N ot acceptable to politicians
j. N ot acceptable to public
k. R isk  o f  failure
I. L ack o f  regulatory flexibility
m. N ot enough time to adequately analyze 
scientific/technical information
n. Encountered difficulties interacting with 
o ther agencies/levels o f  government
o. Lack o f  organizational diversity
p. Solu tion  sought too quickly
q. Solution  sought too slowly
r. Lack o f  m edia support
s. Lack o f  recognition
t. F ear o f  not being re.elected
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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s. Using the scale presented below, what is the relative importance o f  the following sources o f  information in the 
search for new solutions.
Very Somewhat Not IM not
Inpcnant Important Important
a. Academic papers
b. Personal interviews with academics I 2
c. Personal interviews with agency petsotmel I 2
d. Federal government sources I 2
e. State government sources
f. Personal experience and opinions I 2
g. Expert opinions/guidance I 2
h. Private contract service
I . Independent field reports
j. Identified similar problem 
and solution elsewhere
k. Internet resources
6. For approaches which were “borrowed" from another location with a similar problem, please rank th
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
importance o f the following in adaptation o f the approach to 
approaches were borrowed, please go to question #7)
•ry
n p o r t u l
a. No adaptation occurred, approach was adopted 
as it was found (Go to question #7)
b. Academic papers
c. Personal interviews with academics
d. Personal interviews with agency penonnel
e. Federal government sources
f. State government sources
g. Personal experience and opinions
h. Expert opinions/guidance 
I .  Private contract service
J .  Independent field reports 
k. Public supportiveness
relative
he problem. (Use the scale presented below. If no
SomcwlMl
Im portaot
Not DWm—
I n p g r ta a l
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7. In your experience with policy innovation, bow important do you find the following 
factors to be? Please rate using the scale 
below. VOT 
l a p o r t u t
S o acw k at
la p o rtu t
Sot
Im p o rta n t A c ttu
a. Cooperation between many agencies 1 
and/or levels o f  government
b. Volunteers 1
c. User fees and market-like approaches 1
d. Flow o f  information and individuals across 1 
organizational boundaries
e. Flow o f  information and individuals across 1 
bureaucratic and political boundaries
f. Planning and analysis as key aspects 1
g. Public support 1
4
4
4
4
6
6
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8. Which of the following factors have you adopted based on your previous experiences, 
and how important are each? Please use
the scale below. Venr SomcwlMf Not DUm
Importait Importait Importait
1 1
I 2 3 4
1
5
1
6
a. Information analysis 1 2 3 4 5 6
b. Information access 1 2 3 4 5 6
c. Information flow 1 2 3 4 5 6
d. Information use 1 2 3 4 5 6
e. Flexible organizational structure 1 2 3 4 5 6
f. Holistic programs 1 2 3 4 5 6
g. Networking 1 2 3 4 5 6
h. Ad-hoc task forces 1 2 3 4 5 6
i. Leadership
9. How important, in your experience.
1 2 3 4 5 6
do you think public support is in the 
ultimate success o f policy? (Please circle 
the correct number using the scale above)
1 2 3 4 5 6
10. If you feel public support is important, please indicate, using the scale below, the
importance o f  each o f  the following factors in motivating public support.
a. Political coalitions 1 2 3 4 5 6
b. Voluntary associations 1 2 3 4 5 6
c. Public awareness/education 1 2 3 4 5 6
d. Political demands on decision makers 
11. How important, in your opinion, is
1 2 3 4 5 6
private sector participation in the ultimate 1 2 3 4 5 6
success o f policy?
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12. If you feel private sector participation is important, please indicate the importance of 
each of the following activities using the scale 
below. Very Im poraat SomewhatImportant
Not Did not
Important Aeecji
a. Providing publicity 1
b. Providing resources 1
c. Providing program piloting/demonstrations 1
3
3
3
4
4
4
5 6
5 6
5 6
13. How important in determining the course 
of policy outcomes are the courts? (Please use 
the scale above)
14. If you feel the courts are important, please rank the importance of the following 
activities, using the scale above.
a. Clarification of ambiguous statutes
b. Deriving legitimacy for new ideas
2 3
2 3
4
4
5
5
6
6
15. How important in motivating policy
innovation are the City Council or regional 1 2 3 4 5 6
governments?
16. If you feel the government is important in motivating policy innovation, please rank 
the importance of the following activities, using the scale above.
a. Development of study committees
b. Proclamations/statutes/ordinances
c. Public hearings
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
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17. What techniques/approaches did you learn from past involvement with policy-making that you are 
using now when confronted with environmental policy questions? (Please check all that apply and indicate 
their relative importance, using the scale at right)
Not Did not
Im p o rtan t Aectu
Very
Im portant
Somewhat
Important
□ Organizational flexibility
o Development o f task forces
□ Scanning to determine how other 
municipalities have dealt with similar issues
Q Recruitment o f technical expertise
a  Accessing external information
o  Discussions with experts
o Attending workshops/conferences
o  Unique funding mechanisms
o Public participation/support
o  Don’t fear failure
□ Intergovernmental interactions
□ Use o f volunteers
□ Single individuals serving in multiple roles
o  Planning and analysis
□ Systems thinking
o  Networking
□ Community involvement
o  Crisis motivates change
a  Other (please specify)___________________
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
3 3 7
The remainder o f this survey asks questions about your professional backgroimd. You 
are under no obligation to complete this portion of the survey if you do not wish to.
18. Please describe your current job function._________________________________
19. Please mark the box which most closely describes your professional 
training/background.
□ Scientist
□ Public Manager
□ Public Official
□ Lawyer
□ Private Manager
□ Other (Please describe)__________________________________
Please indicate the approximate number of years experience you have.20. i
□ 1-3 years
□ 4-6 years
□ 7-10 years
□ 10-15 years
□ 15-20 years
□ Greater than
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Factor Analysis Question 1
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sum s of Squared Loading*
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
i "" 4.077 45.301 4S .I5r 4.6ty 45.301 45.301
2 1.912 21.244 66.545 1.912 21.244 66.545
3 1.047 11.636 78.180 1.047 11.636 78.180
4 .748 8.312 86.493
5 .457 5.081 91.573
6 .393 4.365 95.938
7 .173 1.923 97.861
8 .128 1.424 99.285
9 5.437E-02 .715 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Component Matrfic
Component
1 2 3
oné_A .867
ONE B .773
ONE_C -.875
ONE_D .734
ONE_E .676 .605
ONDE_F .683
ONE_G .720
ONE_H .768
ONEJ .753
Extraction Method: Principal Component An 
a. 3 components extracted.
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Reliability
*** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis ******
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1 .
2 . 
3. 
4 .
5.
6 .
ONE_A
ONE_B
ONE_D
ONDE_F
ONE_G
ONE I
2.9444
2.1111
2.7778
3.4444
4.1111
2.2778
1.7978
1.5297
1.8005
1.7896
1.2314
1.6017
18.0
18.0
18.0
18.0
18.0
18.0
ONE I
ONE A
Covariance Matrix 
ONE B ONE 0 ONDE F ONE G
ONE_A
ONE_B
ONE_D
ONDE_F
ONE_G
ONE_I
2.5654
3.2320 
2.1242 
2.1634 
1.7908 
1.1830 
1.6046
2.3399
1.5556
1.3007
.6340
1.8497
3.2418
1.4575
.9673
1.4771
3.2026
.8301
.9869
1.5163
1.0850
Correlation Matrix
ONE_A ONE_B ONE_D ONDE_F ONE_G
ONE_I
ONE A 1.0000
ONE B .7724 1.0000
ONE D .6684 .5648 1.0000
ONDE F .5566 .4751 .4523 1.0000
ONE G .5344 .3366 .4363 .3767 1.0000
ONE I .5572 .7550 .5122 .3443 .5501
1.0000
R E L I A  B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S S C A L E ( A L P
N of Cases =
Statistics for 
Scale
Mean
17.6667
18.0
Variance
58.1176
N of
Std Dev Variables 
7.6235 6
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Icem-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item
Item
Deleted
Deleted
ONE_A 14.7222 
.8171
ONE_B 15.5556 
.8290
ONE_D 14.8889 
. 8445
ONDE_F 14.2222 
. 8679
ONE_G 13.5556 
.8639
ONE_I 15.3889 
.8428
Scale 
Variance 
if Item
Deleted
37.1536
40.8497
39.6340
42.1830
47.2026
41.5458
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.8091
.7635
.6723
.5477
.5555
.6784
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.7689
.8145
.4846
.3420
.5413
.7227
Alpha
if
Reliability Coefficients 6 items
Alpha = .8676 Standardized item alpha = .8695
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Factor Analysis Question 4
Total Varlanca Explalnad
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadlngi
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative S Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 6.248 31.232 “ l l i J i 8448 31432 31432
2 3.180 15.899 47.131 3.180 15.899 47.131
3 Z163 10.817 57448 2.183 10.817 57.94)
4 1.929 9.845 67494 1429 9.645 87494
S 1.554 7.770 75.383 1.554 7.770 75463
6 1.236 6.180 81443 1438 6.180 81443
7 1.073 5J87 88410 1.073 5.367 86410
8 .873 4.387 91477
9 .477 2.384 93.680
10 J89 1.948 95.606
11 J18 1.591 97.197
12 .222 1.108 98405
13 .189 .948 99451
14 S.708E-02 .335 99488
15 I.915E-02 .248 99432
16 U64E-02 .168 100.000
17 3.691E-16 1J48E-15 100.000
18 I.327E-16 6.637E-16 100.000
19 •1.48E-16 •7J85E-1B 100.000
20 Z94E16 .14725-15 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analyaia.
Component Matifc
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TDTIRTr .801
FOUR_B .766
FOUR_C .716
FOUR.D .729
FOUR_E .521
FOUR_F 407 .670
FOUR_G .669
FOUR_H .601
FOURJ .844
FOUR.J .647 .534
FOUR.K 499 .516
FCUR.L .645
FCUR.M .699 ..513
FOUR_N .778
FOUR.O .612
FOUR.P .691
FOUR_Q
FOUR_R .569 .543
FOUR_S .618 .611
FOUR_T .619
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 
a. 7 components extracted.
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Reliability
»*** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis * * * * * *
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S S C A L E  (A L P H A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. FOUR A 3.4737 1.2635 19.0
2. FOUR 3 3.1053 1.7287 19.0
3. FOUR C 2.5789 1.5390 19.0
4 . FOUR D 2.6316 1.5352 19.0
5. FOUR L 2.2105 1.5121 19.0
6. FOUR P 2.6842 1.4163 19.0
7. FOUR T 1.6316 1.5709 19.0
Covariance Matrix
FOUR_A FOUR_B FOUR_C FOUR_D FOUR_L
FOUR A 1.5965
FOUR B 1.9474 2.9883
FOUR C 1.0994 1.0468 2.3684
FOUR_D 1.3509 1.8187 1.5585 2.3567
FOUR~L 1.0614 1.4766 .9269 .6930 2.2865
FOUR P .9912 1.3684 .9152 1.0994 .8480
FOUR_T .7953 1.0409 1.1696 1.1345 1.3041
FOUR_P FOUR_T
FOUR P 2.0058
FOUR T .7105 2.4678
FOUR_A 
FOUR_B 
FOUR_C 
FOUR_D 
FOUR_L 
FOUR_P 
FOUR T
FOUR_P 
FOUR T
Correlation Matrix 
FOUR A FOUR B
1 . 0 0 0 0
.8916
.5654
.6964
.5555
.5539
.4007
FOUR_P
1 .0 0 0 0
.3194
1 .0 0 0 0
.3935
.6853
.5649
.5589
.3833
FOUR T
1 .0 0 0 0
FOUR C
1 .0 0 0 0
.6597
.3983
.4199
.4838
FOUR D
1 . 0 0 0 0
.2985
.5057
.4704
FOUR L
1 .0 0 0 0
.3959
.5490
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  
N of Cases =
S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
19.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 18.3158 64.7836 8.0488 7
34 4
Item-tocal Statistics
Scale
Mean
Scale
Variance
Corrected
Item- Squared
Item
if Item if Item Total Multiple
Deleted
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation
FOUR A 
. 8 4 3 3
14.8421 48.6959 .8218 .8510
FOUR a  
. 8464
15.2105 44.3977 .7552 .8649
FOUR C 
. 8 6 4 3
15.7368 48.9825 .6236 .6274
FOUR 0 
. 3 5 0 7
15.6842 47.1170 .7264 .7218
FOUR L 
. 3 6 8 4
16.1053 49.8772 .5909 .5591
FOUR ? 
. 8 6 8 5
15.6316 50.9123 .5871 .3677
FOUR T 
.3736
16.6842 50.0058 .5541 .4392
Reliability Coefficients 7 items
Aloha = .8773 Standardized item aloha
Alpha
if
,8801
Reliability
Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis ****** 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
2 .
FOUR_N 
FOUR G
FOUR_N 
FOUR G
Mean
3.1429
3.0476
Covariance Matrix 
FOUR_N FOUR_G
2.7286
1.8929 3.6476
Correlation Matrix 
FOUR N FOUR G
FOUR_N 1.0000
FOUR_G .6000 1.0000
N of Cases = 21.0
Statistics for Mean Variance
Scale 6.1905 10.1619
Item-total Statistics
Std Dev
1.6518
1.9099
Cases
2 1 . 0
2 1 . 0
N of
Std Dev Variables 
3.1878 2
345
Item
Deleted
FOUR_N 
FOUR G
Scale 
Mean 
if Item
Deleted
3.0476
3.1429
Scale 
Variance 
if Item
Deleted
3.6476
2.7286
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.6000
.6000
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Alpha
if
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S
.3600
.3600
S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Reliability Coefficients 
.^Ipha = .7451
2 items
Standardized item alpha = .7500
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Factor Analysis Question 5
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadlngi
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
4 . ^ 41.365 4iSS 4-1 .MS 41.365
2 1.882 17.110 58.475 1.882 17.110 58.475
3 1.249 11.357 69.831 1.249 11.357 69.831
4 1.074 9.759 79.590 1.074 9.759 79.590
5 .881 8.010 87.600
6 .570 5.179 92.779
7 .362 3.288 96.067
8 .210 1.910 97.977
9 .154 1.401 99.377
10 5.982E-02 J44 99.921
11 S.678E-03 7.889E-02 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysle.
Component Matrfic
Component
1 2 3 4
FIVEJf .551 -.584
FIVE.B .842
FIVE.C .828
FIVE_D .791
FIVE.E .876
FIVE_F .699
FIVE_G .817
FIVE.H .507 .744
FIVEJ .889
FIVE.J .671 .578
FIVE_K
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 
a. 4 components extracted.
3 4 7
Reliability
**** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis ****** 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1 .
2 .
FIVE_C 
FIVE 0
FIVE_C 
FIVE D
FIVE_C 
FIVE D
3.6364 
3.7273
Covariance Matrix
FIVE_C FIVE_D
1.1948 
.9437 .8745
Correlation Matrix
FIVE C FIVE D
1 . 00 0 0  
.9233 1.0000
N of Cases = 22.0
1.0931
.9351
2 2 . 0
2 2 . 0
Scatistics for 
Scale
Mean Variance 
7.3636 3.9567
N of
Std Dev Variables 
1.9891 2
Item-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item
Scale 
Variance 
if Item
Corrected
Item-
Total
Squared
Multiple
Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation
Deleted
FIVE_C 3.7273
FIVE D 3.6364
.8745
1.1948
.9233
.9233
.8524
.8524
Alpha
if
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .9540 Standardized item alpha = .9601
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Factor Analysis Question 6
Total Varlanca Explalnad
Initial Elganvaluaa Extraction Sums of Squared Loading#
Componant Total % of Variance Cumulativa % Total % of Variance Cumulativa %
1 3.289 6zÉ9^ 32.893 3.289 3Z893 3ZÈ9j
2 2.536 25.358 58.251 2.536 25.358 58Z51
3 1.326 13.263 71.514 1.326 13Z63 71.514
4 1.283 12.834 84.348 1.283 12.834 84.343
5 .848 8.481 92.829
6 .447 4.470 97.298
7 .190 1.902 99.201
8 S.552E-02 855 99.856
9 1.441E-02 .144 100.000
10 -3.37E-16 -3.367E-15 100.000
Extraction Mathod: Principal Componant Analyaia.
Component Matrfic
Component
1 2 3 4
SIX_B .870
SIX_C .527
SIX.D .581 .503
SIX_E .842
SIX.F ..506 .801
SIX_G ..621 .622
SIX_H ..625
SIXJ .594 .703
SIX_J .652 .554
SIX_K .737
Extract on Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a. 4 components extracted.
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Reliability
»**♦ Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis * * * * * *  
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1 .
2 .
SIX_B 
SIX K
SIX_B 
SIX K
SIX_B 
SIX K
3.4545
3.5455
Covariance Matrix
SIX B SIX K
2.2727
.8273 3.0727 
Correlation Matrix
SIX_B
1 . 0 0 0 0
.3130
N of Cases =
Statistics for Mean
Scale 7.0000
SIX_K
1 . 0 0 0 0
11 . 0
Variance
7.0000
1.5076
1.7529
1 1 . 0
1 1 . 0
N of
Std Dev Variables 
2.6458 2
Item-total Statistics
Item
Deleted
SIX_B 
SIX K
Scale 
Mean 
if Item
Deleted
3.5455
3.4545
Scale 
Variance 
if Item
Deleted
3.0727
2.2727
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.3130
.3130
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Alpha
if
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S
.0980
.0980
S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .4727 Standardized item alpha = ,4768
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Factor Analysis Question 8
Total Varlanca Explalnad
Initial Eigenva was Extraction Suma of Squared Loading:
Component Total % of Varlanca Cumulative % Total % of Varlanca Cumulative %
1----------- Z978 33.089 33.089 id78 33.089 i5.Bi!T
2 1.920 21.329 54.418 1.920 21.329 54.41»
3 1.373 15.259 69.677 1.373 15.259 69.677
4 1.024 11.376 81.053 1.024 11.376 81.053
5 .702 7.804 88.857
6 .464 5.160 94.017
7 .317 3.517 97.534
8 .188 Z088 99.622
9 I.403E-02 .378 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Componant Analyaia.
Componant Matrik
Componant
1 2 3 4
EIGHT A .6id
EIGHT.B .614 .534
EIGHT.C .879
EIGHT D .802
EIGHT.E J22 .643
EIGHT F .739
EIGHT.G .513
EIGHT.H .670 583
EIGHTJ .851
Extraction Method: Principal Componant Analyaia. 
a. 4 components extracted.
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Reliability
**** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis ***** 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
EIGHT_C 
EIGHT D
EIGHT_C 
EIGHT D
4.3158 
4.3684
Covariance Matrix
EIGHT_C EIGHT_D
.8947
.5994 .5789
Correlation Matrix 
EIGHT C EIGHT D
EIGHT_C 
EIGHT D
1 .0 0 0 0  
.8328
N of Cases =
Statistics for Mean
Scale 8.6842
1 . 0 0 0 0
19.0
Variance
2.6725
.9459
.7609
19.0
19.0
N of
Std Dev Variables 
1.6348 2
Item-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item
Item 
Deleted 
EIGHT_C 
EIGHT D
Deleted
Scale 
Variance 
if Item
Deleted
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Alpha
if
4.3684
4.3158
.5789
.8947
.8328
.8328
.6936
.6936
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  
Reliability Coefficients 2 items 
Alpha = .8972
S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Standardized item alpha = .9088
352
Factor Analysis Question 17
Totml VirUnca Explained
Initial Eigenvalue# Extraction Sums of Squared Loading:
Component Total % of Varlanca Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulatives
1 3J33 21348 21349 u u 21349 ■■■3TJ0'
2 3J74 18.746 40395 3374 16.746 40395
3 3.051 16350 57345 3351 16350 57345
4 2J49 13352 70396 2349 13.052 70393
5 1.708 9392 80.089 1.708 9392 60.083
6 1J13 7397 87386 1313 7397 87383
7 J70 5390 92.776
S 373 3.161 95357
9 J17 1.761 97.716
10 341 1339 99.058
11 .170 344 100.000
12 S349E-18 3.836E15 100.000
13 3.828E-18 2.125E-15 100300
14 2.410E-16 1339E-15 100.000
15 I.874E-16 1.041E15 100.000
16 I395E-17 8307E-17 100.000
17 -1.42E-18 •7386E-16 100300
18 -230E-18 -1.809E-15 100300
Extraction Mattiod: Principal Componant Analyaia.
Component MatrBc
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6
SEVTN_A -.788
SEVTN_8 .640
SEVTN_C .508 .604
SEVTN_D .538 .528
SEVTN_E .863
SEVTN_F .753
SEVTN_G .563
SEVTN_H .683
SEVTNJ .867
SEVTN.J -357 .578
SEVTN_K .802
SEVTN_L .627
SEVTN.M .815
SEVTN.N .824
SEVTN_0 -.680
SEVTN_P .747
SEVTN_Q .747
SEVTN_R srr
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 
a. 6 components extracted.
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Reliability
.*»»*Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis **»»♦• 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1 . SEVTN_E
2. SEVTN I
SEVTN_E 
SEVTN I
4.0714 
3.7857
Covariance Matrix
SEVTN_E SEVTN_I
. 6 8 6 8
.4011 .6429
Correlation Matrix 
SEVTN E SEVTN I
3EVTN_E 
SEVTN I
1 . 0 0 0 0
.6036
N of Cases =
1 . 0 0 0 0
14.0
.8287
.8018
14.0
14.0
Statistics for 
Scale
N of
Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
7.8571 2.1319 1.4601
:tem-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item
Item
Deleted
SEVTN_E 
SEVTN I
Deleted
3.7857
4.0714
Scale 
Variance 
if Item
Corrected
Item-
Total
Squared
Multiple
Deleted Correlation Correlation
.6429
.6 868
.6036
.6036
.3644
.3644
Alpha
if
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .7526 Standardized item alpha = .7528
Reliability
***** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis ****** 
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
3 5 4
1.
2.
3 .
SEVTN_B 
SEVTN_M 
SEVTN R
SEVTN_B 
SEVTN_M 
SEVTN R
3.3846 
3.3077 
4.1538
Covariance Matrix
SEVTN B SEVTN M
1.2564
.7885
.6026
2.0641
.6154
1.1209
1.4367
.8987
SEVTN R
.8077
13.0
13.0
13.0
Correlation Matrix 
SEVTN B SEVTN M SEVTN R
SEVTN_B 1.0000
SEVTN_M .4896 1.0000
3EVTN_R .5982 .4766
N of Cases = 13.0
1 . 0 0 0 0
Statistics for 
Scale
N of
Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
10.8462 8.1410 2.8532
Item-total Scatistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item
Item
Deleted
Deleted
SEVTN_B 7.4615 
.6000
SEVTN_M 7.5385 
.7373
SEVTN_R 6.6923 
.6440
Scale 
Variance 
if Item
Deleted
4.1026
3.2692
4.8974
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.6127
.5404
.6124
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.4119
.2923
.4022
Alpha
if
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Reliability Coefficients 3 items
Alpha = .7394 Standardized item alpha = .7658
Reliability
**** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis * * * * * *
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R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  - S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Mean Std Dev Cases
1.
2 .
SEVTN_F 
SEVTN G
SEVTN_F 
SEVTN G
4.3333 
2.9333
Covariance Matrix
SEVTN_F SEVTN_G
.9524
.5952 .7810
Correlation Matrix 
SEVTN F SEVTN G
SEVTN_F 
SEVTN G
1 . 0000  
.5902
N of Cases =
Statistics for Mean
Scale 7.2667
1 . 0 0 0 0
15.0
Variance
2.9238
.9759
.8837
15.0
15.0
N of
Std Dev Variables 
1.7099 2
Item-total Statistics
Scale 
Mean 
if Item
Item
Deleted
SEVTN_F 
SEVTN G
Deleted
2.9333
4.3333
Scale 
Variance 
if Item
Deleted
.7810
.9524
Corrected
Item-
Total
Correlation
.6902
.6902
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
.4764
.4764
Alpha
if
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  
Reliability Coefficients 2 items 
Alpha = .8143
S C A L E  ( A L P H A )
Standardized item alpha = .8167
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removid
Variables Variables
Model Entered Removed Method
1 PJ^OBDEF
• Enter
a. Ai requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error otf 
the Estimate
1 .765* .585 .559 .4555
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR0BDEF1
ANOVA
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression 4.680 1 4.ëéô 22.556 ■■ AW
Residual 3.320 16 .207
Total 8.000 17
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR0BDEF1
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
Coefficient
Model
Unstani
Coeff
dardized
dents
StandardI
zed
Coefficien
ts
t SIg.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 
PR0BDEF1
4.54s
-.413
.278
.087 -.765
16.387
-4.749
.000
.000
a. Dependent Variable: THREE
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Regression
Variables Entered/RemovAd
Model
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
1 • Enter
a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .642* .412 .378 .6093
a. Predictors: (Constant), BARRIER1
ANOV/t
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression 4.426 i 4.4ié 11.923 .003"
Residual 6.311 17 .371
Total 10.737 18
a. Predictors: (Constant), BARRIER1
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
Coefficients
Model
Unstam
CoeffI
dardized
dents
StandardI
zed
Coefficien
ts
t SIg.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 
BARRIER1
4.602
-.431
.355
.125 -.642
"15.à4é
-3.453
.AÔÔ
.003
a. Dependent Variable: THREE
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removèd
Model
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
T....... • Enter
a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable; THREE
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
i ....... .382* .146 .101 .7079
a. Predictors: (Constant), BARR1ER2
ANOV/f
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression 1.623 "" ■' "T 1.623 3.239 .088*
Residual 9.520 19 .501
Total 11.143 20
a. Predictors: (Constant), BARRIER2
b. Dependent Variable: THREE
Coefficients
Model
Unstani
Coeff
dardlzed
dents
StandardI
zed
Coefflclen
ts
t SIg.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 
BARRIER2
4.064
-.212
.385
.118 .382
10.550
•1.800
.000
.088
a. Dependent Variable; THREE
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removëd
Variables Variables
Model Entered Removed Method
1 %pOBDEf • Enter
a. AI requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: TWO
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .080* .006 -.056 1.5859
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR0BDEF1
ANOV#
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression 
Residual 
Total
.259
40.241
40.500
i
16
17
2.515
.'iôi .752"
a. Predictors: (Constant), PR(3BDEF1
b. Dependent Variable: TWO
Coefficient
Model
Unstam
Coeff
dardlzed
dents
StandardI
zed
Coefflclen
ts
t SIg.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 
PR0BDEF1
4.45i
-9.72E-02
.967
.303 -.080
4.ë07
-.321
.000
.752
a. Dependent Variable: TWO
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removed
Model
Variables
Entered
Variables
Removed Method
1 • Enter
a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: TWO
Model Summary
Model R RSquare
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
i .265" .070 .016 <1.6536
a. Predictors: (Constant), EARRIER1
ANOVA
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SIg.
1 Regression 3.51 i i 1.285 .273"
Residual 46.487 17 2.735
Total 50.000 18
a. Predictors: (Constant), BARRIER1
b. Dependent Variable: TWO
CoefRclenfb
Unstandardized
Coefficients
StandardI
zed
Coefflclen
ts
Model B 1 Std. Error Beta t SIg.
1 (Constant) 2.M5 .MS 3.104 .006
BARRIER1 .384 1 .339 .265 1.133 .273
a. Dependent Variable: TWO
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Regression
Variables EnterecVRemovèd
Variables Variables
Model Entered Removed Method
1 BARRIERS . Ënter
a. AI requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: TWO
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .i09« .044 •.006 1.6013
a. Predictors: (Constant), EARRIER2
ANOV/f
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 
Residual 
Total
2.236
48.716
50.952
4
19
20
2.236
2.564
.872 .362*
a. Predictors: (Constant), BAIRRiER2
b. Dependent Variable: TWO
Coefficients
Model
Unstani
Coeff
dardlzed
dents
Standard!
zed
Coefflclen
ts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 
BARRIER2
4.y§3
•248
.871
.266 -.209
6.501
.934
.666
.362
a. Dependent Variable: TWO
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Regression
Variables Entered/Removêd
Variables Variables
Model Entered Removed Method
1 BARRjEàS . Ënter
a. AI requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: TWO
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .110“ .o4ï -.040 1.6277
a. Predictors: (Constant), EARRIER3
ANOVA
Model
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression .ëié 4 .éië .233 .635“
Residual 50.336 19 2.649
Total 50.952 20
a. Predictors: (Constant), BARRIERS
b. Dependent Variable: TWO
Coefficient
Model
Unstani
Coeff
dardlzed
dents
StandardI
zed
Coefflclen
ts
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 
BARRIERS
4.388
-.110 .228 -.110
"'5T(r
-.482
.000
.635
a. Dependent Variable: TWO
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